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 Chapter I The wider setting  
 
Since 1989, five parliamentary elections have been the stage for the foundation 
and demise of political parties aspiring to govern the new democratic Polish state. The 
demise of the AWS before the 2001 elections after ten years of attempts to create a centre-
right core party resulted in a new splintering of the right-wing, and the centre-right became 
again devoid of a pivotal formation. While Eurosceptic parties in average gain 8 percent of the 
vote, in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections Eurosceptic parties gained around 20 percent 
of the vote. In Poland right-wing parties show an unusual propensity for Euroscepticism. The 
persistence and increased importance of nationalism in Poland, which has prevented the 
development of a strong Christian democratic party, effectively explains the levels of 
Euroscepticism on the right. After the autumn 2005 parliamentary elections the national 
conservative party, Law and Justice, formed a governing coalition with the national Catholic 
League of Polish Families, creating one of the first Eurosceptic governments. Although this 
work does not intend to provide a theorisation of party systems development, it shows that the 
context of European integration fostered nationalists’ divisiveness of, and provoked the 
splitting of the right the unusual propensity of parties for Euroscepticism makes Poland a 
paradigmatic case of the kind of conflicts over European integration emerging in Central and 
Eastern European party systems.  
Since the creation of the European Economic Communities in 1956, and in 
particular since the Maastricht Treay, extensive decision-making powers were transferred 
from the national states to the European Union. While in Western Europe the ideological 
conflicts to emerge from this are only now becoming apparent, in the former Eastern Bloc 
these conflicts were vividly apparent just some years after the democratic transition.  
 
Our purpose is to provide a framework for the analysis of the impact of European 
integration in the ideological formation of core party systems in Central and Eastern 
European. The environment of accession to the EU has been challenging for the 
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institutionalisation of the party system core in countries where nationalism is a dominant 
identity, mainly due to the impossibility of hedging conflicts over questions of sovereignty. The 
Euroscepticism of nationalists adds problems and di visiveness among centre-right 
coalescent parties. The growing importance of nationalism on the right makes Poland a 
paradigmatic case of its heigthened divisiveness in the context of European integration.  
Need for adaptation of Marks and Wilson’s cleavage thesis in order to account for 
the independent impact of nationalism, conceptions of political community for the European 
stances of parties. This is particularly relevant for the analysis of the impact of Europe on the 
ideological structuration of the CEE party systems.  
The ideological composition of the core party system as a domestic intermediary 
factor influencing the impact of European integration (in terms of heightened divisiveness). 
Argument: in those core systems where nationalism is an identifying element, European 
integration has an indirect effect on the heightened divisiveness of nationalism. This is most 
obvious in countries where there is a coincidence between the structuration of the core party 
system (in terms of composition of party families) and the process of accession to the EU.  
 
In the ideological vacuum of post-communism, which some have called "the end 
of history",1 a whole new political discourse had to be created. Post-communism is about 
"reinventing politics".2 Besides creating the institutions of a new political regime, new political 
symbols and political mythology had to be conceived. Europe, as the only future-related 
symbol of post-communism, became ever present in the political programmes of parties.3 In a 
paradoxical way, “Europe” offered a valuable substitute for the communist ideology as it is 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
1 Fukuyama, F. (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin Books. 
2 Tismaneanu, V. (1992), Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, London: Macmillan. 
3 Verdery, K. (1999), “Civil Society or Nation? ‘Europe’ in the Symbolism of Romania’s Postsocialist Politics”, in 
Kennedy, M. and Suny, R. Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press; 
Bozóki, A. (1997), “The Ideology of Modernization and the Policy of Materialism: the Day After for the Socialists”, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 13(3): 56-102. 
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constructed upon a comparable dynamic: the promise of moving towards a better future. 
Communist political mythology was build around the belief in the coming of a Golden Era,4 
the perfect world of a classless society. The Golden Era is a significant component of any 
modern political mythology.5 And although “there is very little knowledge, even among the 
elites, of what the EU actually entails, (…) the prospect of membership is sufficient to sustain 
a future, a belief that there is an aspiration”.6 The way support for integration was formulated 
in parties’ founding declarations and electoral programmes revealed the mainly symbolic 
functions of Europe.7  
                                                     
Alongside Europe, nationalism emerged as an equally strong political project 
substantiating the identities of emerging political elites. The structuration of right and left in 
Poland was partially related to parties’ relation to the concept of the nation. Politicians 
assembled all socio-cultural issues – religion, nationalism and civic libertarianism in a single 
programmatic dimension. Poland, even before accession, became a paradigm of the 
ideological conflicts created within political elites by European supranationalism.  
Research objectives 
The monograph contributes to the academic literature on the formation of party 
positions on European integration, and analyses the effects of parties’ normative political 
ethos, including their attitudes towards nationalism. This provides an effective explanation of 
the Europhile and Eurosceptic positions of Polish parties, but it can also offer a powerful 
explanation of the positions taken by Central and Western European political parties with 
respect to European integration. The monograph then analysis the impact of the European 
 
 
 
 
4 Boia, L. (1993), Mythologie Scientifique du Communisme, Caen-Orleans: Paradigme. 
5 Giraud, R. (1986), Mythes et Mythologies Politiques, Paris: Editions du Seuil. 
6 Schopflin, G. (2000), Nations. Identity. Power, London: Hurst &Co, p. 69 
7 The use of general formulations in parties’ manifestoes is normally intended to create a symbology of party identity. 
Pomper, G. (1988), Voters, Elections and Parties: The Practice of Democratic Theory, Oxford: Transaction Books, 
p.400. 
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issue on the formation of the party system core, arguing that the unconditional and 
unchanging Euroscepticism of nationalists hightened ideological disagreements on the right, 
thus contributing to the difficulty in creating a stable core to the party system.   
Chapter outline  
 The book starts by providing a conceptual clarification of the basis of parties, 
both of its ideological and its strategic dimensions. The normative political ethos  
developing a ‘strategic hypothesis The second chapter spells the analytical 
framework that separates and keeps independent the two dimensions of parties’ core 
ideology, the political and the economic. The third and fourth chapters provide the illustration 
for the hypothesis spelled out in Chapter II, describing empirically the formation of parties’ 
normative political and economic ethos, strategies of competition and positioning on 
European integration. Chapter V, based on the analytical framework developed in chapter II, 
formulates the hypothesis that Europe had an unintended divisive impact on the formation of 
the Polish party system core. The impact of the European issue on the structuration of the 
party system is analysed through the interaction between parties’ ethos formation, strategies 
of competition and European stances. Analytical strategies of Europeanisation: This 
hypothesis is then tested in cases where the inconsistency between a party’s ethos and its 
strategies of competition is apparent. The failure to adapt the ethos to a desired strategic 
location and European attitude is taken as evidence of the predominance of ethos over 
parties’ strategies of competition.  
Chapter VI provides a comparative assessment of the framework’s applicability, 
extending to European cases, East and West, the appraisal of the impact of parties’ 
normative political ethos on the formation of their positions on European integration. The 
chapter draws some conclusions on the impact of these on party policy positions 
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Conceptions of parties 
 
The party literature has conceived parties in two fundamentally different ways: 
either as organisations primarily searching to turn their ideological precepts into policies or as 
organisations seeking above all to elect their members into office. These conceptions are the 
foundations of the academic literature explaining the stability and change of political parties 
within democratic systems. Both intend to expose the reasons for the persistence of political 
organisations established at the time of democratic mobilisation and their establishment in 
stable and structured formations with regulated interactions, i.e., party systems. According to 
these two schools of thought, the analysis of individual parties and party systems either 
portray parties’ competitive behaviour as a result of their persistent ideological disagreements 
or as deriving from a competition to attain office. Based on these two traditions, two sets of 
theoretical explanations for parties’ European integration stances emerged. 
 
The policy-seeking tradition  
 
The policy-seeking tradition of political analysis views a party as essentially 
determined by its ideology. However, authors of the office-seeking tradition hold different 
conceptions of ideology and the way it determines parties’ behaviour. One strand follows a 
cultural conception of ideology that follows Weber’s conception of ideology as part of cultural 
conflicts. The other more developed strand conceives ideology as the translation of social 
interests, a conception informing Rokkan and Lipset’s macro-historical theory of party 
formation, the cleavage theory. The authors holding a cultural conception of ideology 
ultimately conceive parties as embodiments of political ideas; ideologies alone carry through 
the party and determine their policy positions. The Rokkanian school sees social groups as 
intermediaries between parties and ideology; parties are essentially linked to social groups 
and their interests. 
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The Rokkanian tradition  
 
According to Lipset and Rokkan, the founding moment of encapsulating social 
divisions into political identities fundamentally determines a party’s ideology and the policy 
choices available to it.8 The process of party formation implies the re-shaping of fuzzy social 
identities into sharper and more defined political ones, strongly binding their authors and their 
organisations to the representation of the social group they first mobilised. The Rokkanian 
approach conceives ideology as deriving directly from interests of social groups. Therefore 
ideologies are conceived as a set of specific set of policy prescriptions aimed at protecting 
determinate social groups. Political parties’ behaviour, and the relative immobility of European 
party systems, is explained by the influence of these constraints, imposed on parties during 
political mobilisation. Ideologies are closely attuned to the socio-economic conditions present 
at the moment of mass enfranchising; the institutionalisation of these interests in parties 
means that they remain a long-lasting element in the structuration of political competition. 
Parties remain deeply bound by the representation of interests long after the enfranchising 
period is over.  
The literature deriving from the Rokkanian concept of ideology and party 
formation has logically focused on the restraining effect of macro-historical circumstances to 
explain the endurance of a party identity through social and political upheavals. “It is only 
through the historical process of mobilisation, politicisation and democratization that any 
specific cleavage acquires its distinctive normative profile and organisational network”.9 
Bartolini and Mair maintain that socio-economic classes provide a closure of the electoral 
market; cultural values are consequently secondary in the creation of political identities. The 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
8 Rokkan, S. and Lipset, S.M. (1967), “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” 
in Rokkan, S. and Lipset, S.M (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: A Cross National Perspective, New York: 
Collier Macmillan.  
9 Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990), Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European 
Electorates, 1885-1985, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
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sociological school maintains that social classes provide a boundary of mobilisation that is 
harder to cross, and political discourses are not crucial to the process of mobilisation.10 The 
focus of this literature is therefore on specifying the social macro-conditions and how they 
determine the mobilisation of parties.11 
This discussion is also linked to the debate concerning the chances of parties’ 
supra-class strategies. Following Rokkan’s assumptions, Przeworski and Sprague describe 
the restrictions imposed by the representation of blue-collar interests on social democratic 
parties trying to extend their appeal. The authors conclude that a fundamental dilemma is 
imposed on social democratic leaders: either to maintain their core constituency or to enlarge 
their appeal. Przeworski and Sprague do not consider the reinterpretation of their class 
appeal as a possible strategy and conclude that social democracy is doomed to loose its role 
of “integration and identification” 12, i.e., to become a catch-all party or to loose its electoral 
pre-eminence.  
Kirchheimer’s description of the adaptation of mass parties to changing 
conditions of political competition, imposed by increased electoral volatility and the decline of 
social identification is equally based on a Rokkanian understanding of ideology. Kirchheimer’s 
catch-all theory implies that parties have to choose between maintaining their ideology, 
translated in the defence of social groups’ interests, and achieving or maintaining electoral 
success. Kirchheimer observes that European mass parties adapted to the decline of social 
identification by shedding their ideological commitments and transforming into catch-all 
parties with an appeal that transcends the social groups’ interests.13 For Kirchheimer the 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
10 Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990), op.cit. 
11 See for example Bartolini, S. (2000), The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980: The Class 
Cleavage, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
12 Puhle, H. (2002), “Still the Age of Catch-allism? Volksparteien and Parteienstaat in Crisis and Re-Equilibration” in 
Gunther, R. et al. (eds.), Political Parties, Old Concepts and New Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 78. 
13 Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems" in Joseph LaPalombara, eds., 
Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. . 
 13
widening of a party appeal necessarily implies severing the link with the particular social 
groups from which ideologies originate.  
 
Party ethos and the cultural conception of ideology 
 
Those authors subscribing to a cultural conception of ideology differ from the 
Rokkanian approach in that they see ideologies primarily as a product of intellectual 
processes and not as a direct translation of group interests in the political sphere. For these 
authors ideology is related to, but not deriving directly from, the social structures. The creation 
of an ideology maybe inspired by the social reality but it always implies an abstracisation from 
the particular social circumstances in which it emerges; it is an intellectual process that is 
partially independent of sociological circumstances. Ideologies are created when certain ideas 
have been abstracticised from their social context. Ideological creators specify “the ways 
social conditions are themselves textualised, structured by basic conceptual distinctions and 
turned into figural elements.”14 Ideologies emerge in circumstances of social change; 
however, ideology, as culture, is produced by actors who choose the central elements of 
reality to be represented.  
The production of ideology consists in a simultaneous articulation of ideas 
corresponding to social and political circumstances and an abstractization of these same 
conditions through the use of representative elements. Although ideologies are linked to the 
historical circumstances on which they are formed, they have an abstract, representative 
nature that allows them to transcend the more immediate situations in which they are 
produced. In the production of these systems of ideas and their institutionalisation a core 
group of ideas remains available to be used in other contexts and times. The process of 
ideological institutionalisation requires the creation of “communities of discourse”, and political 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
14 Wuthnow, R. (1989), Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, and European Socialism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
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parties are one of the institutions that play a crucial role in this process. Therefore, at the core 
of political parties are key conceptions of the political and economic reality determining 
parties’ ideological and policy positions. If a party occupying a policy space disappears the 
policy space previously occupied by it will be up for grabs.  
 
Several authors implicitly or explicitly treated the subject of party formation under 
the prism of a cultural conception of ideology. In his book “Political Parties in Western 
Democracies”, Von Beyme subscribes to the vision that value conflicts, rather than the 
competing interests of social groups, are the basis of political ideology.15 When describing 
party families the author focuses primarily on the intellectual environment of political elites 
rather than on the sociological context of its voters. The literature on party formation 
subscribing to the cultural origins of ideology tends to describe the micro-conditions of party 
formation and focused primarily on the intellectual environment of political elites and the way 
it interacts with the social and political context. Primary examples of this literature are Laitin, 
Kalyvas, and Kitschelt’s descriptions of the formation and transformation of parties and 
ideologies.16 These authors assume that actors are strongly determined by their basic 
assumptions about reality; these conceptions then become crucial for the politicization of 
certain identities, in a particular way, place and time.17 Since these organisational processes 
are costly and electoral victory plays an important role in their consolidation, ideas become 
encapsulated as party identities and are central elements of political competition.  
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
15 Von Beyme, K. (1985), Political Parties in Western Democracies, Gower: Aldershot. 
16 Laitin, D. (1986), Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press; Kalyvas, S. (1996), The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press; Kitschelt, H. (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, p.265. 
17 Kalyvas, S. (1996), op. cit., p.134. 
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The party ethos 
 
Political parties are created to embody political ideas. Parties therefore represent 
in their ethos the central and immutable concepts. A party’s ethos is distinguishable from 
party doctrines, which are applied propositions in the electoral sphere and subject to 
immediate considerations of electoral success. 18 A party’s ethos is a fundamental and 
abstract concept from which other ideological positions derive. Party ethos and party 
doctrines are connected but obey to different logics: the first relates to the long-term party 
survival and the second addresses the more immediate external image of the party.19  
A party ethos limits the party’s ability to adapt to changing conditions of 
competition. Parties can not shed the basic conceptions that provide the coherence of their 
political role in representative and procedural terms. Since the ethos does not derive from 
social group interests but is rather an abstract conception, parties can develop supra-class 
strategies without losing their core ideas.20 Consequently, the response of parties to the 
declining social identification that characterised European democracies in the second half of 
the twentieth century does not necessarily imply the shedding of their core identities. The 
assumption that ideology is derived from an intellectual process rather than being a 
translation of social group interests serves to explain differently the way parties adapt to 
conditions of competition.  
Thus, in light of the cultural conception of ideology, Kirchheimer’s argument that 
the European mass parties’ transformation into catch-all parties has implied a total shedding 
of their ideological commitments does not appear correct. The transformation of European 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
18 Druker, H.M. (1979), Doctrine an Ethos in the Labor Party, London: Allen and Unwin. 
19 Although Gallagher, Laver and Mair consider that classifying parties according to their identities is one of the 
accepted ways of classifying parties, the literature has largely ignored this classification and concentrated on policy 
positions and international linkages. Gallagher, M. Laver, M. and Mair, P. (1992), Representative Government in 
Modern Europe, New York McGraw-Hill, p.181. 
20 This is the debate between, for example, Kitschelt and Przeworski and Sprague on the transformation of European 
social democracy. 
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mass parties into catch-all parties21 did not imply giving up their core ideas. The widening of 
parties’ appeals was not indiscriminate but guided by parties’ origins and value commitments; 
modern parties are therefore not free to adopt any position that potentially increases their 
chances to win votes, as the small variation in policy positions of European parliamentary 
parties in the last fifty years testifies.22  In fact, certain ideologies were always conducive to 
denominational and class parties, like the Italian Christian democrats or the German social 
democrats, showing a tendency towards catch-all strategies since the emergence of mass 
politics. The search for electoral success by the widening of a party’s appeal is in no way an 
exclusive characteristic of European polities in the second part of the XX century. Catch-all 
appeals also derive from the vision of the political environment implied by the core values of a 
party’s identity.  
These conceptions underlie Kitschelt’s analysis of European social democracy. 
While stressing that “the continuity of ideas over time is a critical factor influencing the ways 
parties stake out appeals”23 Kitschelt affirms the possibility of a supra-class strategy. This is 
possible due to a reinterpretation of class; this allowed social democratic parties to succeed in 
maintaining their identity and adapt to the decline of working class identification. The author 
suggests that some social democratic parties were successful in widening their appeal by 
stressing the political dimensions of their ideology and effectively reinterpreting the meaning 
of class while maintaining a commitment to social justice.24 
The view that party change implies the reinterpretation of party ethos is shared by 
Panebianco. Panebianco’s conception of integrated change is congruent with the view that in 
the long-term party change always implies a re-operationalisation of political ethos, 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
21 Kirchheimer, O. (1966), “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems” in LaPalombara, J. and 
Weiner, M. Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
22 Budge, I. (2001), Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments, 1945-1998, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.274. 
23 Kitschelt, H. (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, p.265. 
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organisation and policies. Panebianco and other proponents of integrated party change 
consider that all aspects of parties, be they organisational, ideological or strategic, are 
interdependent.25 The different dimensions are related and change in one aspect is 
constrained by adjustments in another. Therefore party transformation can only be the result 
of “consistent organisational transformations”.26 Shifts in a party’s strategy should also lead to 
a change in its organisational format.27 Panebianco suggests that the reinterpretation of a 
party’s identity can lead to a change in competitive strategy.28 This process can not, however, 
take place in a sweeping manner, and party change is therefore a slow process. 29  
 
Assuming that ideas are in the long-term predominant over strategies results in 
treating political competition in a fundamentally different way from economic competition.30 
The agreement on a set of fundamental values, as a condition for the maintenance of political 
solidarity, is a structural variable of political competition and an impediment to the free reign of 
competitive office-seeking logic.  
The ethos view of parties rejects the vision that parties’ rationality should be seen 
mainly as the attempt to attain office. Political values that are at the core of parties’ identities 
provide actors with a fundamental framework for analysing reality; parties’ rationality is 
primarily bound by this framework of reality. In the words of Przeworski: “Ideas are critical for 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
24 Kitschelt, H. (1994), op. cit. 
25 Janda, K. et.al. (1995), “ Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos” , Party Politics, 1(2): 171-
196 and Panebianco, A. (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 16.  
26 Panebianco, A. (1988), op.cit.  
27 Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994), “ An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change” , Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 6(3): 259-288, p. 283 
28 Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994), op. cit 
29 Wolinetz, S. (2002), “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in 
Contemporary Democracies”, in Gunther, R. et.al (eds.), Political Parties, Old Concepts and New Challenges, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 157-8. 
30 Bartolini, S. (2000), “Collusion, Competition and Democracy, Part II”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (1): 33- 65. 
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explaining the direction in which parties diverge from rational strategies.”31 Therefore, in order 
to deal with the decline of voter-party linkages, parties’ can reinterpret their ethos, but not 
abandon their basic conceptions. A party’s core concepts therefore work as an anchor, 
shaping rather than following the competitive environment.32 As such response to electoral 
defeat is limited by the values informing parties’ core identities. 
The office-seeking tradition 
The pure rationality school  
The conception of parties as unbound by value commitments and free to change 
their policy positions in order to be fit to compete was first formulated by Anthony Downs.33 In 
his An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs states that “parties formulate policies in order 
to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies”.34 Downs applied the 
concepts and methods of analysis of economics to political competition, portraying office and 
its benefits as the equivalents of payments in economic theory. According to this vision, the 
primary goal of parties is winning elections: parties are not locked into policy positions. 
Instead, party elites can manipulate positions in order to maximise support. Parties are 
conceived as ad hoc and loosely bound groups of office-seeking individuals, whose 
ideological preferences are irrelevant for the strategic decisions of the party. Party cohesion is 
assured by the satisfaction of aspirations to office of its members.  
The Downsian view of voters as perfectly elastic consumers, ready to switch their 
vote should an attractive policy offer be made to them, implies that voters’ preferences are 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
31 Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986), Paper Stones: a History of Electoral Socialism, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 224. 
32 Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press; Schattschneider, E. (1964), Political Parties and Democracy, New York: Holt, p.64. 
33 Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row. 
34 Although Downs treats ideology as instrumental and as a rational short-cut to policy position, he also considers 
that party ideology should contain a degree of internal and external coherence. However, this idea is never included 
in the model since it would undermine its own foundations. Downs, A. (1957), op. cit., p.28. 
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seen as exogenous to the process of party competition.35 Therefore voters participate and 
vote based on utilitarian considerations of the expected policy output of a party. Modifications 
to this analysis of voting motivations have been suggested by schools named as “subjective 
Downsianism” and “social Downsianism”. Subjective Downsianism maintains that rather than 
an objective and rational assessment of voting and policy utilities, it is the perceived utilities 
and perceived probabilities of influencing the policy outcomes of elections that motivates 
elites and voters. Social Downsianism considers that belonging to social groups reinforces 
individuals’ appreciation of voting utility.  
The view that office attainment is the fundamental motivation of politicians and 
the utility output of a certain policy the main consideration for voters, suggests that the form of 
party organisation is unimportant in the short- and the long-term; organisations can be 
adapted to office-seeking considerations in order to win office at all or almost all levels at 
which elections take place (local, regional or national). Parties are therefore weakly 
hierarchical organisations that function more as coalitional structures, broad enough to 
embrace different social groups and give the party a chance of winning a majority.  
Downs’ office-seeking party vision was developed through an immensity of 
literature, encompassing both theoretical models and empirical work on party positions and 
the dimensionality of the political space. Based on the premise that competition for office 
determines the content and stability of party policies, the literature on the formal modelling of 
party policy positions grew considerably.36  
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The bounded office-seeking school 
 
Although inspired by Downs’ conceptions of parties as office-seeking 
organisations, most authors of this school now considers that political actors act in an 
environment that constrains their options. Constrains are formulated mainly as to how the 
institutional set-up influences parties’ choices. Therefore, scholarship advances by 
formulating how attaining office is embedded in a set of institutional constraints. Parties act 
within an institutional set-up, the political regime, which fundamentally determines their 
opportunity structure and therefore influences their strategies. The degree to which parties 
are voter maximizers and the manner in which they compete are therefore fundamentally 
determined by the institutional environment and parties’ strategic decisions are deeply 
affected by the institutional constraints they act in.37  
The most obvious institutional constraints on parties’ behaviour are electoral 
systems. Electoral systems provide different degrees of distortion on the translation of votes 
into parliamentary seats.38 Distortions are larger in single-member districts than in 
proportional representation. In systems of proportional representation party strategies are 
also dependent on district magnitude, electoral thresholds and the system of seat allocation.39 
Electoral systems therefore oblige parties to act strategically in order to maximise the number 
of seats obtained. Electoral systems also determine to a large extent whether the system is a 
two-party, three-party or a multiparty system, and this determines the structure of incentives 
in the attainment of office and coalition politics.40 According to this literature, the type of party 
appeals, whether stable or changing, narrow or broad, are to a large extent predetermined by 
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the conditions of competition.41 In multiparty systems the complexity of coalition politics 
determines that vote maximisation is not the sole consideration parties should take in 
consideration when staking out appeals; rather, considerations related to coalition bargaining 
are equally important considerations. 
The process of coalition formation is also determined by the format of the regime, 
i.e., whether parliamentary or presidential. Müller and Strøm argue that party strategies are 
constrained by the way legislative seats are transformed into bargaining power, i.e., the 
process of coalition formation. If legislative seats translate directly into coalition bargaining 
power, in a more single-minded way parties will try to maximise votes, for example by 
developing a catch-all strategy.42 If, on the contrary, coalition bargaining is subject to other 
factors, these will constrain the way a party develops its electoral strategy.43 Equally, the 
greater the differential between office benefits when in office and in opposition, the more 
strongly parties will pursue office. Majoritarian systems, by excluding a large number of 
parties from office, encourage a starker fight for votes than more inclusive systems where 
governmental participation is enlarged to a wider set of players.44  
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 Theoretical approaches to the determination of parties’ 
European attitudes 
 
The policy-seeking tradition 
 
The study of parties as actors in European integration is a relatively recent strand 
of the study of European politics. Simon Hix and Christopher Lord were the first to research 
the field by analysing parties’ European positions in the context of the European party 
families.45 Stating that parties’ European attitudes are relatively stable phenomena, their work 
suggests a linkage between support and opposition to European integration and the 
established European party families. However, Hix and Lord do not theorise the linkage 
between party families and a party’s European positions; parties are organised in party 
families mainly to expose the differences in terms of European attitudes within party families.  
The first attempt to determine parties’ European attitudes through their ideological 
positions was carried out by Gary Marks and Carole Wilson. These authors started by testing 
party divergences in the perception of economic integration deriving both from the position of 
the parties  in the economic left-right scale and the national states degree of welfare support 
in relation to the European average. Marks and Wilson established that party strategies are 
weak explanatory variables and consider that “political parties (…) have an interest in 
blending the issue of European integration into existing patterns of party competition”.46 
Parties’ attitudes towards European integration would depend on their perception of the EU’s 
contribution to their preferred economic regime. A social democratic party in a relatively liberal 
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national economy is expected to become more pro-European as the EU increases its 
regulatory competences. An economically liberal party is expected to become progressively 
less enthusiastic as economic integration goes beyond the single market template in 
regulating the market. This first analysis, based on economic criteria, largely ignored the role 
of political values in determining attitudes towards European integration.   
In their 2002 article, Marks, Hooghe and Wilson revise their stance by empirically 
testing the relative weight of the political-cultural axis of competition against the left-right 
economic axis in determining parties’ European positions. The authors conceptualise the New 
Politics axis as an agglomeration of policy positions, on one side being the Green, Alternative 
and Libertarian (GAL) positions, on the other the Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist 
(TAN) ones. Despite the multidensionality of the axis, the authors conclude that it is the 
nationalist component of the axis that makes parties European positions so consistent with 
the GAL-TAN axis. Proximity to the TAN pole is the strongest factor determining parties’ 
attitudes towards European integration.47 Although Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s article 
stresses the importance of the political dimension, in the Introduction of the Special issue of 
Comparative Politics Marks and Steenbergen eventually hedge their position by asserting that 
the predominance of the political dimension is inconsequential since the two dimensions 
normally fuse and can be considered part of the same left-right economic dimension.48  
Although asserting the importance of the political dimension of party ideology, 
Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s theory is based on a multi-variable statistical analysis pitching 
parties’ ideologies and strategic positions against each other. This methodological approach 
results in a theory that is too simple to account for parties’ responses to European integration. 
By classifying parties through a two-dimensional typology serving as the basis of an 
explanation of parties’ European attitudes, the theory developed in this thesis attempts to 
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result in a more precise prediction of party positions on European integration and a basis to 
understand parties’ rationality.  
 
The office-seeking tradition 
 
Downs’ spatial analysis predicts that a party’s strategic behaviour is primarily 
determined by its office-seeking efforts. As a means to maximise vote parties tend to adopt a 
centripetal behaviour and a centrist position in the policy space. When excluded from 
government, parties devise centrifugal tactics that serve as a way of creating effective 
opposition to the government. Deriving from the premise that a party’s primary objective is 
achieving office, two theories of party attitudes to European integration were devised.49 First 
Paul Taggart and then Nick Sitter conceived Euroscepticism as part of the opposition tactics 
of competition, and Europhilism as linked to a strategy aimed at increasing the chances of 
attaining government. Parties permanently or temporarily excluded from governmental office 
take Euroscepticism as a way of marking their opposition to central government, both in 
systematic and in a sporadic way. If parties are essentially seen as vote-and office–seeking 
institutions, the fundamental motivation of a party when devising policy positions is the 
maximisation of its chances of achieving office. It is the logic of vote and office-seeking that 
determines parties’ European positions. The fact that European integration is a process 
essentially driven by national governments makes it logical that parties of power maintain a 
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Europhile attitude. In reverse, Euroscepticism has become a “touchstone of dissent”50 from 
mainstream politics, a way of marking opposition to the government. 
The difference between Taggart and Sitter’s position hinges on Taggart’s 
conception of opposition not only as a condition of strategic location in the party system, but 
also as a result of parties’ ideological extremism. Sitter, on the other hand, formulates a 
theory of party positions on European integration based solely on the dichotomy between 
government and opposition. Also, while Taggart considers that only parties outside the central 
cartel express Eurosceptic positions, Sitter proposes that any party excluded from 
government at a particular point in time is bound to take Eurosceptic positions.51 Both Sitter’s 
and Taggart’s theories are based on locational variables; Taggart, however, by stating that 
Euroscepticism is the “touchstone of dissent”52 does not imply that centrifugal tactics provoke 
Euroscepticism. The author merely maintains that populism is at the origin of both 
Euroscepticism and centrifugal strategies. Populism results in both an ideological aversion to 
centrist politics compromises and to the EU’s supranational mode of decision-making.53 The 
author does not specify the relations between strategies of competition, ideological factors 
and Euroscepticism. Sitter ascribes Euroscepticism only to a rational opposition tactic, and 
states that a party exclusion from governmental office, and its subsequential centrifugal 
strategies, is the primary cause of Euroscepticism.  
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Conclusion 
 
Despite the efforts for ideology-based and strategy-derived explanations of party 
positions on European integration, a satisfactory account of the causes of party European 
attitudes is still absent.54 This seems to derive partially from a conception of parties as the 
translators of economic conflicts, which results in the simplification of ideology as the left-right 
axis, 55 partially from the use of multivariate statistical analysis that makes it impossible to 
account for heterogeneous causality.  
In the attempt to achieve a better explanation for party positioning in the 
Euroscepticism-Europhilism continuum I develop a new typology of parties as translators of 
intellectual value conflicts. The core concepts at the centre of parties’ ideologies are the long-
term determinants of parties’ positions on European integration. This theory also attempts to 
overcome the pitching of ideology against strategy by conceiving of an interaction between 
the two factors and European integration. 
The ethos theory of parties’ responses to European integration is a contribution in 
theoretical understanding to party-based support and opposition to the process of the 
unification of the continent. The thesis also presents a new scale of parties’ European 
attitudes. Despite the decreased importance of their representative functions a party is still 
guided by the core value embodied in its identity. This thesis also aims at contributing to the 
general study of parties with an understanding of party’s rationality is bounded by certain 
conceptual understandings of the political and economic realities; parties try to act 
strategically within these boundaries. Achieving office is therefore intrinsically linked to 
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realizing the goals inscribed in the conceptions of political and economic basic units deriving 
from the cultural and intellectual environment of the party’s elite and remains a fundamental 
determinant of party’s policy positioning. Constituting the party’s core identity, these concepts 
provide long-term consistency to their doctrines by constraining the policy options of the 
elites.  
 28 
Chapter II The Explanatory Framework 
 
This chapter proposes a new conceptualisation of parties and uses it to explain 
party positions on a newly-defined Europhile/Eurosceptic scale. Contrary to other ideological 
explanations of parties’ European attitudes,56 the ethos theory classifies parties according to 
their political and economic ethos rather than their policy positions. Also, he explanation of 
party responses to European integration developed here considers the independent impact of 
a party’s political and economic dimensions on its European attitudes.  
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section presents the theoretical 
framework of a party’s European attitudes by re-conceptualising Von Beyme’s notion of party 
family as the explanation of a party’s responses to European integration. It equally proposes a 
new conceptualisation of the Euroscepticism-Europhilism scale and a section with 
propositions on the necessity and sufficiency of different conditions. In the second part 
Qualitative Comparative Method (QCA) is presented as the methodology used to test party 
positions on European integration.  
 
Paarty ethos and the mapping of ideological space  
Scholars typically depict parties’ ideological stances on a left-right axis, which 
associates the socio-cultural and economic dimensions into one single continuum. While 
authors define the two dimensions in purposefully different ways, most define the dimensions 
of political competition as a continuum agglomerating ideological positions with no particular 
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link but parties’ attempt to offer an attractive package easily appreciable by voters.57 
Following the Rokkanian tradition, these authors view party ideology as the reflection of social 
groups’ preferences. 
This agglomeration of policy issues results in a definition of the cultural dimension 
of party competition that previledges one particular view of the nature of policy stances. While 
the economic divide is consensually defined as a continuum of positions along the 
redistributive–liberal economic dimension, several authors propose different definitions of the 
socio-cultural dimension. While Marks, Hooghe, and Wilson define the vertical axis as the 
continuum between a green, alternative and libertarian pole (GAL) and a traditional, 
authoritarian and nationalist pole (TAN), in their Post-Communist Party Systems Kitschelt 
et.al. define it as a continuum of socio-cultural ideological positions stretching between an 
authoritarian and a libertarian pole.  
 
The typology of parties I propose here differs from these conceptions of 
ideological space in two ways. The first difference results from envisaging party ideology 
primarily as the intellectual positions of an elite group on the relations between the individual 
and the political community. I therefore see parties as embodiments of these fundamental 
conceptions rather than as translations of socio-cultural values and economic interests in the 
political sphere. From these core elements parties derive other ideological positions. The 
ideological space is therefore composed of types of parties differently combining the political 
and the economic ethos. 58  
Secondly, the conception of ideology as the regulator of the political relationship 
between the individual and the community also results in a different definition of the vertical 
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dimension of competition. In effect, most attempts to characterise the ideological space follow 
Inglehart’s conceptualisation of the vertical axis as a reflexion of variance in socio-cultural 
values along a materialist/post-materialist continuum. Following a Rokkanian conception of 
party ideology, Inglehart conceptualised the ideological space as the transaction of societal 
conflicts into the political sphere.59 In contrast I conceive this axis of competition as an 
independent reflecting the different attitudes parties take on the nature of political community, 
including attitudes towards nationalism.  
The typology of political parties developed here appears to add to Marks, 
Hooghe, and Wilson’s GAL-TAN axis or Kitschelt’s dimensions of competition as an 
explanation of parties positions on integration because it replaces an agglomerate of socio-
cultural conceptions with a more fundamental way of distinguishing parties. Parties’ 
ideological positions derive from a ‘genetic code’ of conceptions that serve as the 
interpretative key to the political environment. Parties thus possess political "mental maps"60 
through which they chose their ideological positions. Liberal’s conception of the political 
community as the civil society results therefore in a liberal vision of culture that sees a variety 
of lifestyles as an acceptable and desirable feature of society. From the nationalist definition 
of political community derives a conservative vision that attempts to preserve the past culture 
and society. The class vision of the political and economic communities results in a libertarian 
view of culture and social interactions. Parties are ultimately "communities of discourse" 
sharing basic conceptions of the political reality.61 Since the creation of such communities has 
“high start-up costs and learning effects”62, their definition is expected to be largely stable. 
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The basic values informing a political identity are therefore structural elements of political 
competition.63 
Parties’ genetic codes differ not only in their content but also in the relative 
importance of the economic and the political conceptions. Some are based on an economic 
concept, i.e., the definition of the economic community, others on a value conflict of a political 
nature, i.e., the definition of the political community. This results in some parties being more 
deeply entrenched in the political dimension and others in the economic dimension of their 
ethos. For example, the socialists’ political identity derives from the economic conflicts 
between work and capital; therefore the socialists’ ethos is based on an economic definition of 
a basic social unit; while the Christian democrats’ identity is essentially formed by the value 
conflicts between secularism and a conception of political community based on Catholic 
universalism.  
By distinguishing and keeping separate the political and the economic 
dimensions of parties’ ideologies and replacing a one-dimensional continuum by a two-
dimensional classification, this typology differs equally from the widely accepted left-right one-
dimensional view of political attitudes and ideologies.64 Inglehart first conceptualised the 
socio-cultural dimension separate from the left-right economic dimension,65 but eventually 
considered that the two should be assimilated in one single axis.66 This proposition was 
adopted by most authors, on the assumption that a synthesis of the political and economic 
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dimensions worked on the functional level, since it enabled political competition to be 
simplified into either a dichotomy of “left-libertarian” and “right-authoritarian” positions. 
However, this single dimension does not appear to explain the structuration of parties in the 
European policy space.  
 
A typology of party ethos 
 
The table below describes the combinations of political and economic 
communities constituting the variety of party types present in Europe. Each party type holds 
one of the dimensions as central to its identity; the other, although secondary, maintains a 
separate and independent impact on a party’s policy positioning. Contrary to the left-right 
conceptualisation which assimilates the new politics dimension into the left-right economic 
axis, this typology maintains the political and the economic ethos separate.67 The political 
ethos is the conception of the political community, the basic unit of a polity that delineates the 
parameters of the parties’ responses to phenomena affecting the political relationship 
between the state and its citizens. The economic ethos is the conception of the economic 
community, the basic unit of economic relations defining the preferred national economic 
regime.  
To define the content of the political and the economic ethos of European 
parties68 I derive from the literature on European parties a description of the basic 
communities at the core of each party type. The social democrats’ identifying coomunity is the 
economic class. Social democrats are therefore committed to the elimination of differences 
among classes by counteracting inequalities stemming from structural positions in the labour 
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market and protecting low and minimum income groups.69 Adapting to the globalisation’s 
limiting impact on the opportunities for demand-side strategies70, social democrats moved to 
policies “addressing the physical and social organization of production and the cultural 
conditions of consumption in advanced capitalist societies”.71 The social democrats’ 
cosmopolitanism derives from their definition of economic classes as the fundamental 
community of economic and social activity.  
Christian democracy encompasses those parties whose ideology translates the 
Christian message into a political programme.72 Although the autonomy of confessional 
parties from the relevant churches has been achieved to a greater or lesser degree in 
different countries, the reference to a religious conception of the fundamental political 
community remains the essential element of those parties’ identity.73 Catholic social doctrine 
inspires the choice of the family as the basic economic community. Consequently, Christian 
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democrats conceive the welfare state as “aiming at ameliorating the sufferings resulting from 
market inequalities but not at replacing or changing market conditions”.74  
The liberal parties’ basic unit is the individual human being. Liberals promote the 
individuals’ right of free economic and political association in the market and the civil society. 
While in their formative period liberal parties’ main goal was the achievement of political 
reform, as a consequence of long-term adaptation to the structure of electoral competition, 
the individual’s capacity to act in a sovereign manner in the market-place became their 
dominant identitary trait.75 
Among European parties conservatives’ identity is the least consistent and the 
most adaptable to changing political and economic circumstances. Conservatives were 
created in the attempt to protect endangered institutions such as the church and the 
monarchy. However, although conservatives initially opposed liberals in both political and 
economic terms, several factors, among which the socialists’ electoral success, led 
conservatives to progressively adopt economic liberalism and opposing the development of 
the state’s redistributive role. Conservatism in contemporary Europe combines the definition 
of the nation as the political community and the individual as the economic unit.76  
Nationalists’ fundamental political community is the nation, and the nation-state’s 
sovereignty the party’s highest value. The national economy is conceived as a closed system 
that can be insulated from the international market by protectionist policies.77 The corollary of 
these two propositions is that states’ external relations are dominated by the need to preserve 
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the national sovereignty. Nationalists’ focuses on these aims create a very contentious 
international environment where the capacity for cooperation is limited.78 
Agrarian parties hold the estate as their identifying concept. In the nineteen-
century the notion of estate implied that the monarchy granted landowners special rights and 
privileges.79 In the context of democratic mobilization the agrarian movements used the 
concept of estate to imply that landowners were entitled to institutionalized support by the 
state. Contrary to the concept of class, estate does not imply the self-consciousness of a 
common social identity, therefore agrarian parties do not a priori conceive of a political ethos.  
Ecologist parties owe their identity to the conception of the ecological system as 
the primordial economic community. Ecologists are therefore sceptical of the methods and 
objectives of economic liberalism: economic growth through the mastery of nature.80 
Ecologists’ political ethos is cosmopolitan and derives not only from the view that the 
ecological crisis has a global dimension, but also draws from the concept of universal justice 
at the core of peace movements from which several European ecologist parties derived from. 
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 Table 1. Party types’ political and economic ethos  
The dominant ethos is marked in bold. 
 Political 
Conception of Community 
Economic Conception of 
Community 
Social 
democrats 
Class based  
cosmopolitanism 
Class. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on a class basis 
Christian 
democrats 
Religious cosmopolitanism Family. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on a family and 
residual basis 
Liberals Civil society 
cosmopolitanism 
Individuals. Acceptance of market 
capitalism.  
Conservatives Nation Individuals. Accept market capitalism  
Nationalists Nation  Nation. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on the basis of the 
nation 
Agrarians No a priori conception  Estate. Compensate for the failures of 
market capitalism on the basis of 
estate 
Ecologists Ecological system 
cosmopolitanism 
Ecologic System. Compensate for the 
failures of market capitalism on the basis 
of the ecological system 
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Conceptualising strategies of competition:  
Centrist parties 
 
Party centripetalism is an office-seeking strategic behaviour with the objective of 
gaining office and retaining it throughout several elections. Centripetal parties choose a mode 
of moderate competition that implies a fight for the centre position in the axis, where the 
majority of the votes are cast, through the use of moderate propaganda tactics and 
consensual politics.81 Following Capoccia’s classification of anti-system parties, I classify 
centripetalism as a behavioural concept, by separating ideology from behavioural strategic 
considerations.82 Centripetal parties are those that compete through the themes of the main 
axis of competition, adopt a pivotal role for coalition making, accept that role by another party 
and promote the values in which the political regime is founded. Centripetal parties are 
regime-builders and relational centrism is operationalised through a general evaluation of a 
party’s coalition and propaganda strategy, rather than its location in the ideological space. In 
the event that this axis is not yet stable, centripetal parties are those shaping it. In cases 
where the party system is overcrowded with parties, and due to the exclusivity of office, a 
centripetal strategy implies that parties assume a pivotal role in the creation of large 
coalitions.  
Other ways of classifying competitive party strategies stem from the proposition 
that ideologies can be the source of competition within a multi-party system. In these 
classifications parties are grouped through the content of their ideology and policy positions, 
and the degree of their ideological extremism is analyzed. Traditionally, anti-democratic 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
81 Downs, A. (1956), op. cit.; Daalder, H. (1984), “In Search of the Center of European Party Systems”, American 
Political Science Review, 78(1): 92-109, p. 99. 
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ideologies were the touchstone of anti-systemic party stances.83 However, the decline of 
explicitly anti-democratic ideologies like fascism and communism, and the difficulty in finding 
an uncontested definition of democracy, has meant that ideological anti-democracy is no 
longer a conceptual equivalent to an anti-system stance.84  
 
Polarising parties  
 
Capoccia defines polarising parties through the disentanglement of Sartori’s 
definition of anti-system parties, by downplaying the ideological aspects of the concept. 
Capoccia’s more refined typology of parties’ behaviour combines ideological and relational 
aspects of the concept and offers a new variant of anti-system party, the polarising party. 
Although not ideologically anti-systemic the polarising party is defined by its opposition to the 
party system centre. The assessment of relational anti-systemness is based on a general 
evaluation of a party’s coalition and propaganda strategies, rather than its location in the 
ideological space.  
A polarising party “adopts isolationist strategies, tends to build a separate pole of 
the system, refuses to enter coalitions (at the national level) and resorts to outbidding 
propaganda tactics, systematically opposing and discrediting some founding values of the 
regime, on which all other parties agree.”85 Contrary to the typical anti-system party, which 
combines location and ideological anti-systemness, i.e. an incompatibility with the democratic 
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ideological referents, the polarising party does not present a clear-cut opposition to 
democratic values.  
 
A scale of party responses to European integration  
Taggart and Szczerbiak define Hard Euroscepticism as the fundamental 
disagreement with the “entire project of European political and economic integration”. A 
party’s hard opposition to European integration is therefore tightly defined. In opposition, Soft 
Euroscepticism is defined as the “contingent or qualified opposition to European 
integration”,86 i.e., it encompasses any type of criticism of the EU while not distinguishing 
between a positive and negative appraisal of European integration. In 2000, while attempting 
to refine the meaning of Soft Euroscepticism, the authors distinguished between “policy 
Euroscepticism” and “national interest Euroscepticism”, and consider that the two categories 
not only are not mutually exclusive but are also compatible with support for the European 
project.87 
Attempts to improve Taggart and Szczerbiak’s scale with a more precise 
definition of Soft Euroscepticism added a second dimension to the principled opposition to the 
EU by distinguishing between principled and functional support or opposition to the EU. While 
Kopecky and Mudde’s typology define this second dimension as the assessment of “the 
general practice of European integration”,88 Conti’s scale defines functional attitudes as the 
compatibility between the national goals and European integration while principled attitudes 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
86 Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2001), “Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of 
Central and Eastern Europe”, Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association, 10-12 April, 
p.5-6 
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result from a fundamental and unmediated support/opposition to the values of European 
integration.89  
My criticism of these scales is twofold. First, while Kopecky and Mudde’s 
classification results in a typology that is unfit to be translated in a scale of a decided positive 
or negative evaluation of European integration, all the previous classifications follow the 
parties’ attempts to hedge their fundamental opposition to integration by assimilating the 
party’s distinction between values and practices of integration into a scale of European 
attitudes. Second, all these authors conceive the value of European integration as an 
unmediated good and assume the existence of a primordial European identity.  
Considering this assumption unrealistic, I propose a scale of support and 
opposition that takes the nation-state as the primordial framework of identity of European 
elites and masses. Support for the EU is a function of the promotion of national goals.90 The 
two fundamental attitudes, Euroscepticism and Europhilism, are defined as a perceived a 
priori incompatibility or congruence between the national interest and European integration. 
Borrowing from Taggart and Szczerbiak’s terminology, a distinction between Hard and Soft 
positions nuances the categories. Soft indicates the placing of conditions on the fundamental 
and a priori relationship between national interest and European integration, and Hard 
indicates an unconditional support or opposition to European integration. A Soft Eurosceptic 
party deems that despite the a priori assumption of opposition between national interest and 
European integration, under certain conditions these could eventually coincide. By contrast, 
Soft Europhilism considers that the a priori correspondence between European integration 
and the national interest might be overridden by the non-fulfilment of certain conditions by the 
EU. 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
89 Conti, N. (2003), “Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case”, EPERN 
Working Paper, 13. 
90 This assumption is substantiated by Eurobarometer data showing that support for the EU is closely related to 
citizens” perceived benefits for furthering domestic interests. Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, Citizenship and 
Governance in the European Union, (London, New York: Continuum, 2001).  
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 Party’s ethos as determinants of positions on European 
integration 
 
A scale of party response to European integration  
The definition of Euroscepticism and Europhilism here adopted as the basis of a 
scale of positions on European integration reflects the idea that parties evaluate the EU 
based on their original identitary framework, the nation state, where they are established 
institutionally and in terms of identity.91 Support for the EU is a function of the promotion of 
the national interest, defined by each party according to its identifying concept. The decisive 
difference between a party that supports and one that opposes European integration is the 
perceived a priori congruence between the national interest and European integration. 
Eurosceptic parties perceive European integration as a priori incompatible with the national 
interest.  
Euroscepticism and Europhilia are qualified, according to Taggart and 
Szczerbiak’s distinction, between conditional and unconditional, or soft and hard, stances on 
Europe.92 A soft Eurosceptic party considers that despite the opposition between the national 
interest and European integration, under certain conditions the two may coincide. In contrast, 
hard Euroscepticism is an unconditional opposition to integration. Soft Europhilia admits that if 
the EU does not fulfil certain conditions, European integration will clash with the national 
interest. Hard Europhilia is an unconditional support for integration. Parties holding soft, 
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conditional stances, will be more prone to revise them, whereas hard stances are more 
resistant to change.  
 
Our basic argument is as follows: parties evaluate the EU based on the concepts 
of political and economic communities at the core of their ideology. The political and 
economic dimensions vary in salience across party types. While the economic dimension 
drives the social democrats positioning on European integration, the Christian democrats’ 
political conception determines their evaluation of Europe. In addition, political and economic 
responses to European integration differ in nature. Indivisible political concepts, at the core of 
Christian democrats or nationalists’ identities, provide the foundation of an unconditional 
evaluation of the EU. Therefore, parties based on political conceptions do not change their 
attitudes. Parties based on economic conceptions will do so if they modify their evaluation of 
the EU’s economic regime.  
Right-wing Euroscepticism is a European-wide phenomenon, but in Poland right-
wing parties show an unusual propensity for opposing integration. The persistence and 
increased importance of nationalism in Poland, which has prevented the development of a 
strong Christian democratic party, effectively explains the levels and persistence of 
Euroscepticism on the right. Although the fluidity of the Polish party system challenges its 
suitability for testing ideological hypotheses, Polish new parties, despite their short-term 
existence, inherit rather than create a new identity, which suggests an underlying ideological 
continuity qualifying Polish parties to illustrate the three hypotheses below: 
1. That a party identified by a political concept bears an unconditional attitude 
towards European integration – hard Euroscepticism or hard Europhilia (H1). 
2. That a party identified by an economic concept bears a conditional attitude 
towards European integration - soft Euroscepticism or soft Europhilia (H2).  
2.1. That when the secondary political concept reinforces the economic evaluation 
of integration, a party’s conditional attitude turns unconditional – hard 
Euroscepticism or hard Europhilia (H2.1).  
 
The first hypothesis proposes that political evaluations of integration give rise to 
unqualified attitudes of support or opposition that are stable over the long-term. As scholars of 
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European integration have long argued, the chief consequence of European integration is the 
weakening of the authority of the nation-state. The degree of political authority granted to a 
non-state, the EU, puts into question the supremacy of the nation-state model as the basis of 
political identity. These parties thus consider European supranational democracy and 
governance unconditionally a priori, as for or against the national interest, despite their 
considerations of the EU in economic terms.  
Hypothesis 2 states that if an economic concept is a party’s identifying 
community, its appreciation of integration depends on whether this party sees the EU as 
detrimental or beneficial to achieving its main goal. Economic concepts are divisible and 
quantifiable; therefore, an economic appreciation of integration is conditional, since one can 
conceive to approximate an economic regime by degrees. As the impact of the EU policy 
regimes on the national economic regime varies from country to country, differences in the 
evaluation of the single market also exists among parties sharing the same identifying 
element. Moreover, since the regulation of the single market according to a liberal or a social 
democratic model, is an open question,93 a party can alter its appreciation of European 
economic integration over time, thus responding to the evolution of a specific EU policy 
regime.94  
Hypothesis 2.1 asserts that if a secondary nationalist conception of the political 
community corroborates a negative economic evaluation of Europe, it will reinforce a party’s 
Euroscepticism, turning its opposition to the EU unconditional and permanent (i.e., hard 
Euroscepticism). Likewise, if a cosmopolitan political stance corroborates a positive economic 
evaluation of integration the party’s stance will harden in the opposite direction, (i.e. hard 
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Europhilia), and the party will be a stable supporter of integration. Table 2 summarizes the 
argument and applies it to party types.  
 
Party responses to European integration. 
The use of the ethos concept to understand a party response to European 
integration is spelled in this table. 
Table 2. Party responses to European integration, accounting for different evaluations 
of economic integration.  
 Unfavourable 
European Policy Regimes 
Favourable 
European Policy Regimes 
Social Democrats Soft Euroscepticism Hard Europhilism 
Christian democrats Hard Europhilism Hard Europhilism 
Liberals Soft Euroscepticism  Hard Europhilism 
Conservatives Hard Euroscepticism  Soft Europhilism  
Agrarians Euroscepticism Europhilism  
Nationalists Hard Euroscepticism Hard Euroscepticism 
Ecologists Soft Europhilism Hard Europhilism  
 
The placement of liberal parties on the scale of European attitudes is decided by 
the parties’ evaluation of economic integration. If the Single Market is seen as promoting 
market liberalism, liberals are Europhiles. However, when conceiving the EU’s regulatory role 
as impeding the good functioning of the free market, liberals will be Soft Eurosceptics. The 
liberals’ cosmopolitanism is derived from the idea that individuals should be free to associate, 
and that civil society is the basis of political legitimacy. Liberals’ cosmopolitanism, as a 
second order factor, determines that their Euroscepticism is Soft and their Europhilism 
unconditional.  
As a mirror image of the liberals, the social democrats’ placement on either side 
of the scale of support to the EU is determined by their conception of economic class as the 
fundamental element of identity. Social democrats are permanently engaged with the 
elimination of differences among classes by counteracting inequalities stemming from 
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positions in the labour market.95. Whenever a social democratic party perceives the EU as a 
market opening enterprise which undermines the redistributive role of the state, social 
democrats are Eurosceptic. If the EU is seen as the promoter of regulated capitalism, social 
democrats become supporters of integration. The social democrats’ class-based political 
cosmopolitanism, being a secondary element in the political identity of these parties can lead 
them to adopt a conditional scepticism or an unconditional Europhilism. 
Agrarians and ecologists have also tended to favour European regulatory 
policies, but their definition of the EU’s desirable policy regime is more limited than that of 
social democrats. Agrarian parties will be Europhile if they consider that European integration 
fosters the protection of farmers and Eurosceptic if European integration is considered as 
harming the protection of farmers. Therefore, by extending the CAP provisions to the new 
states of the EU has been the condition of the Central and East European Agrarian parties’ 
support for European integration. Since Agrarians have no determined political identity, the 
definition of their political ethos will depend on the circumstances of their mobilisation. 
Ecologists are Hard Europhiles if EU-harmonised environmental standards are perceived as 
more restrictive than the national environmental standards. 
Since conservative parties are not a priori determined by economic liberalism or 
political nationalism,96 conservatives are the parties with the widest range of attitudes on the 
EU. The conservatives’ attitudes towards European integration are not only dependent on 
which economic regime the EU is seen as promoting, but also on which faction predominates 
within the party. If nationalism is the party’s structuring value, conservatives will be Hard 
Eurosceptics. If the party identity is dominated by economic liberalism it will define its position 
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based on an evaluation of the EU as a market liberalising agent, and normally adopt Soft 
Europhilism. 
Christian democratic and nationalist parties are largely immune to evaluations of 
the European integration’s impact on domestic economic regimes. Christian democracy 
unconditionally supports integration. The reluctance of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine to 
accept the nation as the ultimate political community led Christian democrats to promote 
staunchly European integration in the post World War II period, and ever since Christian 
democrats have been the most consistent Hard Europhiles. The nationalists’ belief in the 
nation as the basic political community determines the priori opposition between the parties’ 
perception of national interest and European integration, unless the EU‘s governance reverts 
to an intergovernmental mode. Nationalists have therefore considered European integration 
as unconditionally incompatible with the national interest.  
Parties’ preferences concerning European integration  
 
From the analytical framework presented above, I derive parties’ preferences on 
the course of European integration. These preferences are drawn from the set of goals 
constituting each party’s ethos. Therefore, a party is likely to support the EU if the Union 
develops features that help the party to attain its fundamental goals. The table bellow 
summarises each party preferences for the development of European integration.  
The present theory also explains why parties whose identities rely primarily on 
political values are more entrenched in their European positions. The supranational character 
of European integration is its intrinsic feature, and more political integration will not 
substantially change the supranational character of the EU. The unquantifiable and immutable 
nature of a political concept makes its reinterpretation difficult. The immutability of both the 
nature of political integration and the party’s political ethos makes the European positions of 
these parties both unconditional and irreversible.  
Economic evaluations of European integration are also both sufficient and 
necessary conditions for parties whose identity is based on economic values. However, the 
hardening or softening of these positions will be determined by the political ethos of the party. 
While parties might base their Europhilism or Euroscepticism on the compatibility of the EU 
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economic regime with a party’s economic values, this attitude will be conditional or unqualified 
depending on the party’s political ethos. The column on economic conditions for European 
integration also shows that economic attitudes can more easily change since these depend 
on the development of the EU’s policy regimes, and not on the EU’s political nature. 
 48 
 Table 3. Parties’ preferences concerning European integration 
 Political 
Preferences 
Economic 
Preferences 
Christian Democrats European supranational 
integration  
Policy regimes favouring mild 
regulated capitalism 
Liberals European supranational 
Integration 
Achieving the single market  
European neo-liberal 
capitalism 
National conservatives Inexistent Inexistent  
Economic conservatives Low level of supranational 
integration 
Achieving the single market  
European neo-liberal 
capitalism 
Nationalists Inexistent  Inexistent  
Social democrats Supranational integration in 
support for European market 
regulation 
European Regulated 
Capitalism;  
Fiscal coordination 
Ecologists Supranational Integration  Policy regimes providing a 
high level of environmental 
protection  
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 Interactions between ideology, European positions and 
core formation  
The troubles caused by nationalism and euroscepticism in a forming core: 
heigthening fundamental ideological divisions and the European issue strenghening divisions 
among liberals, christian democrats and nationalists, making the formation of a unified centre 
right harder to attain.  
Methodology 
 
Progress in finding the causes of parties’ European attitudes has been mainly 
achieved through empirical enquiry.97 The determination of the causes of parties’ European 
attitudes has so far largely turned to one or a handful of individual case-studies or has used 
variable-oriented statistical analysis. While the case-oriented analysis are weak on external 
validity, variable-oriented analysis fail to take into account multiple or conjectural causation, 
i.e., when recurrent events may be caused by any of several circumstances or combinations 
of circumstances. Theoretical disagreement between proponents of strategic and ideological 
explanations has also been linked to the choice of methods. When variable-oriented 
methodological approaches have been chosen, the hypotheses were tested in a way as to be 
pitched against each other.  
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Attempting to overcome this tendency, I adopt the logic of Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to approach the testing of the theoretical propositions advanced 
above. This methodology was developed by Charles Ragin to deal with causal heterogeneity 
while using small numbers of cases.98 This method allows surmounting the divisions between 
case-oriented and variable-oriented research by treating cases as configurations of 
theoretically relevant combinations of features. QCA is used both in the theory-building 
process and in theory-testing since it focuses not so much on discarding causes as weak 
explanations, but on attempting to establish which combinations of causes and which single 
causes are sufficient or necessary to determine causality.  
Basic to Qualitative Comparative Analysis are the logic of qualitative comparison 
systematized by Mill, termed the methods of agreement and of difference.99 Mill’s method of 
agreement is the search for a single common condition among cases having the same 
outcome. Such conditions can be relevant to a discussion of necessity. The method of 
difference is the search for a single distinguishing feature among cases disagreeing on the 
outcome – i.e., experimental design. While both may be important to the discovery of 
connections between phenomena, only the method of difference is reliable for substantiating 
causality.  
The main new element provided by QCA is set-theoretic algebra, which provides 
the formalisation required to apply Mill’s logic reliably. The original formulation of QCA uses 
crisp (or Boolean) sets, implying that cases are either inside or outside a given category. The 
QCA makes possible a dialogue between the theory and the data, leading to conceptual 
clarification and adjustment by connecting the features of a single case with the patterns 
displayed across cases. QCA is therefore a method that serves well the purpose of theory 
building, since it helps to adjust one’s propositions of causality.  
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Ragin’s 1987 book also launched the first serious debate about causal necessity 
and sufficiency, as well as making it possible to identify the so-called “chemical reaction”, i.e., 
identify when variables lead to an outcome only when in each other’s presence. The first step 
in the theory-building exercise is the putting forward of theoretically-based propositions about 
necessary and dependent conditions. Factors which are either present or absent for all cases 
with a given outcome may, if corroborated by other knowledge, be considered relevant to 
claims about necessary conditions for that outcome.100 Propositions about sufficient 
conditions can be explored by identifying causal configurations which are present for at least 
one case with that outcome but in none of the cases with a different outcome. 101 A further 
step is to identify theoretically interesting dichotomies of variables and identify cases that can 
be analysed.  
 
The empirical material  
 
The party ethos is a qualitative and discreet category that can be judged from the 
analysis of party documents. The basic concepts determining the fundamental ideological 
setup of a party can be deduced from the analysis of party documents, in particular those 
produced in the early times of their formation. Naturally, it is in founding declarations that 
parties define their identity, and these are the primary sources of party ethos. When parties 
do not produce a founding declaration the party’s first election manifesto tends to replace it 
and spell out the party’s positioning in the ideological space. When the reassessment of a 
party’s identity takes place, for example with changes of leadership or critical congresses, 
parties also tend to produce documents in which they reaffirm their identity. Party congresses 
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documents, election manifestoes and other publications are therefore also part of the 
empirical material of this thesis.  
A liberal attitude to the choice of party material therefore implies a break with the 
rules set out by the European Party Manifesto Project. The Manifesto Project defines as 
usable party manifestos and platforms those that are a “recognizable statement of policy 
which has the backing of the leadership as the authoritative definition of party policy for that 
election”.102 This implies that only programs, platforms and other documents that are 
produced immediately preceding the election are legitimate empirical material.103 Following 
Harmel and Janda’s criticism to the Manifesto Programme I use a wide range of party 
documents, press analysis and interviews to determine a party’s ethos, its strategies and 
positioning on the Europhile-Eurosceptic axis.104 “The Manifesto data themselves are not very 
useful for establishing the party’s actual positions on any of the issues that together constitute 
its issue profile (…) or at least not precisely enough to be useful in studying changes in issues 
positions.”105  
To determine the concept defining the parties’ political and economic community 
(and not only the relative intensity of the party positions) a judgemental approach to the data 
was chosen. Party documents, interviews and press were then organised so as to justify the 
classification of parties’ ethos. Since parties exist in a historical context, the analytical 
narrative appeared to be the best way to present party material and depict the evolution of 
parties’ ethos and strategies while exposing its qualitative context.106 To gather the contextual 
understanding of parties’ ideological definition I conducted interviews with members of the 
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leadership of the main parties and carried out a survey of the main newspapers and news 
services. Being more flexible than discourse analysis or any quantitative methods, the 
analytical narrative integrates the evolutions of ethos and strategies with the evolution of 
parties’ creation, mergers, splits and demise, all being relevant to determining the causes of 
parties’ attitudes towards European integration.  
 
Classification Criteria 
 
There are three generally accepted party classification criteria: programmatic 
identities, “issue positions” and membership in international parties’ organisations.107 The first 
criterion refers to a categorisation that presupposes that parties can have a similar “genetic 
code” emanating from the circumstances of their birth or from the intention of representing 
similar interests. Programmatic identities refer to the normative propositions of a programme; 
they are about general values. The method of issue positions or policy similarity categorises 
parties according to the similarity between the policies pursued by one party to those pursued 
by another party. The third method of classification, through cross-border organisational 
linkages, became more relevant in Europe after the creation of party groups in the European 
Parliament.  
The present classification follows the method of programmatic identities; 
classifying parties according to their organisational linkages appears inappropriate as 
international linkages are created frequently for instrumental purposes rather than to reflect 
parties’ values and policy positions. The fact that the European party groups have tended to 
sacrifice their identity in order to increase their power in the European Parliament108 shows 
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that the membership in a party group can be misleading in indicating what individual parties 
stand for.  
Since the theoretical framework relies on an abstract level of ideology, the party 
ethos, as an explanation for party’s European choices, Polish parties are classified through 
the criterion of programmatic identity. Despite the constant flux of the Polish party scene and 
the de-consolidated nature of parties’ organisations109 ideological identities appear 
remarkably constant. Following the demise of a party it is very common that another 
organisation appears to take its ideological space. This indicates a rather strongly 
consolidated ideological space. Therefore it appears pertinent to classify Polish parties 
according to their positioning in the ideological space, i.e., through their self-definition of the 
political and economic communities. In cases where the consolidation of an identity is not 
achieved or a previously agreed identity is under threat I point to the divergent factions’ 
definitions of the political and economic identities.  
Case Selection  
 
The focus on the Polish case, a whole party spectrum, the strategic variables can 
be understood in the context of the party system, on the interaction between the variables and 
its impact on the party system. Within the Dmowskist interwar tradition, when nationalism was 
often justified in religious terms, Polish conservative and nationalist parties referred almost 
obligatorily to Catholic moral values as part of the definition of national identity.110 The Polish 
party system the political dimension structures party competition. Polish parties can be clearly 
distinguished between those based on political and those based on economic values. This 
sharp division is visible in that those parties based on political or economic issues dedicate 
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their political documents almost exclusively to issues of that nature. This makes its analysis 
very rich in insights on the kind of conflicts caused by European integration in such party 
systems. The strength of nationalism as a political identity, and the way Polish ideological 
inheritance mixes nationalism and Catholicism, makes Poland an extreme case illustrating the 
interaction between nationalism and European integration,.111  
It is important to note that the conclusions on the level of party system are limited 
to cases with resembling background conditions, i.e., the mobilisation of nationalism. In party 
systems where economic issues structure party competition, nationalism is less prone to be a 
sufficient condition for Euroscepticism and disrupt the building up of centrist coalitions,. In 
countries where nationalism is absent or very weak, other effects, like economic opposition to 
integration, can emerge as an important cause of Euroscepticism. There are, however, 
indications that this background condition is becoming more common, not only in Central and 
Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe.  
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 Chapter III Explaining right-wing European attitudes  
 
This chapter maps the development of right-wing parties in Poland over a period of 
fifteen years, from 1989 to 2005. It describes the several stages of party ideological formation 
over five legislative elections, classifying them according to their core ideologies, strategy of 
competition, as well as tracing their European stances. During the period under investigation 
the Polish right-wing underwent sweeping changes, from a period of extreme fragmentation 
culminating in the 1991 elections (when 29 parties entered parliament), to a period of bipolar 
competition between 1997 and 2001. The gradual consolidation of the party system up to the 
2001 elections was then partially reversed.  
The evolution of the right-wing party spectrum can be understood as a series of 
attempts to find a common denominator that could serve as a basis of identity to a party 
occupying the centre right space. Such efforts were made against the backdrop of Solidarity’s 
dissolution, and the necessity to reconcile different ideological traditions within it. The chapter 
uses extensive empirical evidence to describe the formation and demise of political parties on 
the right of the political spectrum. Despite the volatility of party organisations among 
nationalists, the nationalist ideology, particularly its Catholic national version, has proven the 
most enduring. The predominance of national Catholicism inhibited the 1991-1993 and in 
1997-2001 attempts to create a Christian democratic party based on cosmopolitan religiosity.  
The resilience of nationalism also contrasts with the decline and failure of political 
liberalism to survive as a significant ideology on the centre-right. After the 2001 elections the 
supremacy of nationalism as a party identity is defied only by economic neo-liberalism, with a 
nationalist and liberal conservative party occupying a divided centre-right space. The change 
of the right-wing party scene in 2001 resulted in the demise of Christian democrats and 
political liberals, and its replacement by conservative parties primarily or secondarily identified 
by nationalism and liberalism.  
 The chapter assesses the impact of the identifying dimension on a party response to 
the European issue, investigating whether the Polish right-wing parties’ identifying ideological 
dimensions drive their positions on European integration. Distinguishing parties based on 
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economic concepts, that respond conditionally to European integration, from those identified 
by political issues, that respond to integration in an unconditional manner, seems particularly 
useful in the Polish case, due to the predominance of political concepts as identifying 
elements of the Polish right-wing. 
 
Stages of Polish relationship with the European Union 
 
Polish integration in the EU went through several stages. As time went by and 
accession became an increasingly concrete prospect, the process became an exercise of 
legislative transposition and of negotiating the terms of accession. The Commission became 
the monitoring body of the candidate states’ progress in fulfilling the EU’s conditions. One can 
therefore identify the formal stages of Polish relationship with the EU based on the degree of 
commitment and conditionality of the EU.  
The first stage of Polish relations with the EU lasted from the first elections in 
August 1989 to the ratification of the Europe Agreements in early March 1992. During this 
phase the EU did not make any formal commitment to the eventual integration of Poland and 
the relation between the two parties was to a great extent still open. The second phase was 
initiated by the ratification of the Europe Agreements and the first clear statement of EU 
commitment to the integration of Poland, which took place in the 1993 Copenhagen Council. 
The third stage started with the EU’s decision to open negotiations with seven of the 
accession countries in September 1997. This third phase was characterised by strong 
conditionality and the EU becoming an important issue of domestic politics. The last phase 
started with the ratification of the accession treaty in May 2004 and full integration of Poland 
in the European institutions.  
The changing institutional context of Polish relations with the EU saw the 
replacement of the symbolic clout of Europe by a more concrete assessment of its real-life 
implications. This had a strong impact on Polish public evaluation of accession. As the end of 
the millennium approached public support strongly declined.  
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First Phase: from 1989 to the Europe Agreements 
 
The 1989 elections initiated the first phase of Polish relations with the EU. Taken 
by surprise by the fall of communism in the Soviet satellite states, Western leaders answered 
with a mixture of grand rhetoric and considerable caution regarding the future shape of the 
European order. For two years Poland and the other Central European states were eager to 
obtain security guarantees from the West, but the European institutions and Member States 
were not prepared to promise future membership of the Western institutions. Despite the 
rhetoric of the West European leaders, it took considerable effort for the EU to concede to 
further economic and trade relations with Poland and the other Central and Eastern European 
democracies. 
On 19 September 1989 Poland signed the agreement for trade co-operation with 
the (then) European Community (EC). That agreement was not only the basis for further 
relations but also a starting point for future negotiations on the subject of association with the 
EC. Such an intention was expressed by Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his 
speech in the European Parliament in February 1990. On 19 May 1990 Poland officially 
applied to start negotiations for an association agreement which subsequently started in 
December 1990. In June 1991 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski 
declared in the Polish Parliament that Poland was determined to become a member of the 
European Community. Financial assistance was then provided through the Poland and 
Hungary Aid for Reconstruction in Europe (PHARE) programme, and help was targeted at 
helping Poland and Hungary make the transition to market economy.  
In the early nineties “Europe” was the political myth driving the transformation of 
the country. Public support for integration was almost unanimous, and accession to the EU 
was synonymous with democracy and market economy.  
 
Second Phase: from the ratification of the Europe Agreements (1992) to the opening of 
negotiations. 
 
Signed in December 1991, the trade parts of the Europe Agreements were 
ratified in March 1992. They were a bilateral agreement between the member states and the 
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EU, on one side, and Poland, on the other side. 112 Despite their political provisions (there is a 
title on political dialogue as well as one on cultural, economic and financial cooperation), the 
Europe Agreements were fundamentally a free trade agreement in which the trade barriers to 
imports from the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) were to be eliminated 
earlier than the imports from the EU to the CEEC. They foresaw a gradual opening over 10 
years resulting in a free trade zone. The Agreements also foresaw anti-dumping measures 
and provisions on state aid and established the creation of Association Councils to regularly 
control the implementation of legislation.  
However, to the dismay of the Polish political elite, the Agreements substantially 
limited free trade to industrial products, while trade in services and agriculture was subject to 
strong restrictions. The restrictions to trade in agriculture were particularly badly taken by 
Poland as the EU appeared oblivious to the economic crisis caused by shock therapy and did 
nothing to mitigate some of its effects by opening its market to Polish agriculture and steel 
products.113 The first Polish experience of negotiations with the EU was therefore marked by 
a strong protectionist attitude by the EU member states that seriously hampered the 
development of a cooperative spirit between the negotiating parties.114 The Europe 
Agreements were also modest in political terms, establishing only a limited form of political 
cooperation.  
It was only at the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 that membership was 
acknowledged as the goal of the integration process.115 The Copenhagen Council also 
established the basic criteria for membership of the EU. The first set of criteria concerns the 
establishment of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
112 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Poland, Official Journal of the European Union, L 348 , 31/12/1993. 
113 Sharman, J. (2003), “Agrarian Politics in Eastern Europe in the Shadow of EU Accession”, European Union 
Politics, 4(4): 447-471. 
114 Mayhew, A. (1998), Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe, 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 
 60 
and respect for and protection of minorities, the second a functioning market economy and 
third the preparedness of the EU for enlargement.116 The conditions were designed to 
minimize the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically burdensome 
to the EU, and to ensure that the countries joining were ready to meet all the EU rules, with 
only minimal and temporary exceptions.  
After Poland officially became a candidate state in 1994, its relations with the EU 
changed significantly. The EU became referee as well as player in the accession process. 
Since all three Copenhagen criteria are very broad and open to considerable interpretation, 
they were translated into detail during the negotiations, creating the perception that criteria for 
accession were a moving target. During this phase the Commission became the central 
institutional interlocutor for Poland and the other candidate states. While the EU set the 
criteria, the Commission “put flesh on the bones” by determining their more precise 
content.117 For example, in 1995 the Commission issued a White Paper on the Single Market, 
which outlined primary and secondary tasks and provided a hierarchy of the large number of 
tasks implied by its conditions. As arbiter of the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission also 
gained further powers in its relationship with the candidate states. This meant that the Polish 
political elite had a subordinate relationship with a technical and bureaucratic body with the 
power to determine policy outcomes.118  
                                                                                                                                                       
During this phase public support for European integration remained substantially 
high, with 77 percent of the population supporting accession in June 1994 (the year that 
Poland formally submitted its application). Support peaked at 80 percent in May 1995. 
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Third phase: the accession negotiations  
 
Another formal stage of Poland's relations with the EU started with the 
Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, where the member states accepted the 
Commission's opinion to invite five states to start accession talks.119 The negotiation process 
started on 31 March 1998, when the first sitting of the International Accession Conference 
took place. After the meeting, screening sessions began to determine the extent to which 
Polish law was in accordance with community law, followed by the two parties developing 
position papers for each issue.  
The negotiations for accession were characterised by tightened surveillance of 
the progress of candidate states by the Commission. The Accession Partnerships were 
created to monitor progress, and provided a direct lever on policy-making by setting out a list 
of policy priorities.120 The Commission then reported on applicants’ progress in meeting each 
priority every autumn, laying down short- and medium-term priorities in each issue area, thus 
providing a clear ranking to guide allocation of resources in applying the Copenhagen 
conditions. 
The opening of negotiations also implied reorientation of the PHARE programme 
to focus on pre-accession priorities.121 The whole relationship of Poland with the EU thus 
became focused on preparing for accession. PHARE was now a strategic and financial 
instrument for preparing for accession, its chief aim being to prepare candidate state 
administrations to absorb Structural Funds after accession. 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
119 Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, 11-12 December 1997, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm. 
120 Grabbe, H. (2002), “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire”, op. cit. 
121 Bailey, D. and de Proppis, L. (2004), “A Bridge Too PHARE? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity Building in the 
Candidate States”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(1): 77-98 
 62 
The dynamics of EU accession were altered in 2000 after the Helsinki European 
Council (December 1999) endorsed a change in accession conditionality.122 Countries moved 
at different speeds within the negotiation process, no longer opening the same negotiating 
chapters around the same time but rather following their progress in implementing the acquis, 
as judged by the Commission. This principle of differentiation meant that the better-prepared 
countries could move faster through the chapters of the acquis than their slower neighbours. 
countries that started negotiations later were even able to overtake candidates from the first 
group that fell behind.  
The differentiation between candidates had an important impact on Polish-EU 
relations. In early 2000, after the Commission had issued an unfavourable report in the 
autumn of the previous year, the Polish press made failure of the government to implement 
legislation an important political issue. The immediate and visible results that unfavourable 
reports by the Commission had in closing negotiating chapters became a chief liability of the 
AWS government. Governments had to strike a balance between appearing to protect the 
national interest in the negotiations and efficiently managing the legislative transposition.  
Obviously, certain negotiation chapters were subject to stricter public and political 
scrutiny than others. Of particular sensitivity were those relating to agriculture and the free 
movement of labour. Informal negotiation linkages emerged between the transition period on 
land acquisition by foreigners and the transition period on the freedom of labour, creating a 
conundrum only solved by the change of negotiation position brought by the new government 
after 2001. Being the most controversial, the agricultural chapter was negotiated last. The 
drama intensified as the Commission announced in January 2002 that farmers in candidate 
states would not receive full agricultural subsidies for the first nine years of membership and 
would initially be paid only 25 percent of what farmers in members states received in direct 
payments in the first year, increasing incrementally in the following years. This not only 
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violated the principles set by the government but also emerged as a touchstone issue during 
the negotiations endgame, only being resolved during the Copenhagen Summit in late 2002. 
The settlement on agricultural subsidies resulted in a mixed subsidy system in which higher 
production-based grants would only be given to farmers whose products are subsidized within 
the EU.  
During the period in which the negotiations progressed the opinion polls observed 
a decline in public support for integration to 55 percent in March 2002. Simultaneously, a 
significant segment of anti-EU opinion began to emerge with the number of opponents 
increasing from only 6 percent in 1994 to 29 percent in 2002. Polish public opinion seems to 
have interpreted the conditionality inherent in the negotiations as a sign of an unequal 
relationship between Poland and the EU. For example, several surveys found that 60 percent 
of Poles (including 50 percent of those who supported Polish EU membership) believed that 
the country would be a second class member when it joined the EU, while only 30 percent 
thought that it would join with full membership rights.123 Also, in the late nineties, as the 
government pressed the EU for an “accession date”, public support for an “as fast as 
possible” accession declined.124 
Taking opinion polls at face value, saliency of the European issue for Polish 
voters was, as for other European voters, relatively low. For example, a July 2001 Pracownia 
Badań Społecznych (PBS) survey found that only 4 percent of respondents cited EU 
membership as one of the issues that would have the greatest impact in determining which 
grouping they would support, coming in seventh (last) place.125 Similarly, a July 2001 Pentor 
survey found that, when asked which three election issues were important to them, only 7 
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percent chose EU membership.126 However, despite the low salience attributed to the 
European issue by respondents in the opinion polls, some authors argue that the European 
issue was in the 2001 elections a proxy of other issues, and party European attitude has 
determined voters’ sympathies towards right-wing parties.127 
 
Fourth phase: the end of the negotiations, the European Constitution and accession 
 
Poland, together with the other candidate countries, completed accession 
negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty was 
signed in Athens in April 2003. In May 2004, fifteen years after breaking free from communist 
rule, Poland became a full member of the EU. By the time of accession the EU was a different 
institution from the one Poland first applied to in 1992. The conditions of membership, i.e., 
participating in the decision-making process of the future Union had already been shared with 
Poland, when during 2002 and 2003 it was asked to participated in the European Convention 
to prepare the Constitutional Treaty. In the midst of adverse popular opinion, the Polish 
government accepted a compromise that would unblock the deadlock in European 
negotiations. This happened at the December 2003 EU Summit, when against the majority of 
the public opinion and all opposition parties, the Polish government accepted revision of the 
previously acquired voting rights at the Nice Intergovernmental Conference for a voting 
formula that took into account a double majority and appeared to leave Poland less control 
over the legislative outcomes at the Council of Ministers. The membership of Poland in the 
EU altered fundamentally its status and eliminated the perceived asymmetry of the power 
relations between the EU and Poland, giving the latter a sense that it could exert influence, 
and not only to obey to the will of the European institutions.  
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The accession to the EU, the discussions on the European Constitution, the 
referendum on accession and the elections for the European Parliament did not affect the 
level of public support for EU membership. Opinion polls showed this to remain stable at 
around 55-60 percent while the level of opposition remained at around 25 percent.128  
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 Christian democracy  
 
Christian democratic parties are carriers of the idea that Christians, independently 
of their nationality, are the fundamental political community. The autonomy of confessional 
leaders from the church hierarchy was a necessary condition for Christian democratic parties’ 
formation in the XIX century.129 However, until World War II, Christian political action was 
mainly about defending the privileges of the church in response to attacks from socialists and 
liberals.130  
In the post II World War, when Christian democracy replaced nationalist parties in 
several European countries, Christian democratic parties distanced from their respective 
churches and stated that no specific political programme, particularly in the economic sphere, 
could be derived from the Christian faith. However, a tension remained between the parties’ 
autonomy as political actors and the preservation of their confessional character. In order to 
solve this dilemma Christian democrats redefined their confessional nature in a way that did 
not discard Catholicism but contested the Catholic Church’s monopoly of religious 
interpretation while embracing liberal democracy. 131   
Christian democrats’ ethos is predominantly political: the definition of the political 
community based on the conception of religious cosmopolitanism based on shared faith 
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across national borders. As a consequence, Christian democracy is reluctant to treat the 
nation-state as the natural political unit.132  
Christian democrats’ core ideology holds the family as the fundamental economic 
unit. Christian democrats’ econcomic beliefs are distinct both from socialists who see the 
class as the criteria to correct market inequalities and from liberals’ belief in the market as the 
perfect distributor. Christian democrats, although acknowledging the need for the welfare 
state, do not conceive it as an instrument to alter the social order, on which families are 
based, but rather as a safety net. Deriving from the tradition of Christian charity and Catholic 
social doctrine, Christian democrats propose creating transfers “aiming at ameliorating the 
sufferings resulting from market inequalities”133 and not at replacing or changing the structural 
conditions of market competition. Therefore, the expansion of state transfers created by 
Christian democrats tends to reproduce the disparities stemming from positions in the labour 
market, rather than reducing them.  
 
Liberalism 
 
Liberal parties are a product of Enlightenment, agents in the fight for democracy 
against the powers and privileges of church and monarchy by reinforcing the rational 
elements of the state. Liberals’ quintessential belief in the goodness of human nature elevates 
individuals to fundaments of political and economic community. The tasks of governments 
and states is to make individuals free to participate in political life and act freely in the 
market.134 In its inception, liberal parties’ goals were political. In its plight to reinforce the state 
against traditional institutions, liberal forces fought conservatives and other defenders of the 
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status quo. Liberals were fundamentally based on a political ethos: the citizens associated in 
an autonomous, self-organising civil society which counterbalances the powers of the 
state.135 The fight for individual liberties overthrew monarchies and promoted the 
secularisation of the state. Since individuals are the basic unit of the state, there are no 
reasons to believe that individuals cannot or should not be associated across national 
borders, and the international environment is viewed as conducive to cooperation.136 Liberals 
therefore conceive international relations as a continuation of national political life. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Once liberals’ main political battles were won and civil liberties became 
increasingly taken for granted, liberals focused on the establishment of economic freedoms. 
In most countries Economic liberalism won the central place of liberal parties’ ethos, more so 
since liberals were confronted with both the rise of socialism, an ideology that threatened both 
economic and political freedoms. Socialist parties advocated both the strengthening of state 
powers and correction of market inequalities based on the concept of class. Liberal parties 
focused on defending the market as the main regulator of economic relations.  
 
Conservatism  
 
Conservatives’ main goals have been the protection of traditional institutions. In 
the XIX century this implied the protection of respected institutions like the church, the 
monarchy and the elites that benefited from their power against the liberal drive to centralise 
and strengthen the state. Thinly organised, conservatives were allied in an ad-hoc fashion 
and held a pragmatic attitude to ideology and an aversion to mobilise through mass 
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organisations. Among mainstream ideologies conservatism is the least consistent and the one 
that most strongly defies classification. Conservative parties remain exceptionally flexible in 
order to adapt to the changing circumstances of political competition resulting from rival 
parties defying their electoral space.  
Although conservatives initially opposed liberal parties in both political and 
economic terms, in the early XX century changing conditions of political competition led 
conservatives to take over liberals’ economic and political ethos. The end of the ideological 
antagonism between the two parties is a result of several factors. First, the attainment of 
economic freedom, the secularisation of the state and the accomplishment of nation-building 
processes made conservatives’ previous pleas anachronistic. Adapting to these new 
circumstances, conservatives ended up supporting the democratic nation-state and the 
economic freedom that it guaranteed against the rising success of left-wing ideologies, which 
pled for an increasingly interventionist role of the state in the economy and an internationalist 
view of the political order.137 A broad definition of conservatism in contemporary Europe 
combines two principles: the nation as the basic political community and the individual as the 
fundamental economic unit.138 The preferences of conservative constituencies, combining 
social conservatism and economic liberalism, insured the electoral success of such a formula. 
Nationalism  
 
Contrary to other authors, nationalists are here classified independently of their 
strategic or particular policy stances. Nationalism is considered both by Von Beyme and 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
136 Skotnicka-Illaszewicz, E. and Wesolowski, W. (1995), “The Significance of Preconceptions: Europe of Civil 
Societies and Europe of Nationalities”, in Periwal, S. (ed.) Notions of Nationalism, Budapest: Central European 
University Press, p. 220. 
137 Smith, G. (1988), “Between Left and Right: the Ambiguity of Contemporary Liberalism”, op. cit. 
138 Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000), op.cit. p. 454. 
 70 
Mudde as a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of right-wing extremists.139 Mudde 
asserts that although “the identified ideological core (of radical right parties) is clearly 
nationalist, not all nationalists can be considered right-wing extremists because they are not 
simultaneously xenophobic and stressing law and order.140 The nation, regarded as the basic 
political and economic community, is sufficient to describe these parties core ideology. 
Nationalists’ central plank is the attainment and preservation of the nation’s political 
sovereignty.  
The origins of the nationalist party family are, mainly in XIX century, nationalist 
movements fighting against multi-national empires and the Catholic Church to assert the right 
of nations to self-determination. Nationalism has continued to be popular as the basis of new 
parties well into the XX century, especially in countries where the process of nation-building 
has been traumatic and hazardous, like in Austria, Belgium or Poland.141 Nationalists 
consider external relations as dominated almost exclusively by the national interest, and the 
international sphere as an aggressive environment where state cooperation is very limited. 
Nationalists’ main plea is political and economic nationalism is of secondary 
relevance. Although the national economy is conceived as a closed system that can be 
insulated by protectionist policies, nationalists are often proponents of neo-liberal policy 
stances.  
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 Classifying parties  
 
1989-1993: the dissolution of Solidarity and the building up of 
parties 
First atttempt at Christian Democracy: the Centre Agreement 
 
Poland’s transition to democracy was shaped by the settlement hammered out 
between Solidarity and the Communist Party in their roundtable negotiations of February-
March 1989. After a landslide victory in the August 1989 elections the Solidarity liberal 
leadership pushed for liberals’ primacy in the first postcommunist coalition government under 
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki.  
The first Polish free parliamentary elections in 1991 (the 1989 elections had 
opened only one-third of the seats in the more important lower house of parliament, the Sejm, 
to democratic contestation, reserving the rest for the Communist Party and its allies) were 
fought in the context of Solidarity’s dissolution, caused by the “war at the top” waged by Lech 
Wałęsa and his associates against the liberal faction of Solidarity leading to the creation of 
the Tadeusz Mazowiecki governmental coalition. Marginalised from the first government, and 
preparing the 1991 Presidential election campaign staging Mazowiecki against  Wałęsa, this 
group went about dismantling Solidarity as a political formation and  create a European-style 
party system where parties would be based on clear ideological profiles..  
 
The post-Solidarity political elite had a strong desire to erase the Communist 
period and take over political developments at the point where they were thrown off course in 
1939. This is visible in the extensive quoting in party documents of pre-II World War 
politicians and party ideologies. Polish historical political identitites were therefore very 
important in the process of post-1989 party identity building. Party elites started by digging 
their historical roots. Christian democracy has a weak historical tradition in Poland, the 
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interwar Christian democratic party (Christian Democratic-Labour Party) commanded a small 
support and was irrevelant in government. 
Christian democracy’s appeal for post-1989 political elites was nevertheless 
obvious: in Poland the Catholic political identity was extremely strong, rooted not only in a 
widespread Catholic belief in Poland, but also of its politicisation by Solidarity as an 
opposition movement during the 1980s. The appeal of Catholicism and the family as political 
and economic identities, both central institutions in Poland gave Christian democracy a 
possibly strong support.142 Religious affiliation remained the most important determinant of 
voting behaviour and a CBOS poll in the late eighties revealed that 44 percent of the Poles 
accepted Christian democracy as a desirable centre-right ideology while only 24 percent of 
the respondents rejected it.  
 
Faced with the task to define its political identity, Wałęsa’s sponsored party under 
the leadership of the identical twins Kaszynski, the Centre Agreement (PC), adopted Christian 
democracy, charaterising it as the profile that best suited a centre party. The party elites 
started establishing contacts with the German Christian democrats in order to attempt to 
integrate CD international movements. Equally strong within the PC was a nationalist rhetoric 
drawing on the traditions of Polish nationalist ideology (see next section). The PC’s 
programmatic documents frequently referred to Roman Dmowski’s assimilation between 
Catholicism and Polishness, on whose ideas it based a fierce anti-communism and the 
proclaimed moral superiority of the Polish nation.143  
The nationalist rethoric of a part of the population clashed with the aspiration to 
“build in Poland a strong centre as a factor of equality and political innovation”144 under the 
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aegis of Christian democracy. The PC’s concept of political community was based on the 
Catholic faith: “the PC counts on the support of the part of the society that follows the 
Christian message and is ready to build the Republic accordingly”.145 Its programme of social 
modernisation followed Catholic precepts. “The Polish national interest requires a major work 
of national economic, organisational, and social modernisation. This modernisation should 
respect the moral values defended by Christianity constituting our identity. Without this 
change of system we will never bridge the civilisational gap between Europe and us. (…) The 
bases of every change in Poland must be the restoration of our moral system. (…) The role of 
the Catholic Church is of immense importance to the build up of our moral system, bitterly 
attacked by the left-wing post-communist environment.”146 
When the PC became the leading party in the Olszewski government in 1991, the party 
nationalist faction supported the lustration process, the process of excluding communist 
collaborators from public life, initiated by Justice Minister Antoni Macierewicz. Lustration can 
be interpreted as part of a nationalist agenda in the context of the Polish democratic transition 
from communism. Much more was at stake than the question of past collaboration. Indeed, 
the conflict seemed to centre on the nature of the Polish state. The project of the nationalist 
right-wing was to create a national political community of which the ex-communists were 
excluded. The nation’s natural historic progression should resume from where it had been 
forced off course in 1939. Moved by moral revulsion at the communist system and a sense of 
justice denied, Olszewski and his allies argued that communism was an alien period that 
should be excised from Polish history, its perpetrators punished and its victims rewarded. 
Judging from the rhetoric, lustration was a nation-building task and a patriotic duty. The PC 
was also a supporter of economic de-communisation and denounced the “nomenklatura” 
privatisation. Lustration was strongly opposed by liberal politicians prompted both by 
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pragmatism and a civic vision that the political community should include the willing and not 
the deserving, argued that communism had left an indelible mark on Polish society.  
 
The fundament of the party’s economic policies, the protection of families from 
distortions of market economy, shows a straightforward adoption of Christian democratic 
economic principles. Emulating the Catholic Church’s social doctrine the PC declared that 
“our social policy is concentrated on the family as the central social unit.”147 The PC’s social 
policy featured a pro-family approach, with the party stating that its main objective was that of 
preventing the impoverishment of families in need.The important issue of support for family 
farming was also present in the party’s stances on agricultural reform.  
The PC positioned itself on the economic left-right scale as a middle-of-the-road 
position, proposing a friendly attitude to market liberalism and opting for a gradual approach 
to reforms. The party stated modernisation and external competitiveness as twin goals: “The 
current economic and social structure condemns Poland to backwardness and being unable 
to compete in Europe and the world. If we do not compete in Europe, we will have our 
sovereignty threatened, first economically, and then politically.” 148 The PC programs 
excluded tax increases as a solution to the budget deficit and proposed favourable tax 
regimes for new enterprises to foster the competitiveness of Polish products in foreign 
markets. A rational fiscal and anti-inflationist policy implied a strong pledge for budgetary 
discipline. The programme supported efforts for a faster privatisation.149  
                                                     
 
The contradictions between nationalist traditions and the pledge for a centrist and 
Christian democratic ideological profile, that were latter to become a feature of the Polish 
right, played high in the PC’s desintegration. Prime Minister Jan Olszewski personified the 
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incompatibility between an identification with nationalism and the party’s pledge for a 
Christian democratic identity and a centrist strategy.150 His later political career would show 
the predominance of nationalism and its incompatibility with European integration. In the 
complicated coalition politics after 1991 elections the PC refused to coalesce with the liberal 
UD, adding to the instability of the coalition governments. The PC dissolved in the wake of the 
conflict provoked by the lustration law151 proposed by the faction linked with Jan Olszewski, 
the PC’s vice-president noted that the party’s failure was due not only to personal infighting 
but was also a consequence of the impossibility of pursuing its identity consistently.  
 
 
The liberal renaissance: the Union of Democracy 
 
Like Christian democracy, liberalism had no strong tradition in Poland before the 
II World War. Paradoxically the communist period was a favourable environment for liberal 
thought to florish, as its suppression of civic and economic freedoms gave liberals a clear 
mission. The consitution of the Solidarity movement in 1979 was arguably possible only due 
to the association of intellectuals with the workers’ protest movement. In the eighties 
Solidarity’s revolution was supported by the idea of a parallel civil society independent of the 
communism. 
In the context of Solidarity’s dissolution the liberal faction that had negotiated the 
Round Table compromise and the constitution of a coalition government created the 
Democratic Union (UD) in 1991. The UD was a party clearly based on political liberalism, and 
in the charged political debate on the relations between the Catholic Church and the Polish 
state, it took secular and liberal attitudes. Its leaders maintained that although “the state - its 
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system of law – is part of a defined system of values, which in our culture is rooted in 
Christianity and human rights”,152 it cannot be “taken over by any specific ideological 
group”.153 The party leadership opposed the nationalist and Catholic attempts to take over the 
state and define the political community through Catholicism. It extended its liberalism to the 
promotion of pluralism in the party and the support for a pluralist civil society. “We value the 
common action of all social groups, all active citizens who promote tolerance, avoid violence 
and adhere to an ethos rooted in the Christian tradition. We hope that these values are shown 
clearly in our positions and actions.”154 The party’s was to host “people from different 
worldviews and religions”.155  
The party’s concern for strengthening the state draws a parallel with the early XIX 
century liberals’ efforts to strengthen the rational elements of the state against the power of 
traditional institutions. “The essential reference of the UD is a democratic state serving civil 
society. This fundamental idea synthesises the political thought of the UD and determines our 
political identity. The state, understood as a common haven for the citizens, should provide 
security and a homely feeling. However, we reject the understanding of the state as an 
absolute in the face of which everything else must be given up.” This limited state “must 
protect the freedom of the citizens (…) without discriminating on grounds of gender, age, 
nationality or way of life”.156 
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The UD’s social and political liberalism was a novelty in Polish political history, 
since no liberal parties had existed either before or after the World War II, and no political 
group in exile had proclaimed liberalism as its ideology. The modern roots of Polish liberalism 
are found in the intellectual dissident groups that gave birth to Solidarity. For this reason, 
although Polish liberalism emphasises individual rights, the Solidarity experience stressed the 
need for organising society against the state. The free association of individuals, i.e., civil 
society, became the key political concept of the liberal faction of Solidarity. The “us against 
them”, “us” being a civil society against “them” the communists, demanded a collective 
identity. An individualist ideology did not provide a sufficiently strong base to fight the 
communists. Solidarity between individuals, the key experience of dissidents under 
communism, strengthened the associative aspects of liberal ideology. Belief in the value of 
individuals was complemented by the collectivist spirit that dissident groups within Solidarity 
had to forge to fight communism. The idea of civil society was put in practice not only by 
creating a pluralist party that would reflect the heterogeneity of society, but also by supporting 
civil society organisations. In early 1990s post-communist Europe liberal parties’ emulated 
XIX century liberals fight for the freedom of individuals against all oppressive institutions. 
The UD defined itself as a rational and anti-demagogic party. “We serve the 
voters that value balance and measure, the voters that understand that in public life reason 
should prevail over emotion.”157 This stance emerged in an environment they perceived as 
highly polarised by National Catholicism. Practicing Catholics, such as former Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki justified his choice for creating a liberal party (at the time the Democratic 
Union). “Some people accused me of not creating a Christian democratic party, but I believed 
in the foundation of a pluralist group reflecting the history of the opposition movement, a 
group with different beliefs and world views.158 
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The UD’s clear political ideology contrasts with its contradictory economic 
propositions. The UD was divided between a liberal and a socialist faction, personified 
respectively by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, the author of the shock therapy to the 
marketization of Polish economy and Labour and Social Policy Minister Jacek Kuron. 
Contradictions between these two wings made it difficult for the party to formulate coherent 
economic policies and caused confusion among the electorate. In 1991 the UD, the party that 
in the previous year had imposed several measures implying severe and painful expenditure 
cuts to curb the budget deficit and inflation,, argued for spending measures of higher social 
protection, as well as  micro-economic policies to alleviate the effects of shock therapy.159  In 
1993 the party was still committed to both social cohesion and liberal economic policies, 
arguing that the two principles “kept together guarantee economic growth.”160 The UD’s leftist 
belief in the role of the state to provide equal life chances was openly displayed. “Thorough 
development of social security is a fundamental part of our programme. Health Services 
should be enlarged and remain state-owned.”161 In contrast, the party of 1991 Prime Minister 
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki the Confederation of Liberal Democrats (KLD) had an ethos based on 
economic liberalism. 
 
 
 Nationalism: the Christian National Union and the Coalition for Polish Independence  
 
Nationalism is the most elaborate home-grown Polish political ideology. The loss 
of Polish statehood in the XVIII century made the national question the most proeminent 
political issue thoughtout. At a loss to exercise power, the intelectual Polish classes argued 
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over the terms and strategies of attaining independence. The main conflict in the late XIX and 
early XX centuries concerned the definition of the state’s borders, whether along ethnic or 
territorial lines. The advocates of an ethnically homogenous Polish state, the most proeminent 
of which was Roman Dmowski, conceptualised a symbiosis between the Polish national 
identity and Catholicism, which effectively submitted Catholic cosmopolitanism to nationalism. 
In its 1902 major oeuvre Myśli Nowoczesnego Polaka (Thoughts of a Modern Pole) Dmowski 
favored what he called a "national state," a state in which the citizens would speak Polish and 
profess the Roman Catholic faith. The suppression of Catholic cosmopolitanism is most 
visible in Dmowski’s conception of international relations as a fight for survival and his vision 
of the state’s conduct from the point of view of cosmopolitan justice as a betrayal.162 
Dmowski’s ideology is thus characterised by an acute sense of the importance of the state as 
the only guarantor of sovereingty, making no concessions to Catholic morality in the conduct 
of foreign policy. 
The rival conception to Dmowski’s was that of General Pilsudski, who conceived 
(and conquered) a multi-ethnic Poland at the expenses of the Soviet Union. During the 
Russian Civil War Pilsudki's army made considerable gains and the Soviet-Polish Treaty of 
Riga (1921) left Poland in control of substantial areas of Lithuania, Belorussia and the 
Ukraine. Piłsudski believed in a wide definition of Polish citizenship in which peoples of 
different languages, cultures and faiths were to be united by a common loyalty to the reborn 
Polish state.  
While the geography of Poland in 1921 reflected Pilsudski rather than Dmowski’s 
ideas, the redrawing of borders settled in Yalta, as well as Nazi extermination of Polish Jews 
resulted in the involuntary victory of Dmowski’s ethnically homogeneous Polish state. The self 
definition of Poles as Catholic thus became the most powerful ideological legacy after 1989.  
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From the multitude of parties that emerged from the dissolution of Solidarity (29 
of them entered parliament in the 1991 elections) many espoused nationalist ideals. Most of 
these formations proved ephemeral, thus we focus here on those participating in the different 
1991-1993 governmental coalitions. Two major nationalist parties competed in the right-wing 
camp, representing the different nationalist legacies from interwar Poland: the first the 
socialist nationalism of Josef Piłsudski – the Confederation for the Republic (KPN) - the other 
the Catholic nationalism of Roman Dmowski – the ZChN. In the 1993 elections, another party 
of nationalist character, the Coalition for the Republic (KdR), emerged by secession from the 
PC.  
 
Pilsudski ressurected: the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) 
 
The Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) was the only party independent 
of communist rule before 1989. Leszek Moczulski, whose radical anti-communism and anti-
Soviet rhetoric made him condemn the compromises that the Solidarity leadership had made 
with the communist regime, established the party in 1979. The KPN uncompromising attitude 
mimicked Piłsudski’s call for the Polish elite to actively pursue independence. For the KPN, 
the nation’s salvation is the affair of a few chosen individuals, with no need for religious 
legitimisation. The KPN represented the most consistent of the radical independentist groups. 
Although the great majority of political groupings – led by Solidarity – recognised full 
independence as a goal, the KPN emphasised independence above all else. “Independence 
is the pre-condition for solving all major problems: only in an independent state can 
democracy be implemented and problems solved."163 The democratic transition was seen 
exclusively in terms of the chance to attain independence. “We are the generation of change 
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in the long march of generations. The martyrdom of Poland in Yalta and under the Soviet 
Union is the basis for future action.” 1989 is the historic moment “that cannot be wasted”.164  
The 1993 electoral programme of the KPN spelled out vague and populist 
economic proposals. The KPN demanded the end of privatisation, asked for higher levels of 
subsidies for agriculture, pensions and social security benefits and the creation of a statutory 
right to work. The KPN also proposed an increase in salaries as a way to increase 
consumption and production, and consequently create employment as an anti-recession 
measure.165 The KPN’s uncompromising nationalism and messianic attitude made it one of 
the few dissenters from right-wing unification in 1996 under the AWS. By withdrawing from it 
during the 1997 elections it faced total defeat and disappeared. 
  
The Christian National Union (ZChN) 
 
The ZChN was established by Wiesław Chrzanowski in October 1989 joining 
almost 20 religiously-inspired organisations in a broader right-wing party. Although some 
activists were uneasy about this straightforward association, the party was directly influenced 
by Roman Dmowski’s ideology and proudly stressed its links with the legacy of the National 
Democratic Party.166  
The ZChN’s ideology exemplified how the national tradition can overrule the 
religious universal values of Catholicism. In the tradition of Dmowski, the ZChN professed an 
integral nationalism so conceived that it “conflicts with individual liberalism and 
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Christianity”.167 Dmowski, by declaring Catholicism as “embedded in the essence of 
Polishness” subordinated Christian universalism to national ethics. Polish Catholics’ highest 
mission was the preservation and development of their nation. The Polish Catholic Church, at 
the time und
cial structures should encourage society’s 
observance
d with 
the Union w
                                                     
er the direction of Cardinal Glemp, semi-officially supported the ZChN. 
The particular fusion of nationalism and Catholicism in ZChN’s ideology implied 
that the party protected the national version of Polish Catholicism. Moreover, the ZChN’s 
ideological declaration fought against the reinstatement of the principle of church-state 
separation in the new Polish Constitution. The ZChN’s fundamental apology of a confessional 
Catholic state occupied almost entirely its 1989 ideological declaration. This reads that “the 
Catholic religion is the expression of truth which binds not only private matters but also public 
life”. The party rejected “the concept of an ideologically neutral state according to 
individualistic and liberal conceptions. So
 of Catholic ethical principles.”168  
The party was thus opposed to modernising trends in the Catholic Church, in 
particular the acceptance of the principle of religious neutrality of liberal state enshrined in 
Church doctrine in the II Vatican Council.169 Marian Piłka, one of ZChN’s proeminent 
politicians, observed that Catholicism was in danger of loosing its universal character to leftist 
pseudo-universalism and argued for devolving power to the hierarchy and restore the integral 
character to Catholic doctrine, devolving its ability to inspire culture.170 Publicists affiliate
ere also wary of a modern secular culture, rejecting a consumerist society.  
Its fusion of a conservative interpretation of the Catholic doctrine and nationalism 
lead the ZChN to define Polishness as moral purity. The ZChN’s rhetoric also stressed the 
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superiority of the Polish moral system: “The fundaments of the new Poland should be the 
Christian values that have shaped the culture and identity of the Polish people for a thousand 
years.”171 The absence of any economic policy stances in party’s founding documents 
demonstrates the predominance of Catholic nationalism in the the party’s core ideology. In 
the late nineties this lacuna would eventually be filled with the adoption of a liberal economic 
programme
  
Strategic options of parties 1991-1993  
                                                                                                                                                       
.  
 
 
The 1991 elections were the first fully competitive elections in Poland, with an 
almost pure PR system: no entry thresholds, the applicationf of Saint Langue system for 
transferring votes into seats and fairly large electoral districts. These produced a highly 
polarised and unstructured party system and legislature (twenty-nine parties gained seats in 
the parliament). Due to the fragmentation of the right wing a coalition of many parties was 
necessary to attain office, which kept alive party hopes of participating in government. In this 
period parties had chances to integrate government and pursue centrist strategies, and this 
added to the difficulty in structuring the core party system.172 The confusion was aggravated 
by a multitude of very small parties that “defined themselves as the moral guardians of 
political philosophies“.173 The parties with stronger claims to occupy the core of the party 
system, in particular those parties resulting from the war at the top among the Solidarity 
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movement, 
rnment. After a disastrous attempt 
to oust com
 have always been flexible enough to make the cooperation with the centre 
right a prio ty. This implied leaving behind extremists like Antoni Macierewicz or Jan 
Łopuszanski”.176 
                                                     
the PC and the UD, together with the KLD. The PC, as its name indicates, was 
unquestionably aspiring to form the centre of the emerging party system.  
The centrist strategies of these parties were often thwarted by the actions of their 
troublesome coalition partners, which made the governments that followed the 1991 elections 
as unstable as they were divided. An example of such strategies are those of the ZChN in the 
government of Jan Olszewski initially formed a minority coalition dominated by the PC and the 
ZChN. This government stalled on several policy questions, including the privatisation 
programme announced in June 1991 by the previous gove
munist collaborators from public life, initiated by the ZChN’s leader Antoni 
Macierewicz, the Olszewski government fell in July 1992.  
Despite the responsibility of the ZChN’s leader, Antoni Macierewicz, in the fall of 
the Olszewski government, in which he served as Justice Minister, the party’s centrist 
strategy was clear, as it participated in almost all right-wing governments until 1993.174 The 
ZChN participated in the government that succeeded the Olszewski’s government, the 
Suchocka government, which also included the PC, the UD and the KLD. During the 
Suchocka’s government the ZChN, although routinely torpedoing proposals they saw as 
“antifamily”, anti-Church or too liberal, attempted to establish itself as a core party, by 
remaining loyal in votes that did not imply sacrificing the party’s Christian values. When the 
vote of no-confidence brought down the Suchocka government by one vote, the ZChN’s MP 
that voted against the government was immediately dismissed.175 The drive for government 
participation guided the party to more moderate political stances. “Whatever their ideology, 
the ZChN leaders
ri
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 The change of the electoral law in the 1993 election, establishing 5% and 8% 
electoral thresholds for parties and coalitions respectively, plus a National List – 69 seats in a 
second tier were allotted to parties that cleared a 7% national support hurdle - changed the 
conditions of competition in a dramatic way. An increase in the number of electoral districts 
from 37 to 52 and a consequent decrease in their magnitude (plus inaugurating the d’Hondt 
formula) paved the way to even greater disproportionality and made it harder for small parties 
to get into the parliament and win a significant number of seats. To deal with these new 
electoral circumstances, most parties needed to change their strategies of competition by 
coalescing in order to overcome the electoral threshold. Although the right-wing parties had 
attempted to unify in view of the elections, the negotiations collapsed, and the right went into 
the elections fragmented. Most post-Solidarity parties insisted on their separate identities and 
ended up failing to get into parliament. Those parties that coalesced, like the Ojczisna, 
registered as an electoral coalition rather than as a party, which led them to fail the threshold 
for electoral coalitions of 8 percent. Failure to bow to the new rules of competition was thus 
the prime cause of the post-Solidarity virtual ban from parliament in the 1993 elections. Of the 
parties comprising Suchocka’s coalition government, only the UD survived in a six-party 
Sejm. The UD and the BBWR, both parties retaining a firm commitment to centre-right 
economic policies, performed the core opposition to the SLD-PSL government. 
European Attitudes 1989-1993 
xenophobic, authoritarian, turned towards the past and towards restoring the life of the 
 
 
The UD distinguished its Hard Europhilism from those of its opponents - Christian 
democrats and nationalists. In 1990 Adam Michnick enunciated two sorts of anti-communist 
forces - those who are “liberal, pluralistic, and European”; and the others (…) “who are 
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past”.177 The Hard Europhilism of the UD was a key element of its liberalism. Since the days 
of Solidarity the liberal elite took up the mission of integrating Poland in the EU. Solidarity’s 
1989 electoral programme stated: “This election should be a return. It should come the time 
when Poland becomes a country where everyone is at home. The time when Poland should 
return to Europe. The road to prosperity and independence is a slow and distant one, but the 
market economy and justice will be protected in the Sejm and the Senate and then we will be 
able to say – we chose that road.”178   
The “road back to Europe” constituted the first expression of political liberalism in 
Poland. Freedom for Poland and the post-Soviet states, translated into the immediate 
recognition of Lithuanian and Belarussian independence in 1991, despite the presence of Red 
Army troops. Respect for the 1945 borders was pledged, a position far from certain from the 
government of a country that had just de facto attained sovereignty and where the 
mainstream thinking before the fall of communism was that, when communism would 
collapse, Poland should recover the Eastern territories lost in Yalta, including Vilnius and 
Lwów. Although respecting the 1945 borders was made easier by the fact that all the 
neighbouring Polish states had disappeared - Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the 
Democratic Republic of Germany – the decision to accept the 1945 borders remained a 
choice of the first liberal post-communist government.  
 
Economic liberals, then organised itn the Congress for Liberal Democracy (KLD) 
were hard Europhiles, and justified the pro-Western choice taken in the early nineties mainly 
in economic terms. “In 1989 we were in a horrible situation because of the heavy debts faced 
by the Polish economy. We had no choice but to leapfrog, since the Polish economy was on 
the verge of collapse. So we had to move very quickly. The commitment to liberal economic 
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reforms was intrinsically linked to the symbolic “return to Europe”. That was why in the 
beginning we tried to discuss immediate trade agreements with the EC (…) because the 
Polish market was especially open and exposed to external competition. This openness of the 
economy made politics and economics completely mixed. On a daily basis the symbolism of 
the return to Europe was connected with economic conditions. There was no possibility of 
running a protectionist policy from the outset.”179  
The PC’s support for European integration seemed motivated by the party’s 
centrist bid and Christian democratic pledge. In 1991 the Centre Alliance (PC) portrayed 
Polish integration in the EEC as a matter of raison d’état. The PC claimed to defend 
integration from a different standpoint to the liberal wing of Solidarity. The PC elites criticised 
“the diplomatic activity of the Caucus of the Civic Parliamentary Club (the name given by 
Solidarity to its group in Parliament after the 1989 elections)” which was “dominated by left-
wing leaders”. The party’s Christian democratic and centrist aspirations still reflected in a 
positive appraisal of European integration. However, once the PC disintegrated, the faction 
linked to Premier Olszewski created a nationalist party, the Coalition for the Republic (KdR), 
that opposed integration more openly. The internal conflict in the PC on the definition of the 
basic political community was reproduced later within the AWS, showing that Christian 
democracy’s cosmopolitan support for integration was far from consensual, being in strong 
conflict with the nationalist principles of a large part of the post-Solidarity leaders. 
 
The ZChN’s European attitudes’ confirms hypothesis 1 - that ideologies based on 
political conceptions inspire unconditional responses to European integration. The early days 
of transition were characterised by widespread support for European integration. Europe was 
a synonym of liberal market economy, democracy and membership of the European Union, 
the arrival of large sums of investment capital and the opening of Western markets to Polish 
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products, together with political integration and incorporation into the Western security 
system. However, the gap between the expectations of the elite and the reality of the 
negotiations of the Europe Agreements in 1991 opened the way for a variety of party 
responses. The symbolic nature of Europe made an open critique of the European 
Community (EC) sound anti-democratic, so parties made use of cautious language.  
In 1992 the Association Agreements between the EU and Poland shattered the 
expectations of favourable terms of trade. Nationalist parties were the first to doubt that 
national interests were served by integration. However, in these early days, the symbolic clout 
of Europe resulted in parties expressing Euroscepticism in conditional terms. The ZChN was 
the first to become critical of the terms of the EU. “The EU is egoistic since it did not help 
Poland to overcome the economic crisis by opening trade in the most important areas for the 
Polish products.”180 The ZChN also pointed to the Agreements’ negative consequences for 
the Polish economy, especially in the agricultural sector. The ZChN Soft Euroscepticism 
reflects its economic and political nationalism. “In the foreign policy domain Polish politics 
must have an independent character. We must ensure that our international economic 
relations have a character of partnership. Poland must protect the interests of its producers 
and its market. We should correct the current disproportion in our balance of trade with the 
EEC.”181 “The Polish position regarding the EU should restrict the loss of sovereignty by 
Poland. European integration should not mean replacing the organism of the state by a 
unified and strongly bureaucratised state system of United Europe.” 182 
In 1993 Jan Olszewski’s recently formed KdR demanded the renegotiation of the 
Europe Agreements, assuming an uncompromising tone when calling for the protection of 
national economic interests from the EU, in particular concerning the internal agricultural 
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market.183 The KdR was equally critical of the dictates of international organizations, and 
supported the concept of “Europe of the Nations”. The Euroscepticism of the ZChN, the KPN 
and the KdR shows that despite the symbolic clout of “Europe” in post-communist politics, 
nationalism is a sufficient condition for Hard Euroscepticism. 
Emerging bipolarism: the unification of the right between 1997 
and 2001 
Trade Unionists’ Christian democracy in the Electoral Action Solidarity 
(AWS) 
The 1993 elections were a disastrous defeat for the right, with the liberals 
becoming the only party of previous governments to overcome the 5 per cent threshold and to 
be represented in the Sejm. The extreme fragmentation of the right before the elections 
resulted in 34 per cent of cast votes being wasted and the right-wing becoming artificially 
empty. The attempts to unify the post-Solidarity elite and create a party able to face the 
postcommunist SLD started immediately after the elections and intensified after the defeat of 
Lech Walesa in the Presidential elections in 1995 to the postcommunist candidate Aleksander 
Kwasniewski. All of these attempts, some under the aegis of the Catholich Church, failed. In 
the summer of 1996 the Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ) leader, Marian Krzaklewski started 
negotiations to create a broad based electoral coalition to dispute the legislative elections. 184  
The Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) then came to life. With the Trade Union as its most 
powerful constituent, the AWS (a fusion of more than 30 political groupings) became a rallying 
point for the right’s electorate coming first in the elections, but short of absolute majority.  
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Despite its patchwork composition and its programmatic incohesiveness, the 
AWS contained the promise of a confessional party organising the right-wing. The 
proeminence of the Solidarity Trade Union had an ideological dimension, and its Christian 
democratic programme of social Catholic conservatism was the main influence of the 
electoral coalition’s 1997 programme. The party’s stances on social issues follow the Catholic 
Church doctrine. The AWS’s opposition to abortion revealed the belief in God-given Natural 
Law as the “right to life of each human being from conception to natural death”.185 A symbolic 
alliance with the interwar Christian democratic party, the Christian democratic Labour Party 
(CD-SP) symbolised the commitment to this ideology. The declaration of understanding 
illustrates the constrains imposed by the nationalist heritage on the development of a 
universal Christian democratic ideology. “We, the representatives of Christian democracy – 
the Labour Party, the AWS and the PC, political groups professing and accomplishing the 
independence of Poland and the patriotic ideals of Christian democracy, inheritors and 
pursuers of the ideological and political inter-war Christian democratic movement – recognise 
the fundamental heritage of Poland and the Nation.”186 .  
The 1997 AWS electoral platform reflected the NSZZ’s commitment to the family 
as the basic economic community, a peculiar position for a trade union, since these generally 
identify with the working class.187 “The family is the basis of the society, where each human 
being is educated and develops. We will foster the economy of the family with pro-family 
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taxes and benefits.”188 However, besides these general ideological propositions, the AWS’s 
incohesiveness made it very difficult to propose a coherent set of policy stances.189 If on the 
one hand the AWS defended the limitation of the redistributive role of the state by privatising 
pension funds, decreasing subsidies for industry and diminishing corporate taxes, on the 
other it supported strong public financial backing for the agricultural sector,190 opposed the 
flexibilisation of the labour code and defended universal coverage and high health protection.  
 
The ideological build up within the AWS government 
 
After winning a majority in the September 1997 legislative elections the AWS 
leader Marian Krzaklewski took another step in the attempt to unify the right under Christian 
democratic principles. In November 1997 a new party, the Solidarity leadership created the 
AWS Social Movement (AWS RS) to replace the Trade Union as it retreated to its core 
industrial functions. The AWS RS leader was Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek while Marian 
Krzaklewski remained the leader of Solidarity Trade Union. Both expected the members of 
the AWS parliamentary caucus majority to relinquish the membership of their parties and 
become members of the RS AWS. However, none of the AWS’s MPs but the trade unionists 
left their original parties and the AWS RS never became the basis of a unified Christian 
democratic centre. Contrary to the Solidarity leadership desires and expectations the marked 
programmatic differences among AWS’s constituent members got stronger rather than 
weaker as governing time went by. Also within the Christian democratic caucus of the AWS 
was the Polish Party of Christian Democrats (PPChD).  
Benefiting from their acquired parliamentary and governmental status, the AWS 
segments built increasingly well-defined ideological identities. The ZChN’s process of 
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ideological consolidation is a case in point. The ZChN was the strongest nationalist group 
within the AWS and eager to exert influence in the government. Its moderate wing, reinforced 
by acesss to office, made inroads into diminishing the radicals’ influence within the party, in 
the attempt to play down its nationalist identity. In July 1998 they expelled extremist 
nationalist elements linked with Jan Łopuszanski from the AWS parliamentary caucus. 
Łopuszanski then created in April 1999 its own parliamentary club, the Polish Agreement 
(PP).  
The ZChN, whose ideology until then focused exclusively on fundamental 
questions on the nature of the state, led the party to formulate an economic programme along 
neoliberal lines. Its economic programme urged the creation of a pro-entrepreneurial 
economic environment by increasing benefits to entrepreneurs, ensuring low interest rates for 
investors, low pensions and low taxes.191 The neoliberal principle of individual sovereignty in 
the market made the party more alike to other conservative parties in Europe, such as the 
British Conservative party. However, the attempt to stake a conservative identity remained 
very problematic, for strong factions within the party opposed it in fear of giving up their 
“ideological purity”.192 Although at the end of the AWS mandate in 2001 the ZChN’s profile 
was far from the extreme clerical nationalism of the early nineties, the party’s transformation 
was limited by internal resistance. Other smaller nationalist parties existed in the AWS, such 
as the Coalition of Polish Families, the Polish Family and the National League. Their 
accommodation to the coalition was harder than the ZChN’s, and its confrontative methods 
led them to often try to veto the works of the coalition.  
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Equally, the AWS government was a conducive environment to the ideological 
and organisational consolidation of the conservative group. Previously dispersed conservative 
groupings became more organised and institutionalised within the AWS. Its focal point was 
the Conservative People’s Party (SKL), a party created under the strong leadership of Jan 
Rokita in 1997. In February 1999 other small conservatives merged with the SKL, thus 
strenghening its position. This was initially portrayed by the AWS leadership as a step 
towards a stronger party structure, but the SKL never wished to give up its own identity for a 
wider Christian democratic party entity, especially not one under the leadership of the 
Solidarity Trade Union. The SKL’s combination of neo-liberal and moderate Catholic and 
national positions was seen as serving a broad electoral appeal on which to base the centre 
right. This strand was the one closest to the UW liberals.  
From late 1998 the structure of the AWS Political Council, the chief coordinating 
body of the AWS, reflected the strenghening of separate identities of the AWS ideological 
segments, and the party effectively became a federation of the SKL, the ZChN, the PPChD 
and the AWS RS.  The Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, became a negotiator between, on the 
one hand, the different parties of the AWS and, on the other, its coalition partner, the UW.  
 
The Freedom Union’s remake of liberalism  
 
In preparation for the 1997 elections the liberal camp underwent an extensive 
ideological and organisational restructuring. While the first Polish liberal party, the UD, 
embodied the notion of civil society, in the mid-nineties economic liberalism was the defining 
feature of the new liberal party. The UW’s ideological transformation was far from peaceful 
and the latent conflict that it provoked would eventually split the party in 2001. 193 Created in 
1995, the UW incorporated the neo-liberal Congress of Liberal Democrats (KLD) reinforcing 
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its neoliberal wing and making the intellectuals’ political liberalism relatively weaker. 194 An 
election of Leszek Balcerowicz to the chairmanship testified the commitment to the market 
and the downgrading of political values previously at the core of the UD’s concerns.195 The 
UD thus distinguished itself clearly both from the economic protectionism and the social 
conservatism of the emerging AWS.  
The liberals’s change of identity was not peaceful and in the period leading to the 
2001 parliamentary elections, the party was to suffer from a severe internal conflict between 
the neo-liberals, and the UD’s party elite composed of old time dissidents based on 
conceptions of political liberalism.196 The mutual recriminations concerned the transformation 
of the UW into a party of power, while political liberals were accused of libertarianism. The 
conflict also concerned divergent political conceptions: the economic liberals saw a mild 
version of political nationalism as an appropriate secondary complement for a centrist 
conservative profile. This was against the liberal Solidarity attachment to the idea of a plural 
civil society. In the midst of this internal conflict, the party pulled out of government in June 
2000 and failed to put forward a candidate for the October 2000 presidential elections.  
 
The nationalists outside the AWS: the Movement for the Republic (ROP) 
 
The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) was created in the 
aftermath of the first round of the presidential election in 1995, after a relatively successful 
performance by Jan Olszewski in these elections. With the characteristic speed that political 
alliances are forged and dismissed on the Polish right, Jan Olszewski dissolved the 
Movement for the Republic (RdR), the party he formed in 1993 joining the nationalist splinters 
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of the PC. The ROP was an alternative rallying point to the AWS in the 1997 legislative 
elections, attracting nationalist and religious personalities. With 10 per cent of the votes, the 
ROP became a possible coalition partner for the AWS.  
The ROP’s ideological declaration gave an absolutely central role to the nation in 
the creation of the party’s identity.197 To convey the image of a patriotic Catholic party, 
religious symbolism was repeatedly used, and rhetoric distinguished between true patriots 
and the elites (mainly the UW and the SLD) who were portrayed as anti-independentist.198 
During the controversy around the Constitutional Referendum in 1997, the ROP campaigned 
strongly against Constitutional amendments 90 and 91 by arguing that they “threaten Polish 
sovereignty.” The Polish New Constitution was regarded as “anti-Christian, because it allows 
the creation of religious sects and limits citizens’ rights. It is an act of anti-independentist, anti-
Christian forces in the Polish parliament.”199 The ROP’s nationalism was the basis of an 
authoritarian stance in social terms, in particular by limiting the definition of lifestyles 
acceptable by the nation and rejected the existence of different minorities, not only of ethnic 
but also of religious and sexual orientation. Although advocating a formal separation between 
church and state, the party defended a strong role for the church in politics and society. 
The main theme of the ROP’s founding declaration, the Agreement with Poland, 
is a plea for state control over the national economy.200 The ideological declaration focused 
on economic nationalism, proposing protectionist policies that argued for limitations on foreign 
trade and foreign direct investment. The ROP argued that unemployment should be tackled 
through the creation of public jobs and pension funds guaranteed by the state, supported 
housing for young couples and a pro-family tax system. Social policies were also justified in 
nationalist terms: “A nation where a third of the population lives under the poverty level will 
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not be able to be independent.”201 The ROP called for the establishment of a new system of 
health insurance, a position that was close to that of the Solidarity Trade Union. The approach 
to agricultural reform was conservative in that it defended the primacy of the family farming.  
 
Parties’ strategies between 1997-2001 
 
The 1993 elections drew the limits of an emerging core. Not only were the ex-
communists to form a government in coalition with the PSL but also the exclusion of the right-
wing parties from parliament in the 1993 elections made the possibility of a coalition between 
different parties a necessity. The partial structuration of the party system in the mid nineties 
resulted from the strategic calculations of post-Solidarity leaders in face of an emerging 
strong social democrat party. In order to get office, the right wing political leaders were forced 
to change their strategic behaviour, find compromises and coalesce. This AWS and the UW 
were thus the result of coalitions of political groups willing to achieve office. The ZChN, 
despite its earlier clericalism and nationalism, joined the AWS.  
By choosing the UW rather than the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) as its coalition 
partner, the AWS leadership reinforced its centrist profile,202 but the UW was considered too 
liberal for important sections of the AWS. This choice appeared a good omen for a centrist 
party with a Christian cosmopolitan ethos. The AWS campaign was based on a moderate 
platform and made inroads into the political centre ground, avoiding religious fundamentalist 
rhetoric.203 In its early days the AWS tactics proved successful in promoting the moderation of 
political forces such as the ZChN, by attracting it into the political centre ground,204 and its 
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electoral platform was characterized by a moderate support for the Church’s intervention in 
public life and a conservative view of the social order. 
In the mid-nineties party reformulation the rebirth of the nationalist right resumed 
with the constitution of the ROP as an anchor of this sector, at the same time as the AWS 
constituted itself. Jan Olszewski, a relatively popular presidential candidate, attracted 
considerable support in the polls for his new party. The ROP was assumedly an alternative 
polarising project that mobilized the remaining post-Solidairty elite that did not join the AWS. 
Contrary to the AWS, the ROP showed signs of extremist propaganda tactics during the 
Constitutional Debate in 1997.205 Attempts of cooperation between the AWS and the ROP in 
the form of pre-electoral or post-electoral coalitions failed.206 In the run up to the 2001 
elections the ROP initially joined the AWSP, only to leave it shortly before the elections. After 
refusing advances from Lech Kaszynski’s PiS, Jan Olszewski and some followers joined the 
LPR.207 
 
During the 1997-2001 AWS-UW government emerged another political grouping 
announcing the emergence of a polarising nationalist threat, the Polish Agreement (PP). The 
PP emerged from the expulsion of the most extremist elements of the ZChN leadered by Jan 
Łopuszanski, on an ultra Catholic and nationalist ticket.208 The PP set itself clearly against the 
core of politics. “In the last elections, Poles voted but did not choose. Whether they support 
the left, the centre or the right –they supported the same security, foreign and economic 
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policies. Elections do not bring change. The PP wants to give the Poles the possibility of 
authentic choice.”209 
 
 
European Attitudes 1993-2001 
 
The Union of Freedom (UW) maintained its predecessor’s – the UD - hard 
Europhile attitude. The UW’s European stance supports the hypothesis that economic 
ideologies give rise to conditional attitudes towards European integration, eventually 
hardened by a secondary political evaluation of integration – hypothesis 2.1. While in the 
early nineties the UD’s Hard Europhilism spoke for its commitment to civil society, the UW 
neo-liberals supported the EU mostly for economic reasons. “The EU accelerates the timing 
of our economic growth – it enlarges the market for enterpreneus and it increases the weigth 
of investment capital and Poland will benefit from financial help while diminishing 
unemployment through economic modernisation.”210 However, some of the harder neo-
liberals showed a veiled scepticism regarding the EU regulatory framework. Sporadically the 
EU was negatively portrayed as imposing too much bureaucratic constraints on the Polish 
and European markets. Although the overall evaluation of integration was still positive, the 
economic liberals made clear that this support was conditional on the balance between the 
promotion of freedom and the regulation of the European market. 
The rise and demise of Christian democracy in the AWS, and the part played by 
nationalists in it, illustrates the predictions contained in hypothesis 1, that is, that parties 
based on national or cosmopolitan conceptions of the political community are respectively 
unconditional opponents or supporters of European integration, i.e. hard Eurosceptics or hard 
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Europhiles. The AWS’s European stance between 1996 and early 1998 reflected the 
coalition’s Christian democratic ideology. The AWS slogan for the 1997 elections, ‘twice yes’, 
was meant as a bold approval of integration (to both the EUand to NATO). Further elaborating 
on the European issue, the AWS reserved for Poland the role of missionary in a “Europe that 
is loosing its roots”. In a parallel metaphor to Mickiewicz’s, thje AWS portrayed Poland as the 
‘Christ of nations’.211 Poland’s integration in the EU would bring Europe back to its Christian 
values. “We cherish our thousand-year long history and these traditional values are what we 
need, first of all in Europe and then in the entire world.”212 The AWS reserved for Poland the 
role of missionary in a “Europe that is loosing its roots”.213  
During its early days, the moderate forces within the AWS government tried to 
convince the ZChN’s nationalists of the goodness of European Integration. This was aided by 
the nationalists’ own effort to play down their identity in favour of a moderate conservative 
identity. An example of such tactics was the appointment of ZChN’s leader, Rychard 
Czarnecki, to head the European Integration Committee (KIE), the governmental body 
coordinating the issues related to EU accession. At the time it was thought that giving the 
ZChN control over the technical aspects of European integration would help to convert the 
party to the EU.  
This was somehow complemented by an effort from inside the party to re-
evalutate the relationship between nationalism and European integration. The ZChN’s 
founder and ideologue, Wiesław Chrzanowski, attempts to reformulate the relationship 
between the national movement and the European supranationalism were however doomed. 
The following quote illustrates the impossibility to reconcile nationalism with supranationalism: 
“The national movement (…) has a new look and sees a historical chance for Poland. This is 
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first of all to unite Europe. Protest against unification is sterile. (…) The only question is: which 
Europe? The task of the national group is to look for partners with similar outlooks in different 
countries and fight for a Europe of the Fatherlands, not of the regions. (…) a Europe 
respectful of the peculiarities of the national cultures, not a supranational bureaucracy.”214 
The ZChN’s persistent opposition to integration illustrates the sufficiency of nationalism to 
determine scepticism to the EU, even in face of neo-liberal approval of the Common Market 
and the pressure of office-seeking considerations.  
 
The consensus attained within the AWS concerning integration in 1997 depended 
on the success of Christian democracy as a party identity. But as the influence of the 
nationalists increased and the conflicts deepened in the run up to the 2000 presidential 
elections, Eurosceptic positions were articulated. Facing the opposition of the liberals and 
Christian democrats to his presidential candidature, Marian Krzaklewski looked for support 
among the nationalists, further alienating the liberal wing and triggering the coalition’s 
disintegration. Krzaklewski opened his election campaign with a Eurosceptic discourse. While 
in the Parliamentary debate in August 1999 Krzaklewski stated that, “Poland wants to be a 
member of the EU not because Brussels wants it (…) but because that fits our national 
interest”,215 in his inaugural speech as a presidential candidate, Krzaklewski strongly 
questioned the conflation of the national interest with European integration. “We are now 
deciding if Poland will take the place that belongs to it among the free states that remember 
its national identity, or if it will become the subject of ideological experiments, whose objective 
is to create a new so-called European nation.”216  
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The Eurosceptic faction in the 1997-2001 Sejm was initially confined to ROP, but 
was later joined by the hard Eurosceptic splinter of the ZChN lead by Jan Łopuszanski, the 
Polish Agreement (PP). The stances of both nationalist parties confirm hypothesis 1. Jan 
Olszewski’s hard Euroscepticism was based on political conceptions but was expressed 
mainly in economic arguments against integration. The ROP coined the term Eurorealism, 
which although appearing to argue for an objective assessment of European integration, 
effectively meant opposition to the project as the standards against which integration was 
measured resulted in it being considered incompatible with the national interest.217 In its 
founding declaration, Agreement with Poland, the ROP demanded that integration takes place 
only if defined as a partnership project, and advocated tough conditions on the Polish 
accession, especially concerning the agricultural integration.”218 This attitude appears most 
significant as it was formulated in 1996 when 80 per cent of the population supported 
accession to the EU.219 The ROP rejected integration and assumed that by threatening Polish 
sovereignty the interests of the EU were in principle opposed to Polish national interests. 
Stressing economic sovereignty in ROP’s discourse disguised a politically motivated 
antagonism to a project that goes against the conception of state control over the destiny of 
its population. Jan Łopuszanski’s Agreement with Poland (PP) was the first parliamentary 
party to openly oppose European integration. Jan Łopuszanski ran his presidential campaign 
in the autumn of 2000 solely on the European issue, and argued that his opposition to 
integration was meant to avoid “the future spill of blood”.220 
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Reversal: the 2001 elections and its aftermath 
New Conservatism: The Platform of Citizens (PO) 
The gradual consolidation of the party system taking place from 1993 was 
partially reversed, and a multipolar party system replaced the emerging bipolar system. As 
factional infighting grew and no ideological consensus emerged in the AWS, a succession of 
splits, partially reflecting ideological lines, partially the desire to build a centrist conservative 
party destroyed the AWS. Once again, the right entered the Sejm organised in new parties 
from previous elections.  
As is often the case in Poland, the first split in the AWS was triggered by the 
success of the presidential bid of Andrzej Olechowski, who had won 17% of the votes in 2000 
and joined Maciej Plazynski, a conservative from the AWS, and Donald Tusk, a liberal from 
the UW, to form the Citizen’s Platform (PO). The PO joined conservatives from the SKL and 
the UW. The ideological incohesiveness of the right-wing parties - the UD, the PC, the AWS 
and to a certain extent the UW - were condemned by the PO. In face of the failure of the AWS 
tried to avoid “being too broad in the representation of interests, focusing on some promises 
rather than attempting to fulfil too many.” However, of the two models of right-wing formations 
in Europe, “the example of unified formation in Germany and Britain is preferred to the Italian 
and the French.”221 These two apparently contradictory pledges, one for a narrow interest 
representation and the second for a broad and unified right-wing party are in fact a disguised 
attack on the inclusion of the Solidarity trade union in the AWS and the pledge for a liberal 
conservative party based on economic neo-liberalism. The PO follows these two 
considerations.  
The party’s founding declaration is entitled “To free the energies of Poles” and it 
states “For the Citizens’ Platform the solution for the future of Poland and the Poles is to free 
the entrepreneurs and the national talent (…). However, we will not be able to do so if the 
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economy continues to be slowed down by multiple bureaucratic powers, bad laws and high 
taxes”.222  
 
Economic liberalism was the party’s identifying element, visible in the PO’s 
pledge for the de-bureaucratisation and a thinning down of state functions.223. The PO 
defended a flat income tax rate of 15 percent for which Leszek Balcerowicz had fought for in 
1999 as Finance Minister. As a measure to create a favourable entrepreneurial environment, 
especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises, the party supported the liberalisation 
of the labour code. In terms of social policy it supported the annihilation of the recently formed 
Health Agencies and its replacement with a regulatory package of basic services guaranteed 
by the state. The PO’s electoral platform views social aid as a way to create a safety net for 
the poor. In order to increase the control of public finances the party backs the independence 
of National Central Bank to dictate monetary policy. Their proposition for agricultural reform 
considers that agriculture should be governed through the same principles of other economic 
sectors.  
The political dimension of the party’s stances is secondary for its identification, 
but the 2001 program points to a conservative position by opposing the liberalisation of 
abortion and drugs consumption and defending pro-family policies, and suggests the mild 
commitment to the nation characteristic of liberal conservatives.   
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 National Conservatism: The Law and Justice (PiS) 
 
The other conservative splinter from the AWS was the Law and Justice (PiS) . 
This initially started as a “taxi party” for the Kaszynski brothers, building on the reputation of 
Lech Kaszynski as a tough Justice Minister in the AWS government. Kaszynski, who was 
never a member of the AWS, reacted to the disintegration of the electoral coalition by calling 
to those that were “clean” to join him and form a new party. This call was heard by several 
politicians of the ZChN and therefore the PiS attracted a majority of Catholic nationalists, such 
as Artur Zawisza and Marek Jurek. The party programme starts by declaring: “Poland is in a 
state of crisis. For many years several sectors suffer from lack of state control; the state is 
dysfunctional and corrupt and the economic system suffers from a dangerous pathology.”224 
The party contrasts the terrible situation of the state with the “unusual dynamism of the Polish 
nation”, which deserves to be supported. “The tempo of our march was too slow, matching 
neither our needs, nor our possibilities.”225  
The rhetoric dichotomy between the nation and the state is closely associated to 
one of the main themes of the 2001 election manifesto, the “cleaning up” of the political elite, 
the civil service and, eventually, the whole society from communist collaborators. In the PiS’s 
2001 programme there are strong echoes of the romantic nationalists’ conception of “moral 
purity” as a defining feature of the Polish nation. Lustration is thus nothing less than part of a 
nation-building project to identify the deserving Polish citizens. 
The PiS’s nationalism is tempered by the commitment to individual citizens’s 
welfare in the economic sphere; the party pledges the defense of the “small man” not only 
from organised crime but also from a corrupt and abusive elite that controls the state and the 
economy. Therefore, although the party programme refers extensively to the nation, it also 
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attributes a central role to the individual, as the one to be protected from the state. The PiS’s 
economic ethos was initially left undefined, partly due to the party focus on political issues, 
partly from the conflict between the neo-liberal and the interventionist wings of the party. 
Despite hosting a neoliberal faction,226 the PiS holds a middle-of-the-road economic policy. 
The PiS wanted to retain two tax rates - 18 and 32 per cent as well as tax write-offs, including 
measures that favour larger families. The programme includes some state sponsored 
measures to halve unemployment, such as taxes write-offs for every job created. The PiS 
was in no hurry to control the fiscal deficit and propose to reduce the Central Bank (NBP) 
independence, adding to his mandate the goal of ensuring economic growth while controling 
inflation, and pledging the elimination of the monetary policy council.  
  
 
Dmowski’s remake: the League of Polish Families (LPR) 
 
On the aftermath of the AWS dissolution, a new version of Catholic nationalism 
emerged in the form of the League of Polish Families (LPR), joining some members of the 
ROP and Jan Łopuszanski’s Polish Agreement. Its leader, Roman Giertych, is a descendent 
of a family of nationalist ideologues. The LPR’s main political concept of community is the 
nation, and its higher mission is to defend the nation and its particular devotion to Catholicism 
from its enemies. Such objectives occupy almost entirely its programme.227 This mission is to 
be accomplished, first of all, by the abolition of articles 90 and 91 of the Constitution related to 
the supremacy of international over Portuguese law, which lead to “the annihilation of Polish 
sovereignty”. The national principle urges the party “not to accept the subordination of Polish 
politics to foreign purposes. (…) The LPR pursues Polish interests instead of the doctrine of 
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international adjustment that predominates nowadays.”228 In every declaration the party’s 
nationalism is justified in terms of its Catholicism. The Polish special brand of Catholicism is 
the prime object to be protected from foreign influence. The religious extremist character of 
the party makes it a defender of a strong interference by the Church in state affairs, and the 
strict implementation of the Catholic Social Doctrine.229 
The party is a federation of small political and religious organisations close to the 
nationalist wing of the Polish Catholic Church, and combines the same extreme clericalism 
and nationalism specific to part of the Polish Catholic hierarchy, but particularly to 
Redemptorist father Ryzyk, the director of the Catholic fundamentalist Radio station Radio 
Marjia. Father Ryzyk has a direct role in the creation of a political party and is considered its 
eminence grise. Some youth movements associated with the LPR are typical extreme-right 
movements with fascist overtones like Młoda Wchechpolska (All-Polish Youth), and represent 
the propensity to extremist rhetoric founded in integral religious nationalism present in Polish 
political thinking since the XIX century.  
Despite its support for a national economic system, the party has not produced a 
populist economic programme; on the contrary, it defends neo-liberal economic ideals. 
Proposals for tax cuts for small family businesses are directed towards the middle class and 
the petty bourgeoisie.  
 
Strategic choices: 2001 and 2005 
 
The change in the rules introduced in 1993 stimulated greater proportionality – a 
decrease in the number of districts to 41 and the ending of the National List, plus the 
application pof the Sainte Langue system. These rules favoured the smaller post-AWS 
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parties, which were divided in two major parties – the PiS and the PO – facing the ex-
communists who enjoyed in 2001 very high levels of popularity (it won 41%) of the vote. Both 
the PiS and the PO’s office-seeking strategies at the turn of the millienium were cautious and 
clearly a first stamp in the electoral field.  
The term of the SLD was marked by serious scandals and accusations of 
corruption, leading to a steep decline in the SLD’s support. By the end of 2003 the SLD/UP 
had lost its lead in public opinion to the PO. In early 2004 the deep crisis within the SLD led 
the Prime Minister Miller to resign and a minority takecare government under Prime Minister 
Marek Belka to take office until the autumn of 2005. This meant that the campaign started in 
late 2004, with elections taking place in 25 September 2005 – practically simultaneous to the 
presidential elections. Both the PiS and the PO pursued centrist strategies, and although in 
the two years prior to the election it was expected that the two parties would create a coalition 
and fight the SLD in the elections, the removal from the competition of the SLD candidate led 
to the two centre parties disputing the electorate between themselves.  
The third party of the right emerging from the debacle of the AWS, the LPR, had 
a clear polarising strategy, frequently resorting to very polemic stances and rhetorics. Its  
electoral appeal rounded 7 percent on both elections. Despite its radical approach the LPR 
integrated the government of Lech Kaczynski in the autumn of 2005.  
 
European positions between 2001 and 2005 
 
The victory of Catholic nationalism in the 2001 elections resulted in the 
emergence of a strong right-wing Eurosceptic lobby in the Polish Sejm. This had important 
consequences for the last phase of European accession negotiations, on the debate at the 
time of the accession referendum and the Polish position on the European Constitution.  
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The PiS’s European attitude illustrates that nationalism is sufficient for an 
Europhile stance despite the party being clearly geared to office. The PiS initially tried to 
hedge its attitude towards European integration. The European issue was absent from PiS’s 
2001 election manifesto and the closest statement regarding its international commitments 
was the comment that “It is impossible to maintain a position of neutrality due to Poland’s 
geographical position.”230 The party maintained an ambiguous attitude until the March 2003 
party Congress, when a vote on the issue took place. Even though during the June 2003 
accession referendum the PiS cautiously stood for a Yes vote and invoked security 
arguments in favor of Polish integration in the EU, the terms of PiS’s opposition to the 
Constitutional Treaty showed a fundamental aversion to political integration, i.e. hard 
Euroscepticism. “The Constitutional process is an act of egoism against solidarity. (…) This 
egoistic stance is deeply rooted in a federalist ideology which is of key importance for the 
understanding of the (Constitutional) project.”231 Such a stance did not waver when the PiS’s 
took office in the autumn of 2005, and with the Polish government under its control, it adopted 
a very uncooperative posture on the European stage, by ignoring intergovernmental talks to 
solve the Constitutional crisis.  
The party opposes any type of sovereignty transfer to a supranational body. 
Tensions between Euroscepticism and office led the Kaszynski brothers to try to de-link the 
issue of European accession from issues of morality, like the support for abortion laws, as a 
way to convince nationalists like Artur Zawisza or Marek Jurek to support European 
integration before the accession referendum.232 The PiS adopted a very hard stance against 
the revision of the voting formula gained at Nice, during which Poland and Spain obtained 27 
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votes in the Council, a similar weight to that of Germany. The importance of this issue owes to 
its association with the protection of sovereignty cherished by nationalists. Another 
expression of the PiS’s nationalism during the debate on the Constitution is the emphasis the 
party put on the inclusion of a reference to Christian values in the Preamble of the 
Constitution.233 The PiS joined the LPR, the PSL and the Samoobrona in the demand for a 
referendum on the ratification of the European Constitution. The PiS is also sceptical of 
Poland’s entry into the Eurozone, postponing such decision to a referendum in 2010. 
 
European position of the Citizens’s Platform 
Despite being the only Europhile right-wing party, the PO’s support for integration 
is qualified, i.e., the party is soft Europhile.234 The formulation in the party’s electoral program 
for the 2004 European Parliament elections reveals its conditional nature: “Our key national 
goal is overcoming economic backwardness. For we can only support a Union that builds 
favourable conditions for economic development, one that supports entrepreneurship and 
creativity.” In its electoral program for the 2004 European Parliament elections, the party 
affirmed: “Our key national goal is overcoming economic backwardness. For we can only 
support a Union that builds consequently favourable conditions for economic development, 
that supports entrepreneurship and creativity. We do not tolerate policies that limit economic 
growth”.235 Opposition to the change of voting formula obtained in Nice, coined by the party 
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leader Jan Maria Rokita as “Nice or Death”, reinforced the conditional nature of the party’s 
Europhilia. We do not tolerate policies that limit economic growth”.236  
During the June 2003 EU accession referendum campaign the PO supported 
conditionally the SLD government in its efforts to secure public support for integration.237 
Moreover, the party’s critique of excessive state bureaucracy and red tape, a theme at the 
core of the party identity, was extended to the EU level. As a disguised attack on the EU’s 
economic regulatory role, the critique of the EU bureaucracy is undertaken by the economic 
neo-liberal faction within the party. Hard economic neo-liberals, like Janusz Lewandowski, 
articulated this critique more openly by deeming attempts to regulate the internal market as 
incoherent with the favoured principles of European integration, which are defined as market 
liberalisation.238 During the debates on the Constitutional Treaty, the PO took a hard stance, 
coined by one of the PO’s leaders, Jan Maria Rokita, as “Nice or Death”. The penchant for 
viewing the nation as the basic political community became clearer as the party affirmed its 
conservative identity during the 2005 elections. Of the right-wing parties, the LPR is the most 
openly Eurosceptic, and used every means to disrupt the process of integration, such as 
trying to impede the transposition of European law into the Polish legal system.239 The LPR 
ran the 2001 parliamentary campaign on an anti-European ticket, arguing that integration into 
the EU would compromise the sacred sovereignty of the Polish state. This lead the LPR to 
point to the supremacy of European Law over the Polish Constitution as the crucial argument 
of its anti-European agenda.  
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However, unlike other hard Eurosceptic parties, the LPR run for the 2004 EP 
elections, winning an impressive 17 percent of the votes cast. Immediately after the 
referendum on European accession took place in June 2003, Roman Giertych declared that 
although not changing its opinion on the goodness of European integration, he accepted the 
overwhelming endorsement of accession by the Polish population and considered the 
referendum results as an expression of popular sovereignty.240 In this way Giertych distanced 
himself from other far right nationalists who claimed the results of the referendum to be 
flawed. These have generally refused to accept the outcomes of the democratic processes 
related to European integration.   
 
Analysis  
 
This chapter provides a description of the troubled formation of right wing parties, 
in terms of their ideology, strategy and positions on European integration. This description is 
the basis for an analysis of the effects of normative political ethos, in particular attitudes 
towards nationalism, on parties’ positions on European integration. By the end of the XX 
century it was clear that the post-Solidarity elite was divided by its attitudes on European 
integration, and that the division between Europhiles and Eurosceptics had an important 
impact on the evolution of the party system. The chapter is witness to the impact of a 
normative political ethos on parties’ positions on European integration, even when these 
effects are harmful for parties electoral and office seeking goals.  
 
The analysis of parties’ ideological formation on the right reveals the contrast 
between the extreme volatility of party organisations and the resilience of particular 
ideologies. New parties single-handedly re-used the ideologies of defunct parties, making use 
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of some limited leeway to reinterpret them. All party families went through some ideological 
recycling, but nationalist parties were constantly changing their form of organization. This 
trend was concomitant with these parties’ increasing centrality and rising weight. In the early 
nineties nationalist parties - the ZChN, the KPN, the RdR and the ROP - were fragmented 
and minoritarian. The majour party realignment of the mid nineties resulted in the integration 
of most of these parties in the governmental coalition, the AWS.  By the turn of the century it 
became clear these parties were an increasingly influencial and divisive force in parliament 
and in government, and nationalism was also becoming a winning ticket on the ballot box. In 
the 2001 elections, for the first time, one of the main right wing formations, the PiS, made 
nationalism its central ideological tenet. The 2005 elections gave the electoral victory to the 
PiS and in March 2006 the formation of a governmental coalition between the PiS, the LPR 
and Samoobrona meant nationalists controlled the destinies of the country until the coalition 
demise. 
The nationalists’ increasing success contrasted with the failed attempts to 
establish a Christian democratic party. The two trends seem related. The nationalists’ 
participation in Christian democratic coalitions was controversial and divisive and they 
certainly played a part in their demise. The creation of the AWS in 1996 represented an 
attempt to face the increasingly strong SLD, with a coalition of post-Solidarity forces of 
diverse ideological persuasions under the common heading of Christian democracy. 
Integrating the AWS required disciplining the constituent parties to the main goal of winning 
elections, the most problematic among them being the containment of nationalists. In political 
terms there was an important effort to bring in line the positions of the parties, particularly 
because of the perceived necessity to get the parties to agree on an Europhile stance based 
on Christian cosmopolitanism. When joining the AWS, the ZChN attempted to downgrade 
nationalism by adopting a set of economic neo-liberal stances and transform ideologically into 
a conservative party. But contrary to the building up of different ideological groups within the 
party coalition counteracted the centralising ambitions of the trade union’s leader, Marian 
Krzaklewski. The candidature of Marian Krzaklewski to the presidency exposed a stalemate in 
the fight for power between Christian democrats, conservatives, trade unionists and 
nationalists. Facing the opposition of conservatives for its candidature, Marian Krzaklewski 
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sought the support of nationalists, deepening the ideological rifts dividing the AWS’s 
groupings. 
The liberal camp was initially leadered by Solidarity intellectuals, dissidents 
promoting civil rights and the creation of a parallel society as an alternative to the communist 
regime. While political liberalism was the identifying ethos of the first liberal party - the Union 
of Democracy – the party realignment of the mid-nineties also affected the liberals, who 
merged with a smaller economic liberal party and created the Freedom Union, a party 
identified by economic neo-liberalism. The second important transformation of the Polish right 
in the turn of the millennium saw the virtual abandon of political liberalism and the creation of 
a liberal conservative party, the Platform of Citizens, combining economic liberalism and a 
nationalist attitude.  
 
The Polish right wing parties’ European positions are a witness to the importance 
of attitudes towards nationalism to explain parties’ positions on integration. The post-Solidarity 
camp was the battlefield between two opposing conceptions of political community –
nationalism and Christian democratic religious cosmopolitanism. The victory of nationalism 
over Christian democracy has thus resulted in the rise of Euroscepticism among the Polish 
right.  
Several nationalist parties are a practical demonstration of the impact of the 
political ethos on a party’s attitude towards European integration, being thus a good 
illustration of hypothesis 1. The sufficiency of nationalist conceptions for unconditional 
Euroscepticism is illustrated by nationalists’ responses to European integration during the 
hazardous process of party system building. Nationalist parties, independently of their 
Catholic or laic orientation, polarising or centrist strategy, neo-liberal or protectionist economic 
positions, took an a priori dislike of European integration, assuming increasingly openly their 
opposition to accession as the century drove to a close.  
In the years that followed the transition, the symbolic clout of Europe meant that 
the ZChN and other nationalist parties were cautious in their assessment of European 
integration. However, already in 1992 the party was doubting of the fundamental goodness of 
integration and, after the conclusion of the Europe Agreements, demanded whether 
integration was compatible with the Polish national interests. In the mid-nineties the newly 
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formed nationalist platform, the ROP, goes one step further when demanding whether the 
“real” interests of Polish were served by European integration, a position coined as 
Eurorealism. The integration of several nationalist parties – such as the ZChN - on the centre-
right coalition, the AWS, has resulted in a temporary silencing of these parties’ 
Euroscepticism. Integrating the AWS even meant that the ZChN would attempt to transform 
into a conservative party by adding a neo-liberal economic identity. However, the party’s 
involvement in the management of the accession process – when its leader became head of 
KIE - was marked by deep scepticism and led to a halt of the process of legal transposition.   
The defeat of Christian democracy, first with the demise of the Centre Agreement 
in 1991, and with the AWS in 1997 marked the end of an attempt to create a right wing party 
on a non-nationalist basis. The Centre Agreement was an early attempt to establish an 
Europhile Catholic identity on the post-Solidarity right-wing. Six years later, the establishment 
of the AWS, based on the Christian democratic ideology of the trade union resulted in a 
straightforward approval of integration into the EU and into NATO.  
The AWS’s European stance between 1996 and early 1998 reflected the 
coalition’s Christian democratic ideology. The AWS slogan for the 1997 elections, ‘twice yes’, 
was a bold approval of integration (to both the EU and NATO). The AWS reserved for Poland 
the role of missionary in a “Europe that is loosing its roots”.241 Poland’s integration in the EU 
would bring Europe back to its Christian values. “We cherish our thousand-year long history 
and these traditional values are what we need, first of all in Europe and then in the entire 
world.”242 
However, from early 1998 the nationalists’ increasing power within the coalition 
resulted in growing resistance to the government’s policy of fast accession. The AWS 
moderates’ hope that the experience of office would restrain nationalist opposition to the EU, 
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most prominently that of the ZChN, thus proved unfounded. In the event, the nationalists’ veto 
kept the AWS government in check.  
Some months after the ZChN leader, Rychard Czarnecki, was appointed head of 
the Committee for European Integration (KIE) in late 1997, the party’s opposition to accession 
was clear. Despite the ZChN’s approval of the liberalising effects of the Single Market, and 
the strong pressure to comply with the government’s official policy, its nationalist conception 
of the political community was clearly sufficient as a basis of opposition to the transfer of 
sovereignty to a supranational body. The ZChN’s Euroscepticism hampered the transposition 
of European legislation in the Polish Sejm, made difficult the coordinating role of the 
Committee for European Integration (KIE)243 and the capacity to advance negotiation 
positions.  
The influence of the nationalists increased as the AWS’s ideological conflicts 
deepened in the run up to the 2000 presidential elections. Facing the opposition of the liberals 
and Christian democrats for his presidential candidature, Marian Krzaklewski looked for 
support among the nationalists, further alienating the liberal wing and triggering the coalition’s 
disintegration. Krzaklewski’s opened his election campaign with an Eurosceptic speech. “We 
are now deciding if Poland will take the place that belongs to it among the free states that 
remember its national identity, or if it will become the subject of ideological experiments, 
whose objective is the formation of a new so-called European nation.”244 In the months 
preceding the 2001 elections the AWS would fall apart along the lines of support and 
opposition to European integration, demonstrating that the European issue was by then the 
hallmark of ideological disagreement in the Polish right-wing. 
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The chapter also provides illustration of the impact of normative political ethos on 
a party’s position on European integration, when political attitudes are secondary to the 
identifying economic dimensions. The liberal camp is a particularly good illustration of the 
secondary impact of attitudes towards nationalism on a party’s European stance. While the 
first post-1989 Polish liberal party, the Union of Democracy (UD), shows that a primary 
identification with civil society is sufficient for an unconditional support for European 
integration, its successor, the neo-liberal Union of Freedom (UW), supported Europe on 
condition that integration reinforced the liberalisation of Polish economy. The arguments of 
liberals’ Europhilia are basically economic, eventually reinforced by a political 
cosmopolitanism, reinforcing the party’s positive attitude towards integration. The liberal 
conservative Citizens’ Platform (PO) illustrates that, when neo-liberalism is combined with 
nationalism as a secondary identity, the congruence between the EU and the national interest 
is conditional on the EU favouring economic liberalisation – exemplifying hypothesis 2.2. The 
liberals’ evolution shows that the combined effect of political and economic dimensions is 
relevant for parties’ attitude towards the EU. The replacement of liberals by liberal 
conservatives meant the end of an Eurosceptic and divided right-wing. 
 
Analysing the post-Solidarity parties’ attitudes on European integration also 
provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that parties office-seeking strategies can sustain 
a Europhile position only in the short run. We could see that the AWS’s office promises initial 
hold on nationalists’ Euroscepticism was not sustainable in the mid and long run, and that the 
deep ideological divisions within the party put the coalition existence in jeopardy. The ZChN’s 
Eurosceptic stance testifies to the resilience of nationalists’ Euroscepticism in face of office 
ambitions.  
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Chapter IV Explaining left-wing parties European 
positions 
This chapter describes the development of the social democrats, agrarians and 
extreme left development in terms of their ideologies, strategies and also the stances they 
took towards the European Union between 1989 and 2005.Establishing left wing parties after 
1989 was simpler than the reorganizing the post-Solidarity right but involved a more profound 
reinterpretation of fundamental ideological positions. The deep antagonism the Solidarity 
activists nurtured towards communists resulted on an almost strict separation between the 
two elite groups, so much so that a coalition between social democrats and a post-Solidarity 
party at the national level took place only in 2007, eighteen years after transition was 
completed. This meant that ex-communist social democrats had to quickly restore their 
electoral competitivity if they wanted to survive as a political force. Until 2003, this period was 
marked by a constant rise in popularity of the social democratic SLD, making it one of the only 
anchors in the party system. The agrarian party, the PSL saw its popularity peak in 1993 with 
15% of the vote, to lower and stabilise around 9% in 1997. Nevertheless, the party become a 
kingmaker, a junior partner of government coalitions. 
The chapter assesses the impact of the identifying dimension on a party’s 
response to the European issue.245 Economic identities, because of their divisible nature, 
allow for a re-evaluation of the EU, in particular on whether it is a form of “regulatory state” 
that complements positively the national efforts in that direction. For social democrats and 
agrarians in accession countries the question was whether by integrating the EU their 
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economies could achieve a higher degree of regulation than possible if the country faces 
alone competition in the world market. Because economic goods are by nature divisible and 
negotiable, the agrarians and social democrats’ leadership could evaluate the relative merits 
of the EU’s policy regimes and reconsider their positions on the EU.246 From 1993 the Polish 
ex-communists transformation resulted in the adoption of an economic regime adapting the 
concept of social justice to the limitations imposed by globalisation. In parallel to other West 
European social democratic parties in the 1980s and the 1990s, the ex-communists 
abandoned economic tenets aimed at full employment and generous welfare state programs 
and adopted policies seeking at countering class inequalities by shaping the supply-side, i.e., 
by shaping the conditions of production.247 This resulted in a positive appraisal of integration. 
The agrarian party’s, the PSL, appraisal of European integration gave a positive turn after 
1997, changing as a result of the clarification of CAP’s application to Polish farmers with the 
start of the negotiations. As negotiations progressed the party leadership appraised the 
effects of CAP extension as a priori positive, while continuing to press the Polish government 
for a hard negotiating stance aimed at establishing a level playing field between farmers from 
East and Western Europe.  
The chapter also considers the secondary impact of social democrats and 
agrarians’ normative political ethos on parties’ European attitudes. When attitudes towards 
nationalism are a secondary identifying element, they reinforce or keep conditional parties’ 
economic evaluation of Europe. Since 1993 Social democrats’ cosmopolitanism reinforces 
their Europhilism. The effects of Polish agrarians’ identification with nationalism are also 
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discernible, with the party keeping its support on the EU conditional on Europe’s contributions 
to Polish farmers’ welfare.  
The strategic stances of parties, either polarising or office seeking, are also 
described, and their validity as explanations for parties’ European stances assessed. The 
evidence in this chapter suggests that an office-seeking strategy can trigger a positive 
appraisal of European integration, as the SLD’s 1993 office seeking strategy and turn in 
attitudes towards integration demonstrates. With hindsight it appears that the SLD’s 
Europhilia was sustainable only due to an ideological appraisal of integration. In the case of 
the PSL, its office-seeking strategy since the early nineties was not sufficient to change its 
attitudes towards integration, and indeed, the reappraisal of CAP came about only when the 
PSL left office after 1997.  
Classifying parties 
Social democracy 
 
The social democrats’ main identitary trait is the commitment to the elimination of 
differences among classes by counteracting inequalities stemming from positions in the 
labour market and protecting low and minimum income groups.248 These goals were 
traditionally pursued by the extension of the right to free or subsidized goods and services, 
and by policies destined to shape the labour market to full employment. However, in recent 
years, globalization has been setting a number of conditions that exclude the possibility of 
state interventionism to shape the conditions of consumption.249 Several authors explain the 
mechanisms of adaptation of European social democratic parties to these changing 
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conditions. Boix describes it as a shift from “the arena of resource distribution to address the 
physical and social organization of production and the cultural conditions of consumption in 
advanced capitalist societies”.250 Social democrats are in the “pursuit of a new growth path to 
compete in global markets by maintaining certain instruments for influencing the supply-side 
of the economy. (…) These include the increase of workers’ skills, favouring the production of 
high value-added and high quality goods.” These policies are also seen as “favouring the 
workers and the poor”.251 
Social democrats are traditionally internationalist, a trait that derives from their 
definition of economic class as the fundamental community upon which the state should 
compensate for market failures. However, the commitment to left libertarian attitudes of which 
internationalism is an element, has varied across Europe. Although the legacy of social 
democracy has a strong commitment to individualism, individuals’ social and economic 
positions are determined by their integration in socio-economic classes. For social democrats, 
the class is the fundamental determinant of economic and social activity, and the inequalities 
for individuals ensuing from this fact should be addressed by the state. This has led some of 
these parties to remain more attached to the concept of nation-state, considering that the 
protection of workers’ interest can more easily be achieved in that context.  
The present social democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe had to 
adapt their economic ethos to an extent that is unprecedented in Europe. Their transformation 
from communism into social democracy implied the reinterpretation of class as the economic 
ethos. Not only was the party to abandon the commitment to central planning but it would also 
renounce Keynesian policies as a means to correct the market distortions inflicted by class. 
As described in this chapter some of the ex-communist parties quickly reformed their 
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economic views and came to conceive the correction of class distortions as a question of 
supply side economics.  
 
Agrarianism 
 
Before 1989 classifying separately European parties in an agrarian family was 
controversial since most of European agrarian parties had transformed into Christian 
democratic parties. However, the democratic transition in Central Eastern Europe has given 
rise to a number of parties that can only be properly classified in a separate category. 
Agrarian parties emerged out of the rural-urban cleavage to protect the interests of the rural 
population. The fundamental identitary community of agrarian parties is based on the notion 
of estate 252. This concept was current in XIX century Europe, where social divisions and 
conflicts were understood in terms of estate, when the rights and privileges granted by the 
monarchs to some social groups stemmed from land ownership. Therefore the notion of 
estate linked land ownership with established rights and privileges. The agrarian movements 
re-utilized the concept of estate to the enlarged group of landowners in the context of 
democratic mobilization. Agrarians’ reinterpretation of the estate meant that land-owning 
farmers were entitled to institutionalized support by the state.  
Contrary to the concept class, the concept of estate does not imply a group self-
consciousness of a common social identity. Therefore, the political ethos of the agrarian party 
family is not given a priori, a circumstance that has led these parties to be easily absorbed 
into conservative or liberal movements in Western democracies; the agrarians’ conception of 
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political community derives from liberal, Christian or nationalist traditions.253 The agrarian 
parties define their political ethos according to the political circumstances of their foundation.  
 
Ecologism 
 
The ecologist parties’ core identity derives from a critique of the Enlightenment’s 
reliance on the individual as a rational being and his domination over the remainder of the 
ecological system. Ecologism is based on the conception of the ecological system as the 
primordial community. The ecological system is conceived as a holistic entity that 
encompasses all beings, alive or inanimate. Ecologism therefore defies liberal’s assumptions 
that human rational capacities elevate individuals’ to the primordial elements of politics and 
economics. Ecologists are therefore sceptical of the method and objectives of economic 
liberalism: economic growth through the mastery of nature and defend the concept of 
sustained development.254  
The ecologists’ political ethos derives not only from the view that the ecological 
crisis is global and results from the imbalance in man’s relationship with nature but, in some 
cases, also draws from the cosmopolitanism of the peace movements from which some 
ecological parties originate. The different origins of ecological parties reflect in a tension 
between the interpretations of the cosmopolitan nature of their political ethos. While some 
parties, or factions within parties, are primarily concerned with the application of universalistic 
principles of justice, other parties or factions aim for a revolutionary transformation of the 
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substantive relations between humans and nature, away from the anthropocentric 
conceptions founding political liberalism.255  
 
1989-1993: Coming in From the Cold  
 
Coming in from the cold: The transformation of the communist party 
 
The transformation of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) into a mainstream 
social democratic party was one of the most successful transformation of communist parties 
in the region.256 From the Round Table negotiations until 2001 the PZPR gradually changed 
its traditional ideological discourse. The dominant faction of the PZPR’s pragmatic centre 
succeeded in maintaining the party unity by retaining some of the socialist elements, namely 
the left libertarian discourse and the commitment to the class, but re-interpreted these 
commitments according to the new circumstances.257 This strategy was one of a middle way 
between, on the one hand, the factions that advocated the complete dismissal of the leftist 
character of the party and proposed an alliance with the liberal faction within Solidarity (the 
globalists) and, on the other, the Marxist conservatism of the orthodox hard-liners.258 The 
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redefinition of the party’s ideological discourse was determined by the moderate faction that 
took over the party centre.259  
The PZPR’s transformation from communism to social democracy was based on 
two elements: first, a centrist strategy, second, the successful reinterpretation of the core 
concepts of the party’s identity. Both were devised by the group of young, middle-rank 
reformist group within the PZPR. This group was elected to the leadership of the re-founded 
party in January 1990 on a platform of radical and rapid change. Their election to the party 
leadership was facilitated by the discredit of the regional party structures during the 1989 
election and by the old party leaders’ abandon of party control. The new party leadership 
shared a reformist interpretation of class politics that made it compatible with market economy 
and democratic principles, therefore abandoning the commitment to a centrally-planned 
economy.260  
The sequencing of events proved crucial to determine the reform outcomes. 
Once reformists were elected to the party leadership in January 1990, agreement with the 
new reform program by the rest of the party was a foregone conclusion. Not only had the 
delegates to the new party been compelled to agree on the new statutes before they could 
join it, but also, at that stage, they were unwilling to disagree with the leaders whom they had 
just elected. The writing of the party program was undertaken by a close number of members 
of the Executive Council and swiftly approved by the delegates.261  
The interpretation of left-wing ideals developed by the SdRP was equally useful 
for the staking of a broad electoral appeal demanded by an office-seeking strategy. The party 
specifically claimed to represent all Poles, and renounced to appeal primarily to the losers of 
transition or the traditional working class. Aleksander Kwaśniewski explained: “In order to 
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achieve programmatic goals, the party must rule, and it can only do so through elections – we 
are for parliamentary democracy. Therefore the party must be an effective tool for winning 
elections, with a program that reaches out to potential voters.”262 As this statement makes 
clear, for the young elite that came to dominate the party, office- and policy-seeking strategies 
were closely connected and complementary. The interpretation of class as the basic 
economic and political unit not only served to rebuild the party and adapt it to the new 
democratic circumstances, but also defined it as the main centre-left formation for the next 
decade. The party leaders’ agreement over the interpretation of its ethos made it possible for 
them to stake programs geared to generate broad support and assure electoral success. The 
sequencing of events proved crucial.263 The success of reformist leaders to take over the 
party apparatus meant a successful programmatic transformation and this proved crucial to 
assure the party’s competitiveness and further conversion of its programmatic 
commitments.264  
The resolution of the last Congress of the United Polish Workers Party and the 
documents of the Founding Congress of the SdRP would read: “The long-term ideological aim 
is that of framing a new formula of democratic socialism away from the axiological system of 
communism. We are for the ideals of a rational society and against nationalism, chauvinism 
and the neutral state.”265 As early as 1991 the SdRP’s secularism was one of its most noted 
characteristics.266 Although the staunch secularism and internationalism of the party was 
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noted as making the party’s appeal narrower, the party leadership never changed its definition 
of the political community. Arguably, by anchoring the party’s identity in a left libertarian 
discourse, the party leaders could more easily reinterpret the party’s commitment to social 
justice.267  
By abandoning orthodox Marxism and denouncing Stalinism, the ex-communists 
performed an ideological jump that attempted to reverse the ideological bifurcation resulting 
from the rupture of communists and social democrats’ international movements in the 1920s 
and laid the foundations of a new party identity in the tradition of European socialism. The 
reference to the socialist origins and values was accompanied by the incorporation of the 
historical socialist party of Piłsudski, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). The Polish ideologues 
returned to the core values of the European rationalist ideals of Enlightenment.268 “The left 
must also change, anchored in the values of humanism and rationalism, the equality of 
chances and expectations of the majority of the society. (...)”. The accent put on left libertarian 
values helped the party to successfully reinvent itself by creating an alternative rhetoric to the 
conservative authoritarianism of the post-Solidarity block.269 The internal ideological 
transformation put the accent in left libertarian values and allowed the party to smoothly 
change its economic commitments. This outcome allowed the party to overcome socio-
economic differences thus widening the party’s appeal, serving equally well the new party 
leaders’ office-seeking strategies.270  
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In the aftermath of the Presidential election of 1990 the SdRP’s centrist strategy 
led it to organize a broad leftist coalition of forces. By mid-1991 a coalition, the Democratic 
Left Alliance (SLD), came into being, the SdRP being its dominant actor. 
 
The SLD’s economic ethos came to reflect the evolution of West European social 
democracy. Arguably this conversion was facilitated by the disbelief of a great number of 
party leaders in the effectiveness of communist centrally-planned economy.271 By the mid-
eighties an important faction of the party’s leaders had abandoned their faith in state 
ownership. During the negotiations that resulted in the Round Table Accord and the peaceful 
power transfer performed in 1989 the reformism of the communist leaders showed the 
potential for the transformation of the party.  
Between 1991 and 1993 the party reacted to the radical marketisation measures 
of the right-wing governments by showing a strong commitment to the state’s redistributive 
role. The Balcerowicz plan had severe economic consequences for the majority of the 
population and resulted in a sudden surge of social inequalities. During the SdRP’s First 
Congress the party opposed shock therapy and declared its commitment to third road 
solutions. Although approving the overall direction of the reforms, the party objected to the 
government’s methods and objectives, such as the absolute necessity for curbing inflation.272 
By 1991 the party supported the marketisation measures but advocated state intervention to 
protect the workers’ interests. During the period between 1991 and 1993 the party hardened 
the tone of its criticisms regarding the economic policy followed by the post-Solidarity 
governments, and in particular, the effects these had in deepening income disparity. The 
leaders explained that “voting for the SdRP you will support people who want radical 
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reforms...but would rather implement them with minimal social costs.”273 The SLD was for 
higher consumer taxes and more benefits for small- and medium-sized enterprises. “Taxes 
should be paid by those that consume more, not those that invest more.”274 The advocacy of 
a slow decrease of profit tax illustrated the gradualist preference of the SLD. Fiscal policies 
were intended to ensure that state revenues “cover the budget for the most important social 
needs.”275 This tax regime was also intended to fund the creation of new jobs and the 
transformation of education policy. The reform of education should serve the needs of 
developing skills useful in the new economy.  
In the early nineties, the SdRP was still strongly committed to a traditional 
operationalisation of social justice: “We are for a type of social policy guided by the principles 
of social justice in guaranteeing equality in access to education, culture, medical care, leisure 
and social security.” The SLD’s social policies differed from Christian-inspired social policies 
by declaring its belief in “an active policy of employment creation.”276 In terms of agricultural 
policy the SLD was against the total liquidation of a state-controlled agricultural economy. 
For the 1993 election campaign the party was one of the fiercest critics of shock 
therapy, pointing to the plan’s allegedly dire results – high unemployment, widespread 
pauperization, decrease of real incomes (of white-collar workers), bankruptcy of the 
agricultural sector due to a lack of agricultural and industrial policies. The SLD’s manifesto 
opted for more state intervention, internal market protectionism and higher taxes for the 
wealthy. Both the SLD’s manifesto and campaigns favoured general privatization policies, but 
with explicit substantial amendments aimed at more employee-friendly solutions. Their 
electoral slogan: “Things do not need be like this” indicated both general support for 
marketisation but also the party’s strong opposition to shock therapy.  
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 The Union of Labour (UP) was created in 1992, when the SLD was not yet 
considered a viable centre-left party. Worried at the rising of class inequalities, ex-Solidarity 
activists attempted to fill a perceived gap on the left-wing spectrum by creating a social 
democratic party that would maintain “the Solidarity tradition of workers and intellectuals’ 
cooperation while leading this forum to new realities and forms.”277  
 
The alternative left: the UP 
 
The Labour Union was created in 1992, joining members with social democratic 
orientation of Labour Solidarity and communist members, under the leadership of Ryszard 
Bugaj, Zbigniew Bujak and Wiesław Ziółkowska. Its central ideology was well illustrated by 
the theme of the V Congress of the party, “Poland of Equal Chances”. The programme 
opposed “the neo-liberal utopia” which disregards Polish reality, neglects social justice and 
the reform of the health and education systems. “Poland can only be successful when market 
economy, a just social system and parliamentary democracy are linked harmoniously.” The 
party’s ethos was based on the understanding of class as the fundamental economic 
community. This commitment was shown by the party’s generous welfare state policies, as 
well as its strong links with both the Solidarity and the ex-communist trade unions. The party 
pressed for a strong role for the state in creating structural industrial and employment policies 
financed by the state budget278, and straightforwardly attacked the neo-liberal assumptions 
that privatization is always beneficial and market rules should overrule considerations of 
social justice. 
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The UP’s roots in the Solidarity Trade Union reflected in the party’s political ethos 
and its commitment to the development of an international civil society. In its programmatic 
declaration the party declares its willingness to strike a balance between a communitarian 
view of society deriving from the concept of class and individual autonomy and to combine 
ideological consistency with pragmatism, market economy with democracy, economic 
dynamism with respect for the principles of justice and the environment. The party’s humanist 
view of economic development was reflected in its priorities: the promotion of human, cultural 
and social capital, both with civic and economic purposes in mind. 
The UP saw the development of civil society as a task for the state, through 
programs of citizens’ education. The UP also defended the rights of minorities and was 
committed to the decentralization of the state and a diminished role of church in public affairs. 
However, UP’s origins in progressive social movements led the party to claim more 
universalistic principles of justice, going beyond the narrower claim of international solidarity 
based on the concept of class.  
 
Agrarian’s transformation 
 
The transformation of the United Peasant’s Party (ZSL), a communist satellite 
party, into the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) took place in 1990, and meant a search for the 
roots of the XIX and XX century peasant ideology: biological agrarianism.279 Biological 
agrarianism is based on a metaphor of the nation as a living organism where family farms 
have a vital role.280  The particular history of the Polish agrarian movement determined that 
the PSL ideology was based not only on the defence of agrarian interests, but particularly of 
those of  family farming.  
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The party prescribes farmers as the economic community to be primarily 
supported in face of inequalities generated by the market. In post-communist Poland, the 
PSL’s neo-agrarianism meant a strong interventionist role for the state to support family-
based agricultural farms and resist a drive for commercially more profitable exploitations. The 
PSL’s statist attitude is also inherited from inter-war agrarianism, where the intervention of the 
state to assure an equitable distribution of land was essential.  
The PSL’s warrants the state as the guarantor of the farmers’ welfare. The party 
shared the SLD’s aversion to shock therapy, and this stance became the programmatic 
ground for the party coalition. “Shock therapy has no program for the development of 
agriculture while gradualism has a clear one: the family-based agricultural exploitation.”281 
The defence of family farms was the principle guiding the privatization of state farms. “The 
privatization of state agricultural farms should serve primarily the re-construction of the family 
economy.”282 The defence of small peasant properties has determined its anti-reprivatisation 
position, which could open claims to the peasant properties by other institutions like the 
Church. The strong preference for shaping farmers’ opportunities takes shape in the 
promotion of regional development as a way of fighting regional structural unemployment.  
 
Due to the coincidence of peasant mobilization in the late XIX and early XX 
century in Poland, the PSL’s definition of estate was intertwined with the nation-building 
process. Biological agrarianism, the ideology of the peasant movement of Stanislaw Witos, 
justified the fight for peasant emancipation and land redistribution in the early XX century by 
conceiving the Polish nation as a living organism. In this organic view of the nation, and 
according to its rather elevated conception of the farmers’ estate, family farming is considered 
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as the nation’s most important moral and material resource.283 In the XIX and XX century this 
led the peasant movement in a campaign for land reform, both in radical and moderate forms. 
The party’s neo-agrarian ideology conceived the nation as the fundamental 
political community where peasants have an outstanding mission. This sort of nationalism 
resulted in the attempt to preserve rural values, in the Polish case strongly attached with 
Catholicism. “Natural Law and principles of Christian ethics as well as the historical 
experience of the Polish nation are the fundamentals of the PSL program.”284  
 
Strategic Attitudes 1989-1993 
 
The only party that until 1993 was clearly rejected by all the other parties was the 
post-communist SdRP (later the SLD). Although coming second in the elections, the party 
was still marginalized from the core of acceptable coalition partners. “For all significant parties 
it was unacceptable at that time, and continued to remain unacceptable, to enter into any 
open coalition with, or even to officially cooperate with the SdRP as the heir to the defunct 
communist party (PZPR).”285 In the 1991 elections the SdRP did not seek a place in 
government but hoped for a strong parliamentary presence.286  
The transformation of the SLD into a legitimate catch-all party started before 1989 
and involved the consistent change of the party’s image to one of moderation, 
professionalism and parliamentary cohesion.287 This strategy was explained by one of the 
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party reformers, Josef Oleksy. “We became a pragmatic party. A criticism of this today may 
be justified, but it does not mean that we could have done it otherwise in 1989. We could not, 
and so after the dissolution of the PZPR we consciously became a non-ideological, 
pragmatic, electoral party.”288 To achieve this SdRP served as a pivot for a large number of 
small parties, trade unions and social organisations under the head of the SLD. The SLD’s 
transformation into a party of power is due to the election of a small and young elite group for 
the party leadership in January 1990. Through the acceptance of the market and the staking 
of a laic and liberal social attitude, these elite controlled not only the party’s strategic 
behaviour but also the transformation of its interpretation of class, creating in this way an 
alternative to the right’s discourse.289  
The only surviving political force of interest representation from communist regim 
was the Polish Peasant Party. Historically the representation of farmers in a predominantly 
rural country has been a contested role among Polish parties. In the early days, the once 
satellite of the PZPR, the PSL, competed for this role with the successors of Rural Solidarity, 
the Peasant’s Agreement (PL). The United Peasant Party (ZPL) obtained four out of seven 
cabinet posts in the Mazowiecki transition government in 1990. Although the PSL was a 
satellite of the ZPL it gained acceptance and legitimacy much quicker than the SLD, partly by 
leaving the PZPR block and allowing Solidarity to gain a majority in the post-1989 parliament. 
The PSL’s effectiveness in maintaining an extensive local network maintained through 
auxiliary organisations such as the volunteer fire-fighting brigades supported the loyalty of 
farmers inherited from communist times.290 The party also inherited from the ZPL 
considerable financial resources, which provided another advantage for the party. In 1991 the 
PSL’s leader Waldemar Pawłak was the first choice of Lech Wałęsa for prime minister, but 
failed in forming a cabinet. During the 1991-1993 parliament the PSL was already an 
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acceptable coalition partner and was integrated into the category of core parties much earlier 
than the SLD.  
 
 
The European attitudes of left-wing parties between 1991-93 
 
The SLD’s European attitudes: Until the 1993 elections the SLD kept its 
proximity to Moscow by objecting to NATO’s expansion, supporting instead Gorbatchev’s 
concept of a “Common European Home.”291 A declaration of the Supreme Council of the 
party read: “The change of policy of the German states illustrates that interests run higher 
than illusory hopes. After several months of unsuccessful attempts of rapprochement with the 
Federal Republic of Germany (...) it becomes clear that Europe remains divided in military 
blocks, and therefore that NATO expansion to the Polish border is not acceptable, as it is not 
acceptable to quit the security guarantees of the Warsaw Pact.”292 The uncertainty regarding 
the future of the Soviet Union has determined the conservative attitude of the party regarding 
the geopolitical choices that Poland faced. 
The SdRP remained extremely cautious in adopting a clear stance on European 
integration, this attitude reflecting a conditional scepticism towards the a priori compatibility 
between European integration as a political, economic and security project and the national 
interest. This was expressed more clearly in the refusal to support NATO extension and the 
reunification of Germany.293 . It was only during the Second Congress of the SdRP’s in March 
1993 that Aleksander Kwaśniewski, then party leader, advanced a clearly positive attitude 
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towards NATO expansion. 294 The geopolitical context of the demise of the Soviet Block 
should be taken into consideration in explaining the SLD’s Soft Euroscepticism and its 
opposition to Polish integration in the trans-Atlantic defence system. However, the SdRP 
opposition to European integration in this period also reflects the stage of the party’s 
transformation into a social democratic party. Until attaining governmental office in 1993 the 
party contested the right-wing’s government radical marketisation measures by maintaining 
that the state should remain strongly involved in regulating the market through redistributive 
policies. The SdRP’s scepticism regarding European integration reflected an opposition to a 
supranational policy regime that appeared to impose a further downsizing of the state and the 
deepening of marketisation measures.  
 
The PSL’s European Attitude: Already in the early nineties, underneath the 
general consensual statements on EU accession, the PSL clearly doubted the goodness of 
opening agricultural markets. “Being favourable to the integration of Poland in the EEC, we 
underline the need to question whether this road leads us to a false objective. We should 
know whether integration is separate from liberal fundamentalism”.295 The PSL also 
considered that “market openness is not always a good thing” and that the formula of “Europe 
of the Nations”296 suits the party best. This attitude was a reaction to the protectionist attitude 
of the EU during the negotiations of the Association Agreements regarding Polish agriculture 
and steel products.  
When the effects of the 1991 Association Agreements became clear, the PSL 
became particularly critical of the protectionist attitude regarding Polish products and 
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demanded its renegotiation. After the Europe Agreements the party’s position on the EU was 
of an unconditional Euroscepticism. The discrimination felt by Polish farmers had long lasting 
effects and set the party’s attitude towards accession negotiations. In 1997 this theme was 
still present in party declarations: “one can not tolerate the asymmetry advantaging the EU in 
opening the Polish market to agricultural products.”297 However since the full implications of 
accession, both in terms of access to the European markets and the CAP direct income 
contributions were not known, the PSL’s stance remained conditional on concessions of the 
EU towards Polish agriculture, and could be classified as Soft Eurosceptic. 
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 1993-1997: The governmental experience 
 
Attaining power and further transformation 
 
The September 1993 elections constituted a monumental change in the fortunes 
of left-wing parties in Poland. Although the victory of the ex-communists in the parliamentary 
elections was aided by the fragmentation of the right-wing parties, this success would have 
been impossible without the gradual and consistent transformation of the party’s identity.298 
The domination of the oligarchy established in the transition was crucial for the continuing 
reinterpretation of the party’s ethos. “Closed oligarchic procedures, accompanied by a 
controlled members’ mobilization, decide over the leadership recruitment outcomes. The 
choice of the leader is based on the consensus among the party elite, which contributes to his 
strong position within the party as well as outside it.”299 The time sequence proved equally 
important for the outcome: the elite group that promoted the PZPR’s transformation into social 
democracy in the late eighties kept control over the party identity evolution.300  
During the 1993 election campaign the modernizing leadership of the SdRP dwelt 
in the political legacy of left-wing modernisation and carved out a left-libertarian profile, first of 
all by presenting an absolute commitment to secularism. The party was unequivocal in its 
support for the liberalisation of the restrictive abortion law, and its secular stances took nearly 
11 percent of the program.301 At the time the Catholic Church became notorious for its 
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attempts to influence public policy through its instructions to voters during Church services 
and by pressuring post-Solidarity political parties to heed Church teachings. The party’s 
libertarian stance was appealing to all those that opposed this influence.302 The SLD’s 
secularism and criticism of the Church became an appealing feature of the party, and a 
sufficiently relevant one in the context of the heated debates on socio-cultural issues taking 
place in Poland.  
For the SLD the left libertarian stance ensued easily from the progressive 
tradition of communism and the profile of its leaders. Carving a new identity based on this 
tradition proved a successful strategy for the oligarchy controlling the SLD. Equally natural 
and intertwined with its left libertarian tradition was the adoption of an internationalist identity, 
deriving from the PZPR internationalist traditions. In practice the party’s internationalism was 
reinforced by the search for legitimacy of the reformed ex-communists, and in this context the 
stress the party put on membership of the Socialist International is easily explainable. The 
international isolation to which the ex-communists were condemned in the early 90s was 
progressively brought to an end as a result of the party’s electoral results and the efforts of 
the party leadership. Tadeusz Iwinski, the party’s International Secretary recalls the long 
efforts made by the party to achieve international recognition.303 The search for international 
legitimacy still appeared to be the driving force for the urge to define its international identity: 
“The membership of the Socialist International is the most important and meaningful event for 
us. It is a word of acknowledgement for the transformation achieved in our country and the 
depth of change of the Polish left. Membership is also seen as a weapon against 
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discrimination: “Those who would want to call us ‘communists’ and ‘post-communists’ will 
expose themselves to the ridicule.”304 Internationalism and the party’ commitment to a 
libertarian position seem to go hand in hand: “We hope to deserve the current membership of 
the International Socialist, whose principles of social justice are combined with the principles 
of freedom, individualism and autonomy of the citizens.”305 Through the anchoring of its 
identity in the tradition of European socialism, the Polish left became susceptible to influence 
by the transformation under way in the West European left.  
The victory of the SLD in the 1993 elections meant that the UP had to make a 
choice between integrating the SLD and remaining oblivious to the SLD’s success. 
Confronted with the SLD’s invitation for participating in government the party rejected it, 
hoping for a reassertion of a separate identity and the opportunity to become a more genuine 
social democratic alternative to the SLD.  
 
After taking office in 1993 the SLD changed several of its economic stances. The 
main question was whether the party would continue Balcerowicz economic policies or 
abandon them for deficit-funded demand-side policies. By choosing finance ministers eager to 
continue Balcerowicz’s reforms and assure sound fiscal policies the party made clear that the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the campaign had been replaced by economic “real politics” aimed at 
controlling the budget deficit, combating inflation, cutting down expenditures and opening the 
economy to foreign investment. This implied, with time, a strong change in the party’s 
economic ethos and the abandon of the early nineties slogan of “marketisation with state 
interventionism” policy. In 1997 the party’s economic program had dropped all elements of 
economic policy which could have made their discourse seem backward in the context of the 
European left transformation. The emphasis on a traditional understanding of social justice 
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remained in the party’s programme until 1997, being supported by a faction committed to 
traditional leftist redistributive values.  
In the 1997 campaign the party’s strategy was to prove that it would implement 
market reforms better. The SLD’s program was marked by an evolution in economic values, 
in particular regarding the redistributive role of the state. Classical social democratic policies, 
like employment or social welfare, lost their centrality in the party’s programs. In part, this 
evolution seems to reflect the party’s governmental experience when it had to implement 
economic reforms imposed by the World Bank and the IMF.306 
 
An alternative left prefigured 
 
In contrast with the SdRP, the UP maintained its commitment to a large-sized 
state budget ready to provide for welfare programs and to intervene in the economy to 
compensate for market failure. The party also prescribed that the process of privatization 
should be stopped, since the structure of ownership in terms of public and private ownership 
of the Polish economy in 1996 was then ideal.307 For that reason in its V Programmatic 
Document, prepared for the 1997 parliamentary elections, the UP reasserts its traditional 
leftist identity and demanded that the state should further control privatization of state 
economic assets through a “map of privatization”, rather than letting market forces prevail.308 
This policy intended to protect the market from further foreign acquisitions. In line with this, 
tax revenues were deemed to be used strategically to protect the Polish economic potential 
from the competition of international business and the market instability of its eastern 
neighbourhood.  
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Between 1993 and 1997 the PSL’s nationalist faction lead by Waldemar Pawłak 
was reinforced by the authority conferred to the party leader by its premiership. This meant 
that Pawłak’s conservative interpretation of the concept of estate prevailed.309 His 
predominance was contested by more liberal-minded members that considered that a non-
nationalist interpretation of estate would result on de-emphasizing the focus on family farming 
and accept an agricultural reform based on efficiency principles. The party’s conservative 
outlook was also motivated by the virtual exclusion of right-wing parties from the SdRP-
dominated parliament, inciting the party to take up such a role. However, the PSL’s adoption 
of a nationalist identity was not taken to its logical conclusion through the integration of a 
right-wing formation. 
The PSL’s conflicts between 1995 and 1997 were documented in the 
proceedings and documents of a series of party conferences. Party documents of this epoch 
testify to the conflicts among factions. In the PSL’s V Congress in June 1997, one of the main 
objectives delineated by the party was “to profit from the historical shape given by the peasant 
movement to the system of values.”310 Another document, the party’s ideological declaration, 
commits the party to neo-agrarianism, and states that the PSL’s ideology draws upon the 
“centuries’ long endeavour of the peasantry to live in freedom and participate equally in the 
life of the state.”311 The party document emphasized the role of “agriculture as one of the 
main areas of production and the basis for national survival” with “family farms constituting the 
foundation for the harmonious development of villages and the countryside” and the basis of 
the agricultural system. Another document of the epoch made references to the willingness to 
appeal more broadly to “that portion of the Polish society which lives in the countryside and 
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the small towns, far-removed from the urban centre”312 but the dominant faction focused on 
assuring the support of the party’s traditional core constituency.313 
The conflict over the definition of the party’s economic unit of mobilization and 
identity was expressed in the leadership conflict between Roman Jagielinski, deputy Prime 
Minister and Agricultural Minister between 1995 and 1997, and the party hierarchy. Roman 
Jagielinski was seen as the supporter of “big farmers”, and generally of a broader 
interpretation of the concept of estate, which conflicted with the official line of the party. 
Jagielinski’s conceptions translated in a conception of agricultural reform that favoured the 
transformation of parties and made him a persona non grata within the party, obliging him to 
resign from the post.  
It took a landslide defeat and a change of leadership for the party to abandon its 
previous conceptions of agricultural reform. Pawłak’s preponderance was gradually brought to 
an end by his poor electoral results in the presidential elections of 1995 (4.31 percent) and 
the party’s defeat in the 1997 elections (7.31 percent against 15.6 percent in the 1993 
elections). Eventually the dominant faction’s authoritarianism and nationalism314 was replaced 
by a modernising approach professed by the former deputy prime minister and Agriculture 
Minister Jarosław Kalinowski, who replaced Waldemar Pawłak as party leader in October 
1997.  
Elected in October 1997 the new leader recognized that the party had defined too 
narrowly its constituency. “We allowed ourselves, mainly through our own fault, to be 
characterized as a ‘class party’… because we also took upon ourselves the role of a trade 
union… As a party we should express our views on the most important issues, such as the 
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stabilization of production and the growth of incomes, and not concern ourselves solely with 
the price of specific agricultural products.”315  
 
Strategic choices 1993-1997 
 
By 1993 the PSL, already recovered from its communist past, became the only 
possible coalition partner for the SLD. The PSL’s quick recovery of a centrist status in the 
party system resulted both from the fact that the regime divide impeded any post-Solidarity 
parties to form a coalition with the SLD316 and results also from the fragmentation of the party 
scene in the early nineties. This fragmentation “presents a standing temptation to one or other 
of the smaller opposition parties to move over, as indeed the agrarians did repeatedly in 
Scandinavia.”317 The determination to restore an image of moderation also led the PSL to re-
establish good relations with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.318 The 1993 elections 
confirmed the PSL as the farmers’ political representative when the party achieved 15 percent 
of the vote.  
The 1993 parliamentary elections also marked the PSL’s entrance into the 
political centre. Parties representing a specific constituency have a strong tradition in Poland, 
inherited from the communist past and its opposition, the Solidarity Trade Union. The Trade 
Union revived its political role as the main force behind the AWS. However, not only has this 
role been transitory, but it also seems to have deflected Solidarity from its role of representing 
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the interests of workers.319 The only surviving political force of interest representation from 
communist regime was therefore the Polish Peasant Party.  
 
 
The European attitudes of parties between 1993 and 1997 
 
The SLD’s European attitude: The conversion of SLD’s attitudes towards 
European integration from Soft Euroscepticism to Hard Europhilism came during the 1993 
election campaign.320 The support for NATO expansion, which the SLD had previously 
refused, was the visible face of this transformation. The party progressively made an 
unconditional support for accession to the European Union part of its prominent policy 
stances. Around 1994 the party started portraying integration as a one-time chance to avoid a 
peripheral status and access the centre of European economic power.321 The emphasis put 
by the party on its unconditional Europhilism paralleled the transformation to social 
democracy of a Western kind. Indeed, although the changing geopolitical circumstances of 
Poland in relation to the USSR account for an explanation of the party’s attitudes to European 
integration322 the transformation of the party and its experience in government resulted in a 
long-term change of the party’s appreciation of the EU’s policy regimes.  
Indeed, governmental experience changed the party’s perception of the EU policy 
regimes. Although having been elected on a platform of protest to shock therapy, once in 
government the SLD quickly realised the constraining effect of international commitments on 
its economic policies. During the period in office the party progressively considered the 
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relatively protective character of the European Union’s policy regimes in relation to the 
international standards imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The party joined other 
European social democratic parties in its call for initiatives to bolster EU-level social policies. 
The change of stance of the party towards the European Union was consolidated and during 
the campaign for the 1997 parliamentary elections the party portrayed itself as the most able 
force to lead Poland into membership of the European Union.323 The European issue 
appeared prominently on its electoral campaign.  
 
The UP’s European attitudes: The UP’s attitude towards European integration 
was at this time one of conditional Euroscepticism. The party’s commitment to the 
maintenance of high levels of social protection by the state lead it to consider that it could only 
support European integration if the EU could guarantee the high levels of social protection in 
the European space. The perception that European integration would just increase the 
pressures for the lowering of social standards, i.e., that the EU was mainly an agent of market 
liberalisation and for the degrading of standards of the welfare state, determined the party’s 
conditional Euroscepticism. The conditions for the party’s support are that the European 
Union sets itself the task of labour markets’ regulation.324  
When mentioning the concerns on the social effects of European integration on 
the disfavoured classes, the UP links it with the argument that Poland should quickly ratify the 
European Charter of Social Rights.325 The UP’s Soft Euroscepticism also stressed that Poland 
should fully adopt European Social regulation. The party’s cosmopolitan political ethos 
determined a conditional opposition to European integration. If the European Union further 
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develops its regulatory role as a guardian of high standards of social protection and fight 
against unemployment, the party would give it its full support.326 
 
The PSL’s European Position: From 1993 to 1997 the PSL a priori rejected the 
coincidence between the national interest and European integration. The party’s Hard 
Euroscepticism was justified not only by fears of an asymmetric application of the CAP 
benefits to Poland but also by the party’s nationalist political ethos. The fear that market 
openness would lead not only to the flooding of the Polish market by European subsidized 
agricultural products, but would also give access of foreign investors to agricultural and food 
production, was the condition for PSL’s Euroscepticism. These fears were justified by the 
effects of the 1992 Association Agreements, which proved devastating for Polish small-
holding farmers. The Association Agreements were portrayed as revealing of the protectionist 
attitude of the European Union, an organisation where poor and rich countries have 
asymmetric power in defending their interests.327 The party illustrated this stance with 
examples of the selective rewards of the CAP price mechanisms.328 The European issue also 
played with the conflicts between Jagielinski and Pawłak’ factions on the desirable type of 
agricultural reform. The Commission’s demands for an increase of the size of agricultural 
holdings dove-tailed with Jagielinski’s positions and threatened Pawłak’s stance that family-
based agricultural exploitations be sustained with the help of an interventionist policy at the 
EU level.  
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 1997-2005: The consolidation and fall of the left  
 
Consolidating its profile 
 
By 2000 it was already clear that the SLD would probably constitute the next 
government. At this time the SLD was established as a party of power, capable of 
implementing reforms and run efficiently the state machinery, and being essentially a pro-
market force. However, as other left-wing parties elsewhere in Europe, the party leadership 
searched for a formula encompassing the transformation of its economic ethos, achieved 
through a new interpretation of the principle of social justice. This new interpretation implied 
the renouncing of budget-financed demand-side policies. This has, however, not been 
specifically pursued in governmental policies, with the SLD being weakly commited to deficit 
restraint in face of economic crisis.  
In an internal party speech, the SLD’s general secretary Leszek Miller enunciated 
the Polish Third Way, not in the fashion of Tito but of Tony Blair.329 Consistent with its 
previous programmatic evolution, the SLD attempted to further the image of a modern centre-
left party not only through its left libertarian profile but also by building a technocratic profile 
that implicitly meant the acceptance of the principles of budgetary discipline and giving up 
demand-side instruments of intervention for correcting market inequalities. Despite the 
differences of interpretation it sustained with the UP, still faithful to a traditional interpretation 
of the policies aimed at reducing market inequalities, the SLD proposed to the UP a coalition 
and the two parties ran on the same list in the 2001 elections. The appearance of a workers’ 
party was also maintained by the presence of trade unionists from the OPZZ within its ranks, 
but the UP’s alliance strongly reinforced the coalition’s role as a left-wing party. The eight-
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year resistance of the UP to a coalition with the SLD was then overcome after the party’s poor 
results in the 1997 elections and the change of leadership to Marek Pol. 
 
 
Tough choices for the agrarians 
 
Jarosław Kalinowski, party leader elected in 1997, was successful in quelling the 
debate within the party and re-defining the PSL’s political and economic identity. Certainly the 
parliamentary caucus after the 2001 elections was presided over by a more hard-line 
representative, Janusz Dobrosz, and regional leaders, such as Zdisław Podkanski from 
Lublin, kept a strong position within the party. But Kalinowski’s leadership imposed an overall 
strategy of openness to a wider electorate outside traditional farmers. In an interview to 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Kalinowski asserted that more radical measures (like the ones undertaken 
by the PSL leaders in Lublin330) would drive away new supporters outside the traditional 
electorate and concluded: “If we remain in the trenches we only can lose.”331  
Kalinowski’s leadership made the party a possible coalition partner for both 
centre-right and centre-left governments.332 The PSL eventually joined the SLD in a 
governmental coalition in 2001 and Kalinowski became Deputy Prime Minister, Agriculture 
Minister and negotiator of the controversial agricultural chapter with the European 
Commission. The negotiations leading to government formation showed once again the 
dividing lines within the PSL and the fact that Kalinowski’s efforts to carve a more open 
definition of the PSL’s political and economic identity met with high resistance within the party. 
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The party portrayed itself as the representative of the whole rural population and proposed 
measures of agricultural reform that took into account the interests of the whole peasant class 
rather than aiming solely at assuring the survival of small-holding peasants. This change 
meant that although the party’s concept of estate still referred to family farmers as possessing 
a fundamental and almost sacred role in the Polish nation, 333  the neo-agrarian roots of the 
party, Jarosław Kalinowski persisted in a centrist and pragmatic pursuit of a strategy to 
enlarge the appeal of the party beyond the peasant class.  
 
The rise of the extreme left: Samoobrona 
 
Despite having entered politics in 1992 as an agrarian trade union, when 
Samoobrona attained parliamentary representation in 2001 it still resembled a movement 
rather than a party. This was partly due to the fact that despite the party’s origins the 
Samoobrona’s ethos was based on a claim to represent the disfavoured classes. However, 
the adaptability of Samoobrona’s programmatic stances is one of the most notorious 
characteristics of the party. This flexibility results from the party not being positioned on either 
side of the communist/anti-communist political divide.334 The party was therefore successful 
in creating a series of coalitions with the most disparate groups, like the army, ultra-
nationalists and utopic socialists. The Samoobrona’s secondary political ethos is nationalist, 
resulting from an aversion to a liberal international order.  
                                                     
Samoobrona’s 1992 ideological declaration states that the movement “does not 
only represent farmers, but a wider spectrum of interests, such as those of workers, the 
unemployed, the pensioners and the milieu of culture and education.”335 The attempt to 
 
 
 
 
333 In the role of Agriculture Minister in 15 August 2002 Jarosław Kalinowski declared that “Farmers and the villages 
are the main biological and moral wealth reserved of the Nation”. Quoted in RFE/RL Newsline, August 2002.  
334 Interview with Modzelewski, K. “The Populist Right in the Polish Elections”, Przegląd Tygodnik, 15 October 2001.  
335 Może, a Więc Muszi Być Lepiej, Samoobronej Programy Narodowej (It Can, and it Must Get Better, National 
Program of the Samoobrona), Warsaw: 1992. 
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appeal to all those that suffer from the transition to market liberalism, reflected not only in 
populist rhetoric, but also derives from a loose organization that engaged in a non-
conventional, protest profile. “The Samoobrona is a cry to the Polish society to mobilize and 
fight to protect our national identity and sovereignty, the fight for the future of the country, the 
fight against politicians who lie and against the demoralization and the cynicism spread by the 
politicians that betray the people.”336 The Samoobrona also asserted that the role of the state 
in the domain of cultural policy should be that of promoting national culture by stressing the 
traditions of Polish culture. “This road leads to an ‘organic system’ in which the great diversity 
of human behaviour is integrated through a system of cooperation in the interest of all the 
society, the nation and the state.”337 The Samoobrona’s nationalism is not linked to 
Catholicism or to an authoritarian position in socio-cultural issues. Lepper’s anti-clericalism 
indeed grew with time. 
The Samoobrona’s vague ideological principles involved a commitment to a 
“healthy development, the care for disfavoured people and the national interest.” Lepper 
articulated its protest in a conspiratorial tone against the liberal national and the international 
elite. “The present domination in the system of global relations of an international coalition of 
liberal elites and political corporate finance, indifferent to ordinary people and whole nations, 
using methods of economic totalitarianism, financial terror, controlled information and a 
façade of corrupt democracy, must give way to a humanitarian order, the enlightened 
representation of free peoples with universal principles, humanistic values and cooperative 
principles on the global international system.”338  
On the wake of registering the Samoobrona as a political party in November 1999 
Andrzej Lepper adopted a more defined radical-left identity following a series of strikes that 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
336 Idem. 
337 Trzecja Droga, Polityka Bezpieczenctwa, Jestesmy w Europie, Program Wyborczy Kandidata na Prezydenta RP 
Andrzeja Leppera. (Third Way, Security Policy, We Are in Europe, Presidential Program of Candidate Andrzej 
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338 Idem. 
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succeeded in paralyzing the country in January and February 1999. While in its Congress in 
April 1999 the Samoobrona still counted with a wing of supporters belonging to the extreme 
right-wing milieu, such as the notoriously anti-Semitic General Wilecki,339 in the 1 May 1999 
demonstrations in Warsaw, Lepper called for the creation of a “worker-peasant alliance”, 
dismissed the extreme nationalist wing, and emphasized his friendly relations with Jerzy 
Urban, the left-wing radical editor of the anticlerical weekly Nie.  
 
The protection of the disfavoured classes from the alleged attacks of liberal 
international conspiracies is the basic tenet of the party’s economic doctrine. The farmers’ 
radical protest methods are shown as an example to the rest of the society: “Poland is being 
killed slowly, plant by plant, sector after sector. The protests of Polish farmers have shown the 
whole society the way these crimes are performed and the methods to prevent them.”340 
Liberalism is portrayed as a crime, as a mechanism of thought which distorts reality and 
manipulates the Polish nation. “We denounce the untruthful thesis that there is no other 
alternative to the present reforms, which were imposed through blackmail by the foreign 
centres of political power.”341 
To oppose such international liberal order Lepper advocated a strong state in the 
defence of the weaker social elements, guaranteeing “the right to work and fair pay, a roof 
over one’s head and a good health care system.” “The state should work to decrease 
unemployment, through a programme of massive job creation. The sponsoring of housing 
construction should also become one of the tasks of the state; the policy should have as its 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
339 “Atrakcyjny Lepper”, Rzeczpospolita, 6 April 1999, it is reported that the ultra nationalist General Wilecki called 
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341 Idem. 
 152 
main purpose the creation of employment and bringing down house prices to “an affordable 
level.”342 
To this strategy Lepper called the Third Way. “We have enough of the road to the 
‘Left’ and to the ‘right’. We will try to go straight to you, acting according only to the natural 
law.”343 Despite its claim to represent a centrist option during the 2000 presidential campaign 
Lepper described himself as the most left-wing candidate, aspiring to raise low social benefits 
and pensions.344 This state-centred approach became more explicit with the statement that as 
a result of these pro-social policies “the Polish people should remain a society that respects 
its state, a power that represents its people rather than foreign interests.” 345 
 
Strategic attitudes 1997-2005 
 
After loosing office in the autumn of 1997 the SLD and PSL continued to pursue a 
centrist strategy. In the 1997 election the SLD not only maintained but also slowly increased 
its share of the vote from 20% to 27%.  The quarrelling within the AWS-UW coalition meant 
that the SLD appeared by comparision a competent and rational alternative, and soon its 
popularity started to increase steadily. By 2000 it was clear that the party would regain power 
in the next elections. In 1999 the SLD changed its constitution from a coalition to a party, 
consolidating a unitary structure around the membership of the SdRP. Its reputation for good 
governance paid off when the party regained office in 2001 with 41% of the vote. The SLD 
started governing in 2001 with a marked advantage and high popularity, and thr SLD/PSL 
coalition again was formed. Soon it emerged that the party had difficulty in agreeing on the 
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austerity measures needed to implement to maintain the budget deficit under control, a 
condition imposed by the European Stability Pact of high importance for the accession to the 
EU. The whole term was marked by serious corruption scandals, and these soon undermined 
the popularity the party enjoyed at the beginning of the term. By the end of 2003 the SLD/UP 
had lost its lead in public opinion polls to the Civic Platform. By the beginning of 2005 the 
polling institutes showed that the SLD might have a problem in clearing the 5% threshold in 
the forthcoming election. In March 2004 over 30 deputies from the SLD/UP coalition broke 
away and formed new leftist party, the SdLP and the only stable party seemed to be 
undergoing the same path of disintegration as that of   
 
The PSL suffered a loss of electorate in the 1997 elections, and under a new 
leadership by Jaroslaw Kalinowski, it attempted to enlarge its appeal beyond the narrow 
spectrum of small farmers. The PSL’s record of success was more mixed than that of the 
SLD: in 2001 the party’s electorate was still largely confined to the rural vote, and its 
decreased popularity meant that the party would have a smaller leverage over the run of the 
coalition than in the 1993-1997 coalition. The party was under great pressure to comply with 
the SLD’s policy priorities, while having to avoid being seen as selling off the interests of its 
consitutents to its stay in power. Under these multiple pressures the PSL broke off its coalition 
with the SLD in March 2003. 
After 2003 the SLD continued to govern but in a minority status, and the stepping 
down of prime minister Leszek Miller after EU accession in 2004 led to the creation of a 
caretaker government under Marek Belka was introduced, running the country until the 
autumn of 2005, when it lost office to a coalition of the PiS, gaining only 12% of the vote. 
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The European attitudes of left-wing parties between 1997 and 2005 
 
The SLD’s European positions: The results of the 2001 elections made 
attitudes towards European integration one of the most divisive factor in parliament and within 
the SLD-PSL government. The SLD government’s readiness to compromise with the EU on 
contentious issues in Poland’s EU membership negotiations, including the purchase of land 
by foreigners and the free movement of labour, was taken by its right-wing opponents as the 
proof of the government’s unconditional Europhilism.346 This attitude was explained by Jósef 
Oleksy, widely held as the leading conceptual thinker on European integration, as a stance 
that is opposed to “the conservative way of understanding history, the state and the nation”. 
Oleksy argues that behind the right-wing discourse on European integration there is “an 
historical, sentimental patriotism and the common phobias and stereotypes that exist in Polish 
society.”347 Oleksy criticizes the right-wing portrayal of accession as a “return to the West”348 
and considers that this discourse derives from nationalist conceptions that hinder the 
acceptance of integration as an intrinsically good project pursuing the freedom and the 
citizens’ economic well-being. On another occasion Oleksy pledges for a change in the 
character of Polish patriotism from a concept based on fear and protectionism to an open and 
cooperative concept.349  
The SLD’s Hard Europhilism derives from the coincidence of the economic 
objectives of the European Union and the party’s re-operationalised economic ethos. The 
change of the SLD’s position occurred after the change of EU policy regimes and was solely a 
result of the internal party change. Concurrent with its transformation of its policy stances and 
economic ideology, the party started participating in meetings of European social democratic 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
346 “Handelsblatt” on 30 August, quoted by RFE/RL 31 August 2001.  
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parties, the SLD declared its support for Social Europe and gave its Europhilism a leftist 
tone.350  
It is not exaggerated to say that the election to office of the SLD in 2001 was 
decisive for the fast conclusion of the Polish accession negotiations that had stalled on 
several issues under the AWS government, namely on the 18-year transition period for the 
selling off of land to foreigners. After the resolution of this issue, the party showed its 
commitment to integration in managing the negotiations on the terms of the integration of 
Polish agriculture in the CAP. This was a particularly sensitive issue for its coalition partner, 
the PSL. The SLD showed throughout the negotiations a strong commitment to integrating 
Poland in the EU, honouring its image as a Hard Europhile party, commited to the integration 
of Poland in a supranational European entity.  
 
The PSL’s European positions: Between 1997 and 2005 the PSL’s positioning 
on the scale of attitudes towards Europe changed from a Eurosceptic position to Soft 
Europhilism. The PSL’s a priori recognition that the EU interests are different from the Polish 
national interests has effectively evolved into a conditional Europhilism. This change is mainly 
noticeable in the stances and conditions issued by the party during the accession 
negotiations.351 The Peasant Party’s essential condition for supporting the EU was that a level 
playing field between Polish and EU farmers be established, and not necessarily the 
reception of direct subsidies from the EU. In 1997 the PSL demanded that Polish farmers be 
“included in the Common Agricultural Policy from the moment when Poland joins the EU (with 
Poland) entitled to the same payments and structural funds on the basis of principles that 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
350 During the preceding years the SLD participated regularly and consistently in the meetings of the International 
Socialist, 1996 New York, the Budapest European Summit of Socialist Leaders in October 1996 and the following 
one in London in April 1998. Author’s interview with Tadeusz Iwinski, August 1999. 
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have operated in the Union up until now”.352 However, when reacting to the CAP reform in the 
mid-term review in 2002, which intended to sever the link between farm subsidies and farm 
output and in time equalizing subsidies throughout the enlarged EU, the party’s conditions 
changed. The equality of conditions for all European farmers, rather than absolute levels of 
support, became the most crucial condition for support.353 Although the party still considered 
it necessary to claim an anti-discriminatory pledge,354 it accepted the EU’s supranational 
character of decision- making.  
Europe was, however, a seriously dividing issue within the party, its most 
conservative faction following a strict interpretation of neo-agrarianism and remaining sceptic 
of the effects of integration on family farmers. The progressive faction of the party revised its 
position on the European Union and the CAP’s impact in the welfare of Polish farmers. This 
resulted from the evolution of Polish relations with the EU. Indeed the accession negotiations, 
as a give and take process, resulted in the party abandoning its perception of the CAP as a 
system of domination of the poor by the rich and Kalinowski’s leadership stroke a more 
rational appreciation of the CAP’s effects on the Polish peasants.355  
Indeed, despite its Eurosceptic faction, the PSL campaigned for accession in the 
referendum campaign. The party linked its support for EU accession to the issuing of a land 
turnover law that was approved just before Easter 2003 and campaigned on the slogan “Don’t 
fear the Union. We are with you!” Kalinowski stated that the accession to the EU was an 
opportunity of unifying those forces that accept integration but see it as a challenge. “We can 
equate the Polish EU accession to the mobilization (of the peasant electorate) in the nineteen 
twenties, which permitted to ignore many differences dividing politicians and unify the country. 
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I repeat, the EU does not take away our independence but it is a big, epoch-making 
challenge.”356 
 
The Samoobrona’s European position: The left-wing parties have seen the 
presence of a competing Eurosceptic party for the first time after the Samoobrona’s electoral 
feat on the 2001 elections. The Samoobrona’s position has been until the 2001 parliamentary 
elections one of outright Hard Euroscepticism. The Samoobrona rejected integration on the 
grounds that it threatens “the state and the national economic sovereignty.” Lepper’s defence 
of the economically disfavoured classes led him to focus primarily on the question of Polish 
economic sovereignty, which was threatened by the “transnational corporations that want to 
eliminate the Polish economy and provoke the demise of several branches of industry and 
agriculture.357 Poland is only needed for these corporations as a “reserve of cheap labour and 
an outlet of their products”. This lethal process can only be stopped through the “cooperation 
of all true patriots”.358 Instead of European integration, Lepper and his party offered Poland an 
ambiguous concept of political and economic autarchy to which is sometimes added a pan-
Slavic ideology. 359 
During the 2001 election campaign Samoobrona’s attitude towards European 
integration changed. Andrzej Lepper was less vocal in its opposition to integration; “We do not 
share the arguments of certain opponents to European integration, for whom accession to the 
Union and the submission of our laws to the European institutions is equivalent to a loss or a 
restriction of Polish independence.” Lepper’s self-declared Euro-realism meant the party’s 
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rational judgement of the pros and contras of integration,360 but his declarations were often 
contradictory. While in January 2002 he would declare in the Sejm: “Today we say a square 
‘No’ to the European Union, because we cannot see that we will ever attain any real 
partnership. We see nowadays that we are at Europe’s feet, submissive to its wishes. The 
Union offers us worse and worse conditions and the government agrees to that – in the name 
of which interests, I dare to ask?”361 However, in April 2002 Lepper would contradict these 
declarations and proclaim: “Contrarily to the accusations spread, the Samoobrona is not an 
anti-European party. If Poland is able to negotiate equal conditions of accession to the EU, 
(…) becoming a member of the Union in the shortest time possible is, from any point of view, 
a good idea”.362 Despite the ambiguity of its positions, Lepper seems to have matched the 
abandon of nationalist rhetoric with a conditional Euroscepticism.   
 
Analysis 
 
In the last decade and a half of democracy the former regime parties have 
evolved from communist regime parties to versions of European left-wing parties. The SLD 
proceded to an extensive ideological reformulation of communism to social democracy, while 
the transformation of the other regime party, the PSL, into a democratic agrarian party also 
implied a redefinition of its ideological identity, although of a more limited nature. The chapter 
describes the different phases of ideological evolution of these parties, their strategies of 
competition and European attitudes.  
The SLD’s transformation was a gradual process of adaptation of ideological 
stances from the communist belief in planned economy to the acceptance of the limitations 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
360 Programy Samoobrone Wybory Parlymentary 2001, (The Samoobrona’s Parliamentary Election Program 2001), 
Warsaw: 2001. 
361 Lepper’s declarations in the Sejm, Stenographia Wydawnictwa, January 2002. 
 159
brought by globalisation to the state’s redistributive role. The transformation started in the late 
eighties, when party leaders discussed economic fundamental beliefs in the market. Despite 
being favourable to the marketization of the Polish economy in the early nineties, the SdRP 
rejected Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz’s radical liberalisation measures. Between 
1993 and 1997, while in office, the party complied with the restraining effects of international 
commitments to low public expenditure and a balanced budget. The 1997 SdRP’s election 
manifesto reflected the transformation brought about during the party’s tenure in office. 
Although employment and social welfare were still central to its economic programme, the 
party declared its engagement in balancing redistribution and economic growth. In 2001 the 
party victory was widely perceived to be a reward for the party’s transformation, and its 
sharing with the European centrist consensus on economic reform. However, soon the party 
showed to be severely divided on the priority to be given to the measures to keep a balanced 
budget, so much so that in 2004 the party was in a deep crisis, adding to the split of an 
important faction to create the Social Democratic Alternative. 
Quickly restored to mainstream politics despite its communist past, agrarians’ 
ideological reform was more straightforward, implying a return to the agrarian movements’ 
early XX century roots. This meant that after 1989 the transformation of the ZPL into the PSL 
was based on a fusion of agrarian and national principles, and implied recovering from the 
early XX century a conception of agrarian families as the ultimate moral and material resource 
of the nation. When its electoral fortunes declined, the party leadership attempted to enlarge 
its electorate beyond small farmers, while keeping its ideological commitments to state 
support for smallholders. Its position on the party system and a consistent office-seeking 
attitude granted the party the status of king-maker in the Polish party system.  
Andrzej Lepper’s Samoobrona ideological profile is hard to pin-down, as from its 
inception as a rural trade union its options have been rather volatile. The party’s evolution in 
the last years reveals a basic identification not only with farmers but also with all those heavily 
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disadvantaged by the transition. The Samoobrona can therefore be classified as an extreme-
left party. 
Parties’ evolving conceptions of ways to attain their preferred economic regime 
impacts on their evaluation of European integration. This allows social democrats, agrarian 
and far-left parties’, over time, to change their evaluations of Europe. The analysis of the 
Polish left-wing European attitudes demonstrates the idea that parties’ perceptions of the 
compatibility between their preferred economic regime and the European regime may change 
over time. Theoretically one may explain that by the divisible nature of economic concepts, 
which, contrarily to political ones, allow for partial fulfilment. Social democrats and agrarian 
parties evaluate European integration on condition it partially match their preferred economic 
regime. If political conceptions are concomitant with economic parties’ evaluations they may 
or not strengthen them.  
Throughout the nineties social democrats across Europe came to acknowledge 
the EU’s contribution to a regime of regulated capitalism. In Poland the SLD’s conversion to 
Europe was concomitant with the revision of its economic beliefs. In the early nineties the 
party was opposed to the expansion of European and Atlantic economic, political and security 
institutions. In 1993 the party revised its position, and in the legislative election campaign the 
party supported accession to NATO and started to portray integration as a one-time chance to 
integrate the core European economic block and avoid a peripheral status. Although the 
decision to change its position on European integration was made at a time when the 
alternative security architecture for Europe – the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact - and the building up of a common security architecture, formulated as “a Common 
European Home” by Michail Gorbatchev, was becoming obsolete, the SLD’s support for 
integration was intrinsically related to the revision of its economic beliefs. During its period in 
office - from 1993 to 1997 - the SLD’s support for European integration settled in and gained 
in relevance, so much so that in the 1997 election campaign Polish European accession 
became a central electoral tenet. Not only was the party reformulation of its economic ideas in 
line with the European model of a limited welfare state, but also the party’s political 
cosmopolitanism made the party keen on the supranational element of the EU. In contrast to 
the problems created by European supranationalism to the post-Solidarity parties, the political 
cosmpolitanism reinforced the party’s Europhilia, based on the acknowledgment that the 
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European Single Market allowed for a higher level of social protection than Poland would 
enjoy in the international market.  
The analysis of the PSL’s European positions presented in this chapter is 
perhaps the clearest illustration that economic parties can change their attitudes on 
integration. Early in the nineties the PSL reacted to the EU’s protectionism in relation to Polish 
agricultural products in the Europe Agreements, interpreting it a structural bias of the 
Common Agricultural Policy against poor countries. The party’s nationalism conferred a 
particularly hard tone to the opposition of the party to European integration.  
When taking over the party leadership in 1997 Jarosław Kalinowski substantially 
revised the party’s appreciation of the impact of the CAP on the Polish farmers. The revision 
was certainly facilitated by the progress in the relationship between Poland and the EU when 
negotiations started and a discussion on CAP reform flared up again in Brussels. Since the 
early nineties the PSL’s official line had been that support for European accession depended 
on the conditions offered to Polish farmers. However, after 1997 the party changed the 
minimum conditions for support for accession. In the early nineties the PSL made the defence 
of family farming a condition for support for European integration; in 1997, it considered that 
an extension of CAP in its existing form was a sufficient condition for support for European 
integration; on the eve of accession, and in the context of the debate taking place in the 2002 
CAP mid-term review, the PSL defended a de-coupling of production and subsidies, as long 
as this condition ensured the equal application of conditions of farmers across the enlarged 
Europe. This stance meant that the PSL accepted that the CAP reforms might imply a 
lowering of benefits of all farmers across Europe.  
The abandoning of Samoobrona’s national stances in 1999 was translated later 
into a more conditional Euroscepticism. This appears to confirm the hypothesis that the 
downgrading of the party’s nationalist political ethos meant a less principled opposition 
towards European integration. However, the fickle character of the Samoobrona’s ideology 
makes it rather more difficult to attribute the party’s European positions to a change of 
ideology. 
 
If parties’ European stances are strongly related to their core identities, do 
centripetal and centrifugal strategies impact on their European attitudes? The analysis of 
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Polish core left wing parties show that a party’s office seeking moves can trigger an Europhile 
stance. The substantial change of position of the SLD in 1993 at its II Party Congress, was 
often protrayed as part of a “rational decision to transform the party into a party of 
government”363 in the wake of a reversal of the party’s fortunes at the electoral boot. The 
timing of the change of the SLD’s European stance was related to its office-seeking bid and 
had a strategic motivation to it. However, the SLD’s Europhilism became a defining feature of 
the party because it had an ideological underpinning to it. President Kwaśniewski’s advisor for 
European Affairs, asked about the party stance in 2000, when the support for accession 
declined steeply among the party supporters,364 declared the party’s Hard Europhilism to be 
unchangeable. “The party is firmly committed to European integration and will remain so, 
independently of its voters’ opinions. There is absolutely no debate about this stance.”365  
The evolution of the PSL’s European stances shows that the centripetal 
strategies of parties are, however, neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for Europhilism. 
The PSL, despite its consistent office-seeking strategy throughout the nineties, was untl 1997 
rather sceptical of integration. Indeed, the adoption of an Europhile stance by the PSL was 
countercyclical to its participation in government as during its office-holding years between 
1993-97 the party was strongly opposed to integration. It was only after it left office – and 
when the EU positions on CAP application to Polish farmers became clearer - that the party 
revised its position.  
Paragraph concluding the relationship between European attitudes and 
ideologies and party strategies. 
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 Chapter V The Unintended Effects of Europe 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the rise of the European issue affected 
the core party development. The supranational question can either harm or help the 
unification of a fragmented party spectrum. When conflicts over the definition of the political 
community run high, positions on Europe deepen the divides among possible coalescent 
parties making it more difficulty to bridge differences and find a common identity.  
 
Analytical Framework 
In new democracies, unless a revolutionary party occupies the political space, the 
creation of a stable and predictable party system, depends on the formation of a core, or 
group of, core parties. To create a core party implies the collusion of a number of political 
groups around an ideology, which often means political groups or parties mutting ideological 
differences among them. This process demands that centrist political groups or parties “find 
compromises, reach agreements and eventually collude in order to find the party profile that 
best serves the overall common interests of governmental competitiveness”.366 Parties 
competing in a centrist manner should be prepared to dilute or totally muting issues that 
prevent cooperation with other parties, but failure to do so can lead to ideological conflicts 
thwarting the creation of a centre party. A virtuous spiral would see the party system unify and 
stabilise around a number of ideological options and party organisations by agreeing to 
silence political competition in a number of issues. 367 
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The circumstances, national and international, in which party systems are formed 
are a background condition to the ideological formation of the core. European accession is 
certainly one of the strongest factors influencing the formation of parties. As discussed in 
chapter 2, and illustrated in chapters 3 and 4, there is a close link between a party’s core 
ideology and its positions on Europe. In the previous chapters I conclude that this link is 
unconditional and more permanent in the case of ideologies based on political conceptions, 
such as political liberals, nationalists and Christian democrats, than in the case of parties 
based on economic conceptions, such as social democrats or liberals. Because European 
attitudes do not follow parties’ strategies of competition, they affect parties’ chances to find a 
common ideological identity.  
In the context of accession to the EU, Euroscepticism can disturb the ideological 
formation of the core by reinforcing existing ideological divides between nationalists and non-
nationalists. Euroscepticism is not only a disturbing element in government, but also a 
hallmark of the ideological disagreements between members of the post-Solidarity elite. 
European supranational authority made the bridges among different ideological groups harder 
to build, in particular among those based on different visions of the political ethos. European 
integration deepens the divide between parties based on opposing political conceptions. 
Different economic visions translate into more prosaic issues amenable to quantification, 
easier to reapreciate the relationship between their goals and European policy regimes.  
To belong to a Christian democratic alliance at the time of accession to the EU, a 
nationalist party should be able to quell, or at least to mute, its opposition to Europe, it. As the 
latest developmens show, this has not been the case. While on the right the persistence and 
increased importance of nationalism and Hard Europhilism jeopardised the consolidation of 
the right, on the left the interaction between office considerations, ideological change and 
Europhilism facilitated the transformation of the centre-left. Parties’ European attitudes, which 
are ultimately linked to ideological dispositions, have deepened the divisiveness of 
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nationalism. The predominance of permanent elements of competition means that strong 
limits are imposed on the Europeanization of party systems.368  
The first section of this chapter analyses the effects of a normative political ethos 
on the failure to create a centre-right party around non-nationalist principles by pointing to the 
simultaneity between the rise of the European issue to the forefront of the agenda in the 
context in which nationalism remained an increasingly important. The attempts of the Polish 
right-wing illustrates that the creation of a sizeable centre parties implies not only coalition 
choices but implies that coalescent parties find an ideological common denominator 
compatible with the values informing the process of integration.  
The second section of this chapter analyses the interaction between left-wing 
parties’ European stances, economic ethos and competitive strategies. European integration 
was a more advantageous background for the transformation of the ex-communist party, and 
proved a helping hand for the transformation of ex-communist parties’ to social democracy. 
The accession to the EU facilitated a synergy between the office-seeking strategies and their 
ideological transformation.  
 
.  
Europe and the formation of the centre-right core: the 
dichotomy between nationalism and European integration 
 
The search for a model of the centre-right in Poland is characterised by extreme 
difficulty in finding a common ideological identity within a deeply etched political landscape. In 
chapter 3 we described the contradiction between coalition strategies and the willingness to 
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build separate identities. In particular, Polish nationalists show that, despite their continuous 
attempts to integrate governing coalitions, nationalist parties were not able to maintain their 
declared support for European integration, and, in the context of accession to the EU, 
became particularly divisive elements in governmental coalitions. Despite strategic-driven 
attempts to make national conceptions of the political community compatible with European 
integration, nationalist parties remained Eurosceptic.  
The rise of Euroscepticism reinforced the ideological divisions of the right, already 
noticeable in the governments between 1991 and 1993, and became one of the factors 
impeding the creation of a Christian democratic party. The Polish right-wing, after the split of 
Solidarity and the disastrous elections of 1993, unified in the AWS and won the 1997 
parliamentary elections around a vague pledge for Christian democracy. Christian democracy 
was the most plausible basis for a centre-right party in Poland, and many politicians and 
intellectuals in the country saw its combination of the appeals of Catholicism and family social 
protection, as the best model for a centrist party.369  
The chapter focus on the coincidence between the opening of accession 
negotiations and the constitution of the AWS government in the autumn of 1997. The rise of 
the European issue to extreme priority fuelled the nationalists’ divisiveness within the AWS 
and in its relation to its coalition partner, the UW, and contributed to the impossibility to create 
a centre defined by Christian democracy. The implosion of AWS in 2001, resulted in the rise 
of parties based on nationalism, which is an effective explanation for the high propensity of 
the right for euroscepticism, of which the Law and Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish 
Families (LPR) are prime examples. The victory of the PiS in the autumn 2005 parliamentary 
and presidential elections resulted, some months later, in a coalition of these two parties in 
the first Eurosceptic government in the region.  
The 2001 parliamentary election results, reinforced by the results of the 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005, meant the partial reversal of the party 
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consolidation and, ultimately, the predominance of nationalism over Catholic 
cosmopolitanism. The coalition of the LPR-PiS government in May 2006 ultimately denotes 
the resilience of the centenary political ideology devised by Roman Dmowski, which 
subordinates Catholic universalism to Polish nationalism. The legacies of romantic and 
Catholic nationalism took root in the XIX and early XX century Polish history. Dmowski and 
Piłsudski’s ideologies were, together with Catholicism, a source of right-wing opposition to 
communism and Soviet occupation. With the flourishing of democracy, parties competed for 
the role of guardians of nationalist values. The nationalist legacy of Dmowski assigns Poland 
with a special role in the European order: Poland should become the missionary in charge of 
the Christianisation of the continent.370 The persistence of nationalism by important sectors of 
the post-Solidarity elite resulted in insurmountable ideological divergences impeding the 
consolidation of a Christian democratic party.  
1991-1993 Governmental coalitions  
 
A highly fragmented parliament after the 1991 elections provided a difficult 
context for the first right-wing coalition in Polish democracy. The split orchestrated by Wałęsa 
just before the 1991 elections opened a decade of unstable governmental coalitions among 
the post-Solidarity elite. In addition to ideological divides, the conflict between Walesa and 
Mazowiecki was a further criteria for the diferentiation between the elites, further complicating 
the coalition options. The multiparty governments of the early 1990s tried to combine in 
different compositions five Solidarity spinoffs. After the 1991 parliamentary election, a short-
lived government coalition led by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki failed to agree on economic and 
political issues.  
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The six-month Olszewski government epitomises the kind of conflicts that led to 
the extreme cabinet instability in the early nineties. The two-month negotiations between 
liberals and nationalists to form a grand coalition in the Sejm failed due to Olszewski’s refusal 
to make any changes to the cabinet to accommodate liberals, 371 after having agreed with the 
economic policy spelled out by the liberals.372 Olszewski declared this to be a preventing 
measure to impede his government from “decomposing”.373 This meant that Olszewski was 
determined to keep the identity of its government by excluding the liberal UD and the KLD. 
The Olszewski government was to be a minority government of nationalist parties, whose 
core was composed by the Centre Agreement (PC) and the National Christian Union (ZChN).  
The government acquired a divisive and combative style and focused on 
symbolic issues such as lustration, i.e., the process of excluding communist collaborators 
from public life. Lustration can be interpreted as part of a nationalist agenda in the context of 
the Polish democratic transition from communism. Much more was at stake than the question 
of past collaboration. Indeed, the conflict seemed to centre on the nature of the Polish state. 
The project of the nationalist right-wing was to create a national political community of which 
the ex-communists were excluded. The nation’s natural historic progression should resume 
from where it had been forced off course in 1939. Moved by moral revulsion at the communist 
system and a sense of justice denied, Olszewski and his allies argued that communism was 
an alien period that should be excised from Polish history, its perpetrators punished and its 
victims rewarded. Judging from the rhetoric, lustration was a nation-building task and a 
patriotic duty. On the other hand, liberal politicians, prompted both by pragmatism and a civic 
vision that the political community should include the willing and not the deserving, argued 
that communism had left an indelible mark on Polish society.  
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The Olszewski government illustrates the opposing logics of nationalist ideology 
and governmental imperatives. After five trying months the government fell, following the 
elaboration of a list of supposed collaborators with the communist regime put up by the 
interior minister Antoni Macierewicz, that included several well-known Solidarity activists, with 
the aim of banning them from the government. A vote of confidence called by the liberal 
parties of the “small coalition” and the communist successor party, the Centre of Left Alliance 
(SLD) brought down the government on 4 July 1992. The Olszewski’s government illustrates 
how the identity build up of nationalists drew a wedge between themselves and more liberal-
minded right wing forces. The government’s reformist mission against the political prominence 
of forces associated with the communist system meant that liberal politicians that had taken 
part in the Round Table compromises were considered evil. The vote of confidence on the 
government was, according to Olszewski, to determine nothing less than to “whom Poland 
belongs”.374  
 
The Suchocka’s government 
 
Although for many analysts it had seemed impossible to create a wider coalition 
than the one achieved by Olszewski, on 4 July 1992, while in the Sejm parties were still 
acrimoniously discussing the Macierewicz List, representatives of the warring parties met over 
a period of nineteen hours. A coalition whose main components were the UD and the ZChN 
was put together with the help of the trade unionists from Solidarity under the direction of 
Hanna Suchocka, a technocrat from the UD. Although the presence of the ZChN and the UD 
in the same coalition was a surprise for many, the fact is that the ZChN had, since the 
Bielecki government, attempted to downplay nationalism and play up a centrist strategy in 
order to integrate government. The pragmatism of its leadership made it possible for the 
party, although having claimed Endecja’s nationalism as its own, to ally with the most liberal 
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parties. The PC’s opting out during the coalition negotiations marked a turning point in the 
coalition patterns of the right. By failing to find an agreement with the liberals, the PC’s 
leaders decisively relinquished their role as the pivotal element of the right, and attempted to 
build up a nationalist party. 
The Suchocka’s coalition formula was based on a truce between the secular 
liberals of the Democratic Union and the Catholic nationalists of the ZChN. The limits of this 
formula meant that leaning too far either left or right on social, economic or political questions 
would antagonize one of the major coalition partners, thereby undermining the government 
from within. Although the liberals were careful in avoiding antagonising the nationalists, the 
ZChN’s hard line factions did not play along with the party’s leadership and consistently 
torpedoed projects considered as anti-family or anti-national. This revealed the limits of the 
party’s ideological transformation. The absence of two ZChN members on the vote of 
confidence that brought down the coalition on 31 May 1993 by one vote therefore came as no 
surprise.  
 
Nationalists’ coalition attempts 
 
The parliament’s dissolution on the 29 May 1993 was quickly followed by plans 
for the formation of an electoral coalition to run in the following legislative elections. On 4 
June 1993 an appeal was launched by the PC to unite all the parties “for whom the overriding 
aim is an independent, democratic, and affluent Poland faithful to the patriotic traditions of our 
fathers”.375 Although it was recognised that a electoral coalition should involve a large 
spectrum of ideologies, Olszewski started by imposing the exclusion of liberal parties (the UD 
and the KLD), as well as the ZChN, from this coalition.376 The new coalition was to be called 
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the Polish Union (ZP). Underlying the project was the attempt to reunify the original PC and 
the ZChN’s radical splinters organised in the Movement for the Republic, the Polish Action 
and the Movement for the III Republic.  
Tellingly, despite its assumed nationalist programme and identity, the Polish 
Union attempted to gain membership of the Christian democrat respectability. The party 
included historical Christian democratic party from the inter-war period, the Christian 
Democratic – Labour Movement (CD-SP), who retained the symbolic membership of the 
Christian Democratic International (CDI). The leaders expected to get the CD-SP’s 
membership in the CDI transferred to the Polish Union. Although the president of the EUCD 
(European Union of Christian Democrats) Wilfred Martens, agreed to this plan, its execution 
was hampered by the German CDU, its leaders arguing that the membership of the EUCD 
should be granted only after the election results were known. According to Thomas 
Jackowski, the leader of the SP at the time, the incentive that international affiliation of the 
CDI implied was a factor that could have prevented the dissolution of the ZP.377  
The conflicts within the ZP originated in the disagreements between the PC and 
its splinters over the definition of the political community. Olszewski’s nationalism followed 
Piłsudskist’ independentist tradition while the PC’s brothers Kaszynski followed the Christian 
democratic tradition. These differing traditions were reflected in different strategies of 
competition.378 The Polish Union eventually broke under these multiple pressures.379 With 
hindsight, Olszewski’s choices in 1993 had long lasting effects. Olszewski’s nationalism 
became the basis of an exclusivist conception of his political movement and strongly 
restricted his coalition options. Olszewski’s choice for ideological coherence in opposition to 
the broadening of government coalition implied that the chances of ideological moderation 
and the broadening of the electoral appeal dramatically decreased. The radical nature of the 
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nationalist tradition followed by the Olszewski government proved incompatible with the PC’s 
centrist strategy. After suffering a series of splits, the PC leadership decided to follow 
Olszewski’s radical path and abandon the aspiration of becoming a centrist Christian 
democratic party. 
 
The ZChN factions’ nationalism is another illustration that parties’ strategy can be 
limited by its ethos. Despite the willingness of its leaders to be part of Suchocka’s 
government, the ZChN was a disruptive force in parliament, frequently acting to defeat 
legislative projects that it found unpatriotic or anti-family. On the eve of the 1993 elections the 
right-wing parties composing the governmental coalition chose to run as independent parties. 
The ZChN ended up integrating a Church-brokered coalition with three minor right-wing 
parties allied under the heading of Ojczyzna (Fatherland). The fate of Ojczyzna was a prime 
example of nationalists’ insistence on their separate identity: despite the threshold for election 
coalitions being 8 percent and the opinion polls attributing 6 percent of the vote intentions to 
the party, the leaders insisted on registering as an electoral coalition rather than a party, 
which could have passed the electoral threshold for parties, 5 percent. The nationalists’ 
reluctance to give up their separate identities in face of electoral disaster380 and perceived as 
such by the leaders381, shows that the predominance of ideological over strategic 
considerations were the prime cause of the post-Solidarity virtual ban from parliament in the 
1993 elections.  
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1997-2001: the AWS government 
 
The AWS, formed in 1996 as a coalition of thirty parties, aimed at challenging the 
SLD’s supremacy in the autumn of 1997 legislative elections. Marian Krzaklewski, the leader 
of the Solidarity trade union played the role of unifier and opened the electoral coalition to all 
right-wing forces. The places in the party list were attributed according to the popularity of 
each party as expressed in opinion polls. Krzaklewski ascribed to the trade union a 
coordinating role and exerted personal influence over the AWS’s formation. In the chief 
legislative and coordinating body of the AWS, the National Council, votes were allocated by a 
formula measuring the relative input of every partner to coalitional power. Krzaklewski, a 
computer scientist, operationalised the input of the partners with a formula based on several 
variables, including poll estimates.382 The essence of the scheme was that the Solidarity trade 
union had blocking power in all national and regional executive and legislative bodies.  
The Solidarity trade union was perceived as roughly equidistant to all right-wing 
parties and Krzaklewski was regarded as an unbiased arbiter. The AWS aimed at recreating 
the ideological scope of the Solidarity movement in the eighties. Therefore, alongside the 
conservatives of the SKL and the trade unionists, Krzaklewski integrated several formations 
of soft and hard catholic nationalists, such as the Alliance of Catholic Families (SRK), the 
Polish Family (RP), and the Homeland League (LK).  
 
Krzaklewski’s pre-electoral speech illustrates how much the formation of the AWS 
in 1997 was a pragmatic affair in which parties coalesced without questioning the 
compatibility of their identities: “This large, modern formation will embrace the national, 
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Christian, democratic and independent traditions.”383 The attempt to create an encompassing 
party organisation was not accompanied by the members agreeing on a common overarching 
identity. The founders initially focused on attaining and controlling state power by building 
party structures capable of controlling the state administration, and left identity building along 
Christian democratic lines for after the elections. Christian democracy was seen as the 
ideology with the best chances of attracting overall support among all parties. Within the 
circles of the founders of the RS AWS, Christian democracy was seen as a neutraliser of 
ideological disagreements between the Catholic nationalists and the liberals.  
In face of this commitment to Christian democracy as the model for a centre-right 
party, the inclusion of nationalists in the AWS was challenged. While some considered them 
necessary partners of an electorally successful centre-right formation,384 others argued that 
giving the nationalists a place in the AWS’s electoral lists meant assuring the survival of non-
reformable parties that would otherwise have been eliminated from the political scene.385 In 
fact, their integration in the centre-right confirmed a distinctive feature of the Polish party 
system. While nationalist parties were prominent in most other countries of the region,386 only 
in Poland did nationalists have such a prominence in the centre of the party system. Even 
members of the AWS associated with Christian democracy, like Maciej Łętowski, were of the 
opinion that extreme nationalists should always be included in a right-wing coalition to avoid 
the creation of a sizeable nationalist right.387 It was also believed that the support of Radio 
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Marjia was very advantageous in the elections, and helped the centre-right to achieve a 
majority in the parliament.388  
The inclusion of the nationalists in the AWS was disastrous for the discipline of 
the AWS parliamentary caucus. Their penchant for extreme behaviour is well encapsulated in 
Jan Łopuszanski’s declaration: “In the AWS we must use confrontation”.389 The AWS unifiers, 
especially Krzaklewski and the trade unionists, had hoped to keep a grip on the smaller 
nationalist parties of the coalition and expected that the governing experience would have a 
moderating effect on them. The governing experience not only did not change their behaviour 
but increased their capacity to exert vetoing power. Ultimately Krzaklewski’s position was 
weakened by the nationalists’ ability to put the government in check.  
 
Given the smaller parties’ potential for blackmail, the AWS was gradually 
modified into a coalition clustered around five main constituent elements that were to jointly 
take decisions. While a new Solidarity-sponsored political party, the Solidarity Electoral 
Action-Social Movement (RS AWS) led by the Prime Minister Buzek was set up in November 
1997 to take over the union’s political functions as it gradually withdrew from politics. A more 
equal distribution of power between the bigger and more structured parties, the Conservative 
People’s Party (SKL), the Polish Agreement of Christian Democrats (PPChD) and the ZChN 
was achieved. The increased power of these three parties put some checks on Krzaklewski’s 
power as the coalition’s leader.  
Krzaklewski’s intention had been to fulfil the decade-old project of unifying the 
right by transforming the AWS into a single party. The purpose of the RS-AWS was not only 
to separate the political from the industrial functions of the Solidarity trade union but also to 
create an organisational basis for the unification of the right-wing. The founders of RS AWS 
expected that AWS parliamentarians relinquish the membership of their parties to become 
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members of the RS AWS. However, none of the AWS’s MPs but the trade unionists left their 
original parties and the RS AWS never fulfilled its functions. The fact that each of the main 
AWS partners strongly underlined their distinctive identity and could potentially threaten the 
government’s majority also meant that the government had to constantly square off their 
various partisan interests. This obviously jeopardised the party’s coordination capacity and 
the efficiency of the government.  
 
The rise of the European issue to proeminence – with the opening of accession 
negotiations - coincided almost exactly with the inauguration in office of the AWS-UW 
coalition in the autumn of 1997. The AWS-UW government was thus confronted with the twin 
tasks of accession, i.e., conducting negotiations with the EU and transposing European 
legislation. Already daunting tasks per se, these proved extremely challenging for a 
government deeply divided concerning basic political conceptions. Early on, the                                 
coordination of positions within the executive and the parliamentary caucus in the Sejm, 
proved difficult. Despite the attempts of the party to reinterpret its ethos into compatibility with 
European integration, when its leader Ryszard Czarnecki took the KIE chair, his opposition to 
integration added to the coordination problems between ministries and the parliament in 
proceeding with the process of legal harmonization. When the Freedom Union’s vice-
chairman of KIE, Piotr Nowina-Konopka contested his leadership, an institutional paralysis 
ensued. To assert the KIE’s authority the prime minister had to effectively chair the 
Committee. The controversy over Czarnecki’s leadership had far reaching consequences for 
the progress of preparations for accession. After Czarnecki’s resignation in June 1998 the 
KIE’s position was weakened by a long period of institutional instability as a coalition deadlock 
prevented the prime minister from appointing a permanent KIE secretary. The Freedom 
Union’s insistence on its right to propose a candidate for the KIE secretary, and the ZChN’s 
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opposition to the notion illustrates the ideological fight for the control of the process of 
European integration.390  
The staking of negotiation stances within the coalition was an equally fractious 
field, in particular when an informal link was established between the positions on transition 
periods for the sale of land to foreigners and the free circulation of workers. The coalition, 
under the pressure from the ZChN, proposed an 18-year transition period for the sale of land 
to foreigners for both agricultural land and housing plots.391 Obviously economic liberals 
found it difficult to accept a temporary ban on Poles' seeking employment in EU countries in 
exchange of a stance inspired primarily by a nationalist agenda. In parliament the 
transposition of the acquis communautaire was also encumbered by nationalist members of 
the coalition who opposed the process and impeded the transposition of directives into Polish 
law.  
The Commission annual reports on accession preparations started to note the fact 
that Poland was falling behind the other candidate countries. To deal with laggards in 
accession preparations, a decision was taken in the Helsinki European Council. Unlike 
countires started moving at different speeds within the negotiation process. The opening of 
negotiation chapters followed the progress in implementation of the acquis, as judged by the 
Commission. The result was a visible retraction in Poland’s image as a trend-setter in Europe. 
When the Commission report was in issued in the autumn of 2000, pointing to serious delays 
in transposing elements of the acquis, the Polish political elite counter-attacked, demanding 
that the Commission and the member states put a firm accession date. The failure of the 
AWS-UW government to perform in the negotiations started to be held against the 
government.    
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Centrist Euroscepticism. 
Although Krzaklewski and the trade union had initially been regarded as unbiased 
arbiters of the AWS, his ambition to be the AWS presidential candidate in 2000 proved 
extremely controversial. His candidature was opposed by the liberal and conservative wings 
of the party. Krzaklewski’s campaign strategy was one of polarisation on nationalist 
grounds392 which made agreement between the AWS’s parties rather difficult. Jan Maria 
Rokita led a coalition of moderate conservatives and asked for an internal party referendum to 
choose the presidential candidate. However, the leadership and the rank-and-file of the trade 
union refused to question Krzaklewski’s right to present itself as the AWS’s presidential 
candidate. By choosing a nationalist tactic Krzaklewski provoked an irate response from the 
AWS’s moderate conservative parties. By taking the side of the nationalists and accepting the 
support of Radio Marjia, the trade union leader relinquished the role of moderator that he had 
devised for himself. Krzaklewski nationalist electoral strategy jeopardised the possibilities of a 
commonly negotiated Christian democratic identity.  
Without ideological or organisational settlement within the AWS, Krzaklewski’s 
landslide defeat provoked a crisis that would tear apart the AWS in the run up to the 2001 
parliamentarian elections. Despite the internal opposition, Krzaklewski refused to step down 
from the AWS leadership. The AWS statutes foresaw that a change of leadership required 75 
percent of the votes in the Political Council. The two constituent parties controlled by 
Krzaklewski, the Solidarity trade union and the RS AWS counted 48 percent of the votes. 
Therefore the change of leadership envisaged by the other parties of the coalition was not 
attainable through statutory means. Krzaklewski initial reaction was to try to get rid of the SKL 
and other rebellious elements. “We always had problems with those AWS politicians that 
moved back and forth between the AWS and the UW. This problem has to be solved once 
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and for all.”393 However, the rebellious parties did not show willingness to leave peacefully, 
and considered that the AWS was “as much theirs as it was Solidarity’s”. After two months of 
negotiations mediated by Prime Minister Buzek, the historical leader of the ZChN, Wiesław 
Chrzanowski, and the Church, the rebelling parties founded a federation excluding the trade 
union and the nationalists and threatened to leave the AWS as a tactical move to provoke 
change.  
Although the resistance of the constituent AWS party leaders was partially 
motivated by Krzaklewski’s tactics to centralise power,394 the opposing parties justified their 
resistance to Krzaklewski’s tactics with ideological arguments. Jan Maria Rokita, 
Krzaklewski’s main opponent within the AWS, stated that the strategy embraced by the trade 
union leader “threatens the AWS with a Lepenisation process, a radicalisation that does not 
allow the AWS to govern.”395 Rokita also alluded to the fact that Krzaklewski had jeopardised 
his own role of mediator and the possibility of unification of the right around a Christian 
democratic option by adopting a radical right nationalist discourse in the run up to the 
Presidential elections.  
After Krzaklewski eventually stepped down from the leadership, the choice of a 
new leader came to the fore, bringing into sharp relief the ideological conflicts that had 
hampered the unification of the AWS. Nationalists and liberal candidates were rejected as 
they were not acceptable to one or the other of the parties’ in the coalition. “For the trade 
unionists Krzaklewski is their man (...). Liberals, which want to change their leaders, are a fifth 
column”.396 The increased influence of the conservatives in the AWS after the defeat of 
Krzaklewski and the creation of a federation of parties, the Federation AWS, made the 
conservative option embodied in Maciej Płażynski desirable. Part of the conservative wing of 
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the SKL, Płażynski was a member of the Social Movement and was widely accepted as a 
future leader of the centre-right party.  
However, Płażynski’s plans were different. Andrzej Olechowski’s performance in 
the presidential elections had triggered in the conservatives the hope of creating a successful 
liberal conservative party able to dominate the centre-right. Krzaklewski acknowledged this 
fact when he stepped down as the AWS political leader in early December 2000. “Politicians 
of the centre-right tend to marginalise the role and the meaning of Solidarity. The 
predominance of the conservative liberal programme is in conflict with a Christian social 
vision of the centre-right. The trade unionists must react to the attempt to de-solidarise the 
centre-right”.397 During the following months the AWS would slowly disintegrate into several 
small parties. The project of a Christian democratic party based on the trade union was over.  
 
The EU accession proved a particularly difficult context for the Polish right 
unification. The parties of the post-Solidarity camp differed in their attitudes towards the EU; 
in government these differences proved extremely divisive, and European integration became 
the touchstone of disagreement between the parties. Nationalists’ Euroscepticism translated 
into the attempt to hinder the accession process while in office and this, in term, heightened 
the conflicts with the other coalition members. Despite their office-driven attempts to 
reinterpret their ideology into compatibility with European integration, the parties defending 
the Polish nation remained essentially opposed to accession. The context of European 
integration made the disagreements between the right-wing coalition partners more concrete, 
and deepened the divisiveness of nationalists.  
No party illustrates the tensions between their strategic ambitions to gain office 
and their nationalist Euroscepticism as well as the ZChN. The primacy of the ZChN’s 
nationalist ethos over its centripetal strategies was particularly clear when Rychard Czarnecki 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
397 Declaration to the XIII Meeting of the Solidarity trade union in Spale, quoted in Rzeczpospolita, 12 December 
2000.  
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was appointed chair of the Committee of European Integration (KIE) in late 1997. When it 
joined the AWS in 1996 the ZChN’s centrist strategy resulted in the choice of the moderate 
Marian Piłka as a leader. However, when in February 1998 Piłka tried to take the party 
transformation one step further by drawing closer to the UW by strengthening the economic 
ethos,398 the leader faced strong internal opposition and was eventually closely challenged by 
a hard liner, Henryk Goryszewski, in the party’s elections.  
 
2001: The search for ideological coherence 
 
When the AWS’s survival chances seemed minimal, the incentives for 
conservatives from the SKL to remain in the coalition decreased considerably. The temporary 
settlement of the AWS crisis was jeopardised in early 2001 when the chosen leader of the 
new AWS, Maciej Płażynski, abandoned the party to form a new conservative liberal party 
project, the Platform of Citizens (PO), with Andrzej Olechowski. The exit options also 
determined splits from the UW and, after some months of hesitation, the splitting of the SKL 
and its integration into the PO. 
The demise of the AWS Christian democratic project was a critical moment in the 
right-wing’s evolution.399 Once a cooperative endeavour fails to endure, the chances are that 
fragmented and small parties will return to their initial identity. Small parties, with lower 
competitive capacities, tend to have higher ideological consistency (even if a less appealing 
one). Parties in a weak competitive position are dependent on loyal members and activists. 
When parties become weaker competitors, militants are more likely to advance400 and leaders 
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attempt to maximise existing supporter loyalty by retaining symbols and appeals with their 
organisational forms or the symbolic past treasured by its membership.  
The project of unifying the centre-right was not dead. In their early days both 
right-wing parties, the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Citizens’ Platform (PO), maintained 
explicitly fuzzy identities as a way to preserve the option to coalesce in the future. The parties 
adopted two versions of conservatism, the PO profiling itself as a liberal conservative party 
and the PiS as a follower of national conservatism. The PO’s identity was overwhelmingly 
dictated by economic neo-liberalism. This division of “competences” between the parties 
disappointed one of its founders, Maciej Plazynski, who desired a stronger social 
conservativism identity for the party. This led to an early debate on the party identity. “There 
was no desire in the Civic Platform to widen its electorate, while there was a desire of a large 
part of the electorate for stabilization in the centre. That is a difference of ideas." Płażynski 
said, adding that Poland needs a "popular, broad-based, right-wing party that is not 
associated with just one circle."401 To this claim the liberals answered that Płażynski’s 
proposals that included an approximation with the PiS national conservatives would 
disorientate its electorate, especially in matters related to the European Union. “For a long 
time we did not know what is the position of the PiS in this matter. We have the impression 
that Płażynski is nostalgic of the political majority of the AWS, but for the politicians originating 
in the UW, the AWS is a warning and not an inspiration.”402 As Krzysztof Piesewicz 
emphasised: “We want to build a formation of people that think in the same way about the 
values, the objectives and the ways of acting of the party. We are not interested in a party that 
has as an objective supporting someone to the presidency, or a party to oppose that. That 
would finish, as always, in a permanent parliamentary crisis.”403  
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
401 Kublik, A. “Maciej Płażynski Odchodzy z Platformy”, (Maciej Płażynski Leaves the Platform), Gazeta Wyborcza, 
April 2003. 
402 Interview with Janusz Lewandowski, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 April 2003. 
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Polarisation and nationalism  
 
Chance had it that a government strongly divided on issues of political 
sovereignty, the AWS-UW, was tasked to conduct the Polish accession negotiations in late 
1997. Marked programmatic differences and ongoing internal disputes within the AWS were 
exposed and deepened by the European issue, which, by reinforcing the ideological divides 
between nationalists, liberals and Christian democrats turned Christian democracy into an 
inviable model for the centre in Poland. The prevalence of ideological disputes over a strategy 
to control office, or the centre space, made Europe into an accidental touchstone of dissent of 
the right wing disagreements. Rather than muting their identities when integrating 
governmental coalitions, nationalists clinged to the concept of political sovereignty and 
opposed EU accession on that basis, even if this disrupted the accession process and the 
chances of the governmental coalition.  
The desintegration of the AWS in 1997 marked the end of the partial 
consolidation of the right started after the disastrous defeat in the parliamentary elections of 
1993. In 2001 an increased weight for Eurosceptic parties was noticeable. The electoral 
success of two Hard Eurosceptic parties resulted in the establishment of a strong Eurosceptic 
lobby in parliament flanking, the LPR and the Self Defence (SO).  
 
Synergies between identities and strategic behaviour  
The PSL and the SLD transformations  
 
The transformation of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and the United 
Polish Peasants (ZPL) into the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP) and the 
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403 Krzysztof Piesewicz, quoted in Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 April 2003. 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) implied a conversion of their ethos and doctrine, by abandoning 
communism and embracing social democracy and agrarianism. Without betraying their left-
wing orientation, the parties’ leaders based their new identities on the definition of the 
economic concepts of class and estate. Their political ethos had diverse origins: while the 
PZPR was one of the most entrenched parties in class internationalism of the Central and 
Eastern European communist parties,404 the PSL is the inheritor of nationalist conceptions 
inherent to biological agrarianism, the ideology of the inter-war peasant movements.  
Being based on divisible and quantifiable economic concepts, the PSL and SLD’s 
European positions had a conditional nature, and the transformation of the parties resulted in 
a different appreciation of the CAP and the Single Market regime. The governmental drive of 
the two parties, its ethos transformation and their strategies European positions became 
mutually reinforcing elements. 
 
The SLD’s class-based cosmopolitanism 
 
The SLD transformation is an example of the synergies created by the consistent 
pursuit of a social democratic ethos, governmental office and Europhilism. The SLD’s 
ideological transformation from communism to social democracy was, arguably, one of the 
drivers of transition itself. By accepting market economy, an internationalist conception of the 
political community and stressing their liberal social policies the new party leadership elected 
in January 1990 steered the party into the core of the party system. The ideological choices of 
the SdRP made possible both the incorporation of several minor parties into a single structure 
and the broadening of the party’s public appeal. The drive to attain governmental office also 
consisted of the search for international recognition, and the party multiplied its efforts to gain 
membership of the Socialist International and integrate the Party of European Socialists. 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
404 Kitschelt, H. (2002), “The Strategic Conduct of Post-Communist Successor Parties”, in Bozóki, A. and Ishiyama, 
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As I have argued in chapter IV, the reformist leadership’s victory in controlling the 
party determined its rapid transformation. The office-seeking drive of the party went hand-in-
hand with the transformation of the party’s ethos which consisted not only in stressing a 
liberal social and political stance but also the abandonment of Keynesian demand-side 
policies. By the mid-nineties the SdRP’s leadership had understood through direct 
governmental participation the strong constrains on the development of a strong welfare state 
imposed by international commitments and considered the EU’s policy regime as a relatively 
more protective environment of class interests. This transformation was in pace both with 
European social democratic transformations and with the economic policies pursued by the 
European Union.  
The legacy of communist internationalist ideals in Poland is now embodied in 
SLD’s Hard Europhilism. The support for European integration results essentially from the 
party viewing the EU as a facilitator of social democratic economic ideals. Moreover, 
whenever class-based cosmopolitanism is combined with the perception of a synergetic 
relationship between the party’s economic goals and those of the EU,405 the sufficient 
conditions for unconditional Europhilism are met. Also, although in the 1980s communist 
leaders attempted to revamp failing support for the regime by using nationalist rhetoric and 
symbolism, the Soviet imposition of communism on Poland made Polish national communism 
a contradiction in terms. The SLD’s Hard Europhilism therefore also derives from the 
communist legacy of internationalism.  
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The PSL’s re-working of the concept of estate 
 
The PSL transformation and survival was anchored in the division between rural 
and urban ethos.406 Although farmers do not constitute a class and therefore their political 
ethos are not a priori given,407 due to the historical circumstances of the birth of the agrarian 
movement in XIX-century partitioned Poland, the PSL’s political ethos is founded on the 
concept of nation.408 Agrarian parties are primarily based on the idea that land ownership 
should be rewarded by support and privileges from the central state. However, the freeze 
imposed by communism on the development of the farmers’ movements in Poland meant that 
the PSL’s ideological resources deriving from interwar ideologies combined the two 
conceptions in the concept of family farming. The PSL’s interpretation of the concept of estate 
was therefore influenced by the nationalist concept of the role of farmers one which is 
characterised by biological agrarianism.  
The success of the PSL’s transformation from communist satellite party and its 
resistance to the catholic parties’ attempts to incorporate it certainly owes much to the 
conception of the particular role of farmers in the survival of the nation. 409 However, the main 
identifying element of the PSL is an economic concept and the identification of the peasantry 
with the nation practically elevates peasants’ interests to national interest. The party’s 
evaluation of the compatibility between European integration and the national interest impinge 
on the evaluation of CAP’s impact on farmers’ welfare. 
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The PSL’s changing European position can be understood in the context of a 
dynamic relationship between the EU and Poland. The uncertainty of the conditions of 
application of the CAP on the new member states meant that as negotiations on the EU 
evolved between September 1997 and 2001 a new assessment of the impact of accession on 
Polish agriculture was demanded. Since the economic interests of the party’s constituency 
are directly relevant for the party’s position on the EU, the party became a specialist in the 
CAP benefits and price mechanisms and, in particular, in their application to the Polish 
market. The political ethos of the party determined that Euroscepticism was unconditional and 
Europhilism conditional.  
The analysis of PSL’s move between Euroscepticism to Europhilism indicates 
that office-seeking considerations also played a part in the revaluation of parties’ European 
positions. A landslide electoral defeat in the 1997 elections prompted the election of a leader 
more open to a revaluation of the impact of European integration for the peasant class as a 
whole. However, although the shift to conditional Europhilism certainly incorporated office-
seeking considerations, this centrist stance is in the long-run dependent on the fulfilment of 
the farmers’ interests by the European Common Agricultural Policy. The PSL also illustrates 
that when the parties’ chances of government participation appear small, more extremist 
middle-level cadres can push for a different interpretation of the party’s economic ethos and 
constituencies’ interests and lead to a Eurosceptic stance. A Eurosceptic position, in turn, 
marks the exclusion of governmental coalitions and reinforces a polarising stance.  
 
 188 
 Analysis 
 
The analysis of the interaction between party ideology, strategy and European 
attitudes carried out in this chapter confirms that an office-seeking bid at election time can 
determine a party’s European stance. However, in the long-run, a party’s core ideology 
determines a party’s European stance, even if an Eurosceptic attitude harms the chances to 
consolidate a centre party. It emerges that only the re-assessment of the relationship between 
parties’ definitions of the political and the economic community allows a lasting change of 
parties’ European positions. This is consistent with the assumption that a party’s core 
conception determines its ideological positions down the line, and that a party may suspend 
its ethos only temporarily. The ZChN evolution throughout the 1990s illustrates this 
proposition. Despite its centrist strategy and the addition of a neo-liberal economic ethos the 
party’s national Catholicism remained the primary source of its ideological and policy 
positions. To integrate the liberal governments of Bielecki, Suchocka and the AWS the ZChN 
tried to silence, dilute or reinterpret its nationalist ethos. However, when in government, the 
parties’ ideological and policy stances often disrupted the workings of the cabinets and the 
consistency of the parliamentary caucus. By not choosing between nationalism and a centrist 
position, the ZChN contributed neither to the formation of a centrist party nor a nationalist 
polarising pole, which was eventually filled by the League of Polish Families after the 2001 
elections.  
This suggests that a party’s opposition to European integration intensifies the 
divisiveness nationalists.  The rise of the European issue to proeminence in the mid-1990s, 
together with the resilience of nationalism and Eurosceptic positions, has contributed to the 
failure to structure the right-wing core in Poland. The AWS-UW government offers a 
particularly vivid example of the way the European issue deepened the conflicts over policy 
and ideological issues. When searching for support for its contested presidential bid in the 
nationalist wing of the AWS, the trade union leader Marian Krzaklewski took up a sceptic 
attitude towards European accession as its main discourse theme. The centrifugal tactics and 
nationalist rhetoric of the AWS´s leader at the end of its period in office reasserted the 
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divisions between lines of support and opposition to Europe within the governing coalition. 
The disintegration of the AWS along these lines of conflict resulted in an unusual number of 
Eurosceptic parties gaining parliamentary representation, demonstrating the resilience of the 
nationalist ethos and the failure to create a Christian democratic party. Embodied in different 
organisations, nationalism proved in the long-term both necessary and sufficient for an 
unconditional incompatibility between parties ethos and European attitudes. The presence of 
nationalists in the mainstream political scene in Poland made the ideological distance 
between the post-Solidarity parties impossible to surmount. The European question became 
the hallmark of the ideological disagreements of the Polish right.  
The analysis of the formation of left core shows that European accession was a 
more benefic for the formation of a left core in Poland. The interaction between ethos, 
strategies and European attitudes facilitated the transformation of the Polish left from 
communism to social democracy. This virtuous spiral resulted primarily from the compatibility 
between the social democracy and the European policy regime in the mid 1990s. Being 
based on quantifiable economic concepts the SLD and the PSL could more easily re-evaluate 
the effects of the European policy regimes. 
Conversely, the failure to create centre parties founded on concepts compatible 
with European integration is part of the explanation for, despite being the first country to 
initiate the transition process, Poland has been the CEE state where the emergence of a 
centre-right party has most blatantly failed. Despite the expectations that a Christian 
democratic party would emerge from the post-Solidarity camp and fill the centre-right space, 
the predominance of nationalism over a universal set of principles, prevented the 
development of both Christian democracy and a unified centre-right party. The nationalist 
ideology proved enduring and divisive and impeded the synergy between a party founded on 
Christian cosmopolitanism, Europhilism and a centrist strategy.  
The predominance and stability of core ideologies resulted in an unintended 
effect of European accession on the Polish on core consolidation. A stable core party system 
can be defined not only by the parties’ coalition options and their propaganda tactics, but also 
through an ideological dimension. The consolidation of the core party system is thus as much 
a practical problem of coalition strategy as is a question of the elite finding agreement on the 
values of a common “community of discourse”.  
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Chapter VI Europe as a factor in Central and Eastern 
European party systems 
 
The theory proposed in this thesis understands parties as embodiments of 
political ideas. Thus the concepts imprinted in the party ethos are vital elements of their 
existence and guide their response to contemporary issues. The way parties respond to the 
integration of the continent is, in the long run, determined by the way parties defined the 
political and economic communities. Party ethos, and their degree of conceptual flexibility, 
limits the impact of centripetal and centrifugal strategies of competition on their responses to 
European positions.  
The political and economic ethos are the distinguishing elements of this theory in 
relation to Marks, Hooghe and Wilson’s left/right proposition and represent the grounds for 
criticizing the dynamic theory of Sitter. In their 2000 article Marks and Wilson represent 
political cleavages almost exclusively in terms of reflecting social groups’ diverse economic 
preferences.410 In a later article (2002) the same authors (with Hooghe) note the omission of 
the political cleavage and admit to its ascendancy over the left/right economic axis in 
determining party European positions.411 However, in the introduction to the special issue of 
Comparative Political Studies dedicated to political contestation in the EU, the authors hedge 
their position by stating that the political dimension is highly correlated to the left-right 
economic dimension, so much so that the two can be considered part of the same axis.412  
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By assuming that the left-right axis explains party positions on European 
integration Marks, Hooghe and Wilson413 follow a long tradition of party analysis that 
understands ideology primarily as the representation of social group economic interests. The 
primordial character of economic interests results in a single (mainly) economic axis. The 
conceptualisation of the left-right axis as the synthesis of left-wing social libertarianism and 
right-wing social authoritarianism was first proposed by Inglehart. Although the 
conceptualisation of the rise of a cultural conflict of competition has been Inglehart’s main 
contribution to the literature, he asserts that the opposition between materialist/post-
materialist values has eventually fused with the left-right economic axis and created a one-
dimensional space of competition. 
In this thesis a typology of political and economic ethos takes the place of the left-
right axis to explain party’s European positions. This typology differs from the latter in two 
ways. First, the bi-dimensional character of this typology signifies that the political dimension 
is independent of the left-right dimension (or the economic ethos) and that the political ethos 
can prevail over the economic ethos (and vice versa). Second, this typology defines the 
vertical axis not as a reflection of socio-cultural attitudes but reflecting party’s prescriptions of 
the relation between the individual and the political community.  
The ethos theory departs from the left-right conceptualisation of political 
competition and thus contributes to the general study of political parties. By specifying the 
interpretative concepts binding parties’ rationality414 this typology represents a more 
fundamental way to conceive the ideological space. The party ethos determines not only 
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parties’ positions on European integration but could also explain the stability of parties’ policy 
positions.415  
The Polish party system demonstrates in a vivid way that although a one-
dimensional left-right conceptualisation of party systems is widely accepted,416 a two-
dimensional classification of party identities appears to provide a better classification of 
parties European positions. In spite of the necessity and sufficiency of the central element of 
a party’s identity for the party fundamental choice between Euroscepticism and Europhilism, 
the other dimension of identity still bears an independent effect on a party’s positioning in the 
Eurosceptic-Europhile scale. The framework proposes that while party attitudes to the 
European issue based on an indivisible political concept are unchangeable, attitudes based 
on economic concepts can more easily be reassessed. 
The testing of the ethos theory on the Polish case has shown it broadly 
successful in explaining both left- and right-wing parties’ European attitudes. The Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA)417 and the language of sufficiency and necessity proved a 
productive method to test the theoretical framework, helping to identity the cases where 
theoretically interesting combinations of strategic and ideological conditions were found. This 
resulted in a better understanding of the dynamic interaction between conceptions of political 
and economic ethos, strategies of centripetal or centrifugal mode of competition, and parties’ 
towards European integration.  
A further inference to the systemic level can be derived from the ethos theory. It 
appears that in a party system where the political axis is predominant European integration 
will be more intensely contested. The antidote to the disruption caused by the European issue 
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on these party systems is a Hard Europhile Christian democratic party. In its absence, 
political nationalism is likely to be mobilised and becoming a disruptive element of the political 
spectrum. In party systems based on the economic axis the European issue will be more 
easily accommodated; parties based the economic ethos have conditional and changeable 
European positions and a reassessment of the changing European policy regimes is therefore 
possible.418  
In Poland divergent ideological and office-seeking strategies have led to a highly 
unstable right-wing. The failure of Christian democracy to thrive in Poland resulted in the 
success of a high number of Eurosceptic parties. The instability of the Polish centre-right is 
related to the ideological importance of nationalism for the post-Solidarity camp and the 
impossibility of its reconciliation with a Europhile position. Although office-seeking strategies 
can serve as incentives to moderation, they are not sufficient either to determine parties’ 
attitudes towards European integration unless the transformation of their ideological precepts 
has been achieved. The resolution of this contradiction is necessary for the achievement of a 
stable centre-right identity.  
 
A dynamic theory 
 
In Chapter V I criticised the government-opposition theory for failing to explain 
parties’ long-term positions on European integration. In Chapter VI I conceded that, in the 
short-term, modified competitive strategies can explain the short-term adoption of pro- or anti-
European positions. Parties signalling their will to enter government will adopt Europhilism 
and parties’ opposition the government chose to oppose European integration. The change of 
European position resulting from strategic considerations implies the suspension of the party 
ethos. This suspension is, however, only sustainable in the short-run since it provokes 
untenable tensions within the party.  
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A change in a party’s position on European integration in the long-term can only 
derive from the re-assessment of the relationship between parties’ ethos and European 
attitudes. Although Eurosceptic parties will feel uncomfortable in governmental positions they 
will stick with their ideological evaluation of European integration. In the long-run, the tension 
between Euroscepticism and office makes these parties drift to the margins of the system.  
The further inference of the ethos theory is that party external action is strongly 
determined by its internal life.419 The concepts defining a party’s ethos are a reserve out of 
reach of bids for or opposition to government. Ideological change is a separate and long 
process subject to its own conceptual limits. Thus parties based on the conception of class 
will not propose policies that promote market efficiency to the detriment of redistributive 
policies, but they can devise policies counteracting inequalities stemming from positions in the 
labour market through demand- or supply-side policies. Equally, ecological parties will not 
propose policies that put economic growth ahead of ecological concerns, but the form of 
conceiving the ecological crisis will determine the types of policies they advocate.  
The change in a party’s position on Europe can be triggered by a bid for or to 
coalesce opposition to the government. However, this change will only be sustainable if it 
provokes a permanent reassessment of the relationship between parties’ ethos and European 
policy regimes, resulting in a new status quo. This process is likely to occur only in parties in 
which the economic ethos is predominant. Since political concepts are indivisible and 
unquantifiable, parties based on a predominant political ethos hold unconditional support or 
opposition to European integration. Replacing the concept of the community at the core of a 
party’s identity is subject to even stronger limits, only attainable through a longer time span 
and normally involving the creation of a different party organisation. Therefore, the impact of 
party’s office-seeking strategies will be limited by the political and economic conceptions. The 
incompatibility between Euroscepticism and office condemns parties whose values are 
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incompatible to European integration to a polarising position. Party systems competing on a 
political axis will experience strong conflicts over European integration.  
The constraints imposed on party strategies by core values become most evident 
in the Euroscepticism of nationalist formations. The sufficiency of nationalism for 
Euroscepticism, even when a party is part of a governing coalition, is illustrated by several 
parties in Poland. Even when pursuing a centripetal strategy, nationalists remain Eurosceptic. 
In the 1991-1993 and the 1997-2001 governments several political formations showed the 
resilience of nationalism in face of strategic pressures. The history of the AWS coalition and 
its failed attempts to achieve a unified party organisation and stay in office illustrates the 
instability that nationalist Eurosceptic parties impose on a party system where conflicts over 
the definition of the political community run high. Despite the acute awareness that the right 
should be united in order to face the SLD’s centre-left block, the AWS’s nationalist factions 
remained Eurosceptic. When the disintegration of the party coalition proved irreversible 
several Eurosceptic and centrifugal parties gained parliamentary representation. 
The analysis of the Polish case confirms the theoretical ideas proposed in the 
ethos theory but also suggests that the establishment of a party’s identity and its strategic 
behaviour are not independent from the process of Europeanization. In post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe, “Europe”, as the only symbol referring to the future, gained a 
more prominent meaning than in Western Europe. Scrutinising the compatibility between 
parties’ core concepts and European integration quickly became a task of the party. 
 
Europe seen from the political prism 
 
The typology of parties’ ethos assumes that parties are primarily based on either 
a political or an economic core conception. The different nature of political and economic 
concepts means that some families are more prone to change than others. Since economic 
values are more amenable to quantification and attainable by degrees, parties based on 
economic values can change their attitudes towards the European Union. In contrast, political 
values are absolute concepts while those parties whose identities are based on political 
conceptions are fixed in their positions.  
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The nation and its problematic place on the European sphere 
 
The nation is the political conception that has become the main source of 
opposition to European integration. Resistance to the transfer of political authority from the 
nation-state to the European level in the last half century originated in the ideology that 
legitimises the political authority of nation states, i.e., nationalism. Concepts of political 
community are indivisible and result in an absolute rejection of European integration. The 
Polish case also illustrates that nationalism is a powerful basis for political action even when it 
hinders parties’ chances of keeping office, for example, by leading them to adopt Eurosceptic 
positions. 
Two party types take the nation as their central identifying concept: nationalists 
and national conservatives. The difference between them is that while nationalists are locked 
in their political conceptions, national conservatives can switch to a neo-liberal economic 
identity. Although nationalists often try to develop a neo-liberal economic identity to dilute their 
nationalism, this is often not sufficient for replacing their core identity. The centrality of the 
nation in a party’s identity determines the resilience of its scepticism despite a positive 
evaluation of the economic effects of European integration and a centripetal strategy of 
competition. Therefore, nationalist parties and national conservatives often meet increasing 
difficulties in their attempts to gain and stay in office.  
Since nationalists’ understanding of the political community is necessarily 
incompatible with the principles of European integration, these parties become troublesome 
partners in government. In a multi-level system of governance a Eurosceptic party’s 
opposition to an essential feature of the political system difficult their participation in 
government. In the long-term Eurosceptic parties will be gradually excluded from the centre. 
Party systems organised around the political axis, i.e. where the conflicts between nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism run high, tend to become arenas of conflicts on European integration. 
The irreducible nature of political concepts makes European integration a disruptive and 
contentious issue. Nationalist parties may attempt to integrate government, but their strategy-
derived Europhilism is necessarily temporary. 
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 The increased importance of nationalism in Poland is far from an isolated 
phenomenon. In several other European countries nationalist parties have gained increased 
electoral support. Not only have nationalist parties proved resilient in their beliefs, but new 
parties based on such appeals have successfully entered the electoral arena. The limits to the 
transformation of the nationalist ethos are illustrated by the evolution of the nationalist camp 
in Poland, in particular of its most representative party, the ZChN. Despite its centripetal 
strategy and willingness to reject Euroscepticism, the ZChN remained an unsettling element 
of centre-right coalitions. The attempts of the ZChN to forge a conservative identity based on 
neo-liberalism were unsuccessful and lacked credibility. Despite the party’s emphasis on 
nationalism having been diluted through the addition of a liberal economic doctrine, the 
ZChN’s Catholic nationalism remained its identifying element as the difficulties of the party in 
developing a positive European stance, and the several splits it suffered while attempting to 
do so, demonstrate.  
The re-organisation of the right in the wake of the 2001 elections opened the way 
for a new Catholic nationalist formation in the League of Polish Families (LPR). The LPR’s 
ideology is an even more radical example of the synthesis of Catholicism and Polish 
nationalism that proves the continuing appeal of National Democracy of Roman Dmowski. 
The LPR’s leader, Roman Gyertych, is therefore the inheritor of a long tradition of Polish 
nationalist thought, now finding its number one enemy in European integration.  
 
The Christian cosmopolitanism: Christian democrats, the hardest Europhiles  
 
Due to the demise of civil society as the identifying element of liberal parties, 
currently, Christian democrats are the only party based on a cosmopolitan conception of the 
political community. Political actors viewing the politics of the continent through the prism of 
Christian cosmopolitanism consistently promote European integration as the way to overcome 
national approaches and advance the political integration of Europe. Christian democrats are 
therefore the unalterable supporters of a project that fulfils the vision of overcoming the 
nation-state and achieving a cosmopolitan political order.  
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The failure to establish viable Christian democratic parties as the main centre-
right formation in Central and Eastern Europe. This failure is most intriguing in Poland and, 
with hindsight, has had the most dramatic effects. The persistence and increased importance 
of nationalism has prevented the development of a strong party with a Christian democratic 
political ethos, and provides an effective explanation for the unusually high propensity of 
Polish right-wing parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions.  
In party systems where the political axis is predominant a sizeable Christian 
democratic party can prevent the emergence of strong conflicts over European integration. 
The presence of a strong Christian democratic party assures a Europhile centre-right core. 
Conflicts over integration will appear less vivid and confined to the margins. Christian 
democracy appears the most effective ideological antidote to political nationalism in party 
systems where conflicts over the definition of political community are intense.  
The failure of Polish Christian democracy demonstrates the importance of the 
ideas informing political “communities of discourse” for the formation of political parties. The 
legacy of national Catholicism continued to divide the right-wing political elite after 1989, as it 
had in the interwar period. The division of post-Solidarity political elite between Christian 
nationalists and Christian cosmopolitans reflected the divisions between liberals and 
traditionalists within the Polish Catholic Church. The disagreements between those preaching 
universal Catholicism in the Polish episcopate and those advocating Polish national 
Catholicism prevented the Church from acting as a unifying force and supporting one political 
party or even in succeeding as mediators of political forces.  
The ideological divergences within the post-Solidarity elite resulted in a highly 
fragmented right-wing political scene throughout the nineties, which became further 
fragmented after the 2001 elections. The AWS’s increasingly Eurosceptic rhetoric while in 
office illustrates the resilience of a nationalist identity against office-seeking considerations. 
The centrifugal tactics and nationalist rhetoric of the AWS’s factions at the end of the 1997-
2001 parliaments led to the dissolution of the coalition for the subsequent 2001 parliamentary 
elections in which national Catholicism achieved success through its advocacy of protecting 
the national culture and the state’s political sovereignty.  
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Europe seen from the economic prism 
 
Parties whose identifying community is of economic nature are able to 
successfully alter their stance on European integration. First, the divisible and quantifiable 
nature of economic concepts results in a conditional appreciation of the European economic 
regime. Second, since the European Single Market is not positively based on either a liberal 
or a social democratic model, the EU has adopted both market opening and regulatory policy 
regimes. Changes occurring at these two levels result in the re-appreciation of European 
integration.420  
The reassessment of European economic regimes by parties based on the 
economic ethos appears linked to a centripetal mode of competition. In the last decade the 
positive interaction between centripetalism and a change in the European policy regimes, 
allowed social democratic and economic conservatives to preserve their centrist status. While 
in Western Europe the positive evaluation of the EU by social democrats has mostly resulted 
from a surge of regulatory activity by the Commission, the change in the positions of Central 
and Eastern European social democrats on the EU was caused by their internal 
transformation from communism to a modern conception of social democracy, combining a 
liberal political stance with supply-side conceptions of class-based economic policies. This 
transformation coincided with the clarification of the relations between the European Union 
and Poland, which allowed for a reassessment of European integration. For example, the 
conclusion of the negotiation of the agricultural chapter regulating the application of the CAP 
subsidies led the PSL to abandon the opposition to a system previously considered 
discriminatory of Polish farmers.  
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The class: social democrats and their more extreme cousins 
 
Social democrats, the defenders of the working class and the promoters of the 
welfare state, have been committed to the elimination of class differences by counteracting 
inequalities stemming from positions in the labour market and protecting low and minimum 
income groups.421 Although social democrats have been one of the parties with a stronger 
commitment to class internationalism, their understanding of the international economic 
system has in the past led them to consider that the nation-state is the most appropriate 
setting for correcting market inequalities on the basis of class. Therefore, despite 
internationalism being embedded in the ideological roots of left-wing movements,422 during its 
evolution, social democracy has often held a nationalist political ethos. The nation-state was 
regarded as the best setting to apply class-based policies that challenged an international 
economic order that benefits capital rather than labour and creates pressures for the lowering 
of welfare state standards.  
However, in the context of a globalised international economy the perception that 
national Keynesianism is no longer viable has compelled social democrats to renounce 
demand-side policies and undertake the pursuit of a new growth path to compete in global 
markets by maintaining certain instruments for influencing the supply-side of the economy.423 
The re-operationalisation of parties’ ethos underway in Western Europe in the nineteen 
eighties and nineties is however bound by the limits established by the concept of class. 
Social democrats will not embrace policies that pursue growth at the expense of social justice, 
and will only support European integration if they see it as furthering this goal.  
In the early nineties, following the Single European Act (SEA), the EU began 
developing market regulation instruments. Since its inception the European institutions had 
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been aiming at de-regulation of the market European terms, therefore this represented a new 
policy approach. Social democratic parties acknowledged this change and in a departure from 
their previously held positions, came to support integration.424 The endorsement of policies 
promoting supply-side correctors to the market at the European level coincided with the 
national social democratic parties’ policy preferences at the national level. Social democrats’ 
Hard Europhilism mainly derives from their changed perception of integration as a project 
occupied not only with the completion of the internal market but also with its regulation. Social 
democratic parties therefore support the deepening of political integration in the European 
Union, as necessary to correct the failures of national states in promoting market regulation. 
Furthermore this support is strengthened by a political ethos that conceived the political 
community in cosmopolitan terms. 
While the change of attitude of Western European social democratic parties was 
the result of these two processes, in Central and Eastern Europe the change of attitude of 
social democrats has resulted from a different understanding of class. The Polish case shows 
that although the former communist party’s inherited internationalism predisposed it to 
Europhilism, it was the party’s embracement of social democracy and the transformation of its 
economic beliefs away from state ownership that drove the party’s change of attitude towards 
the European Union. The legacy of communist internationalist ideals is now embodied in the 
SLD’s Europhilism. The party supports European integration because it views the EU as a 
promoter of left-wing economic ideals and judges it a politically valid project to overcome the 
shortcomings of the nation-state.  
The SLD’s transformation is not however exclusively a result of the 
Europeanization process. The specific interpretation of its left-wing inheritance devised by the 
party modernizers is the result of a clear choice of the party leaders to model themselves on 
European social democracy and support European Integration. This support for European 
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integration – a symbol of the transformation of the party and a source of its legitimacy – has to 
an extent determined the direction of the transformation of the SLD, and the specific form of 
its present identity.  
The conversion of social democrats to a pro-integration position was not 
accomplished by those factions that interpret the concept of class in extreme terms. They 
consider that European integration prevents the attainment of the policy regimes that are 
essential for correcting inequalities deriving from positions in the labour market, such as 
public control over capital flows, extensive public investment in industrial policy and the 
statutory right to work and housing.  
In Poland, Self-Defence (Samoobrona) originally a protest movement of agrarian 
origins, articulated an extreme interpretation of the concept of class. Noteworthy for the non-
intellectual character of its programme, the Samoobrona defined its ethos over time as an 
extreme interpretation of class concepts. Its policies addressed the needs of the losers of 
transition. Initially the political ethos of the Samoobrona was clearly nationalist, but in 2000 
the party dropped nationalism as a source of party identification. The move coincided with a 
conditional rather than an outright rejection of European integration. The fact exemplifies the 
effects that a secondary political ethos has on parties’ European attitudes. The protection of 
vulnerable economic groups against the vagaries of a liberal economic system formed the 
basis of both Samoobrona’s polarising strategy, and its perception of an a priori 
incompatibility between European integration and the national interest. 
 
 
The market: liberals and liberal conservatives 
 
Since the free market represents liberals’ identifying concept, their evaluation of 
the EU is based on whether it contributes to the creation of a free European-wide market. 
While broadly in favour of a project that appears geared to the abolition of barriers to trade 
and the creation of economic competition at the European level, liberals have become more 
sceptical of integration since the Delors’ Commission launched policies to increase market 
regulation and redistribution at the European level. While the positioning of liberal parties on 
either side of the Europhilism-Euroscepticism line depends on their evaluation of the effects of 
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the EU’s economic policy regime. Liberals’ support for the EU’s economic regime, if combined 
with the civil society as the secondary identitary element, results in unconditional Europhilism.  
The liberal conservatives, holding the nation as their political ethos, will be either 
Soft Europhiles or Hard Eurosceptics. When judging the EU’s economic regime as too 
regulatory, their opposition to the effects of economic integration is reinforced by the 
opposition of their nationalism to political integration. A positive evaluation of the European 
policy regimes is mitigated by the nationalist view of the political order.  
In Poland the liberal conservatism of the right-wing Citizens Platform’s resulted in 
the centre-right’s variable support for integration. While in the early nineties the civil society 
was the identifying concept of political liberalism, after the 2001 elections and the formation of 
the Citizens’ Platform (PO), economic liberalism emerged as the dominant liberal identity. 
Therefore the early liberal parties’ appraisal of European integration in terms of civil society 
gave way to a conditional and economically based approval of the EU. The centre-right in 
Poland therefore appears to be consolidating around a neo-liberal economic ethos.  
The liberals’ troubled development is a mirror image of the failure of Catholic 
cosmopolitanism to thrive in the Polish party system. Christian and liberal political 
cosmopolitanism have not thrived as central identifying elements of Polish parties and the 
ideological anchors of a Europhile right-wing coalition. The replacement of political with 
economic liberalism as the central identifying element meant the disappearance of an 
unconditional support for European integration as a community of civil societies. The 
economic appraisal of integration is conditional and dependent on the policy regimes of 
European integration. The political and unconditional support for the European project in the 
post-Solidarity camp now appears to have been a phenomenon of the transition. The centre-
right now approaches European integration through the prism of the market.  
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The estate and its elusive operationalisation  
 
The farmers have been the social group that has most strongly benefited from 
European integration through the CAP.425 The concept of estate, on which agrarians are 
founded, means that farmers are entitled to benefits from the state. Nevertheless, the 
agrarian party family is a vivid example of how the understanding of economic community 
determines the perceptions of the benefits and costs of the CAP. The form in which the 
concept of estate is operationalised by parties is as important for their appreciation of 
integration as the real benefits deriving from the EU.  
The stance on Europe taken by the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) illustrates well the 
decisiveness that a favourable evaluation of the application of the CAP on Polish agriculture 
had on the attitude the party towards European integration. Until 1997 the party’s nationalist 
interpretation of the role of family farming was incompatible with the reforms proposed by the 
European Union. The PSL’s peasant ideology, inherited from inter-war Poland, considered 
small family farms as the backbone of the Polish nation and the defence of small farmers’ as 
vital constituents of the nation became the justification for a farmer’s party.  
Following the landslide defeat in the 1997 election, the party changed its 
leadership. This resulted in attempts to widen the party’s appeal beyond small family farmers. 
The party changed its discourse away from the nationalist interpretation of family farming into 
a wider and more pragmatic understanding of the farming community. A re-evaluation of the 
extension of the CAP on Polish farmers was also facilitated by the beginning of the 
negotiations between Poland and the EU. In contrast to the party’s previous insistence on the 
promotion of conditions that maintained family farming, by 2001, Jarosław Kalinowski, 
claimed that the party’s support for Europe depended exclusively on whether Polish farmers 
would enjoy similar competitive conditions as their counterparts in the EU member states. 
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This case thus shows that parties founded on specific agrarian cleavages are constrained by 
their specific constituencies’ economic interests.  
 
The general applicability of the framework 
 
The strength of nationalism as a political identity makes Poland an extreme case 
of the increasing divisiveness of nationalism and Euroscepticism in the consolidation (or 
failure to consolidate) the party system core. Poland serves as a basis for producing and 
testing a theory of heterogeneous causality of parties’ European positions. Although the level 
of structuration provided by the political axis to Polish political competition is unusually 
high,426 the framework appears relevant to explain the dilemmas experienced by nationalist 
parties holding office in other European countries as they challenge the European consensus 
on integration. For the last ten years, nationalist parties have proven increasingly successful 
in gaining a central place in European party systems, and in providing a strong challenge to 
established centrist parties.  
Moving beyond the immediate context of this study, we can test this explanation 
in two different sets of cases. The first set consists of cases from Central and Eastern Europe, 
where the European issue determined the original ideological set up of party systems, i.e., 
where it seemed to influence which types of parties occupy the left and right-wing space. The 
framework suggests that party system core formation Central and Eastern European 
democracies hinges on the ability of the different ideological groups to agree on basic 
identities and the compatibility of those with the values informing European integration.  
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Hungary and Czech Republic  
 
The interaction between European integration and the formation of centre-right 
parties in Hungary and the Czech Republic was less problematic than in Poland. Although the 
Czech centre-right party is Eurosceptic and European integration inspires some reservations 
in its Hungarian counterpart, in neither country the issue became as divisive as in Poland. 
From the mid- nineties - and into the early twenty-first century - both countries saw a 
structured core party system being formed, based on liberal conservatism on the right, and 
social democracy on the left.  
The Hungarian centre right, due to the absense of Eurosceptic parties since the 
2002 elections, is the case that contrasts most markedly with Poland, where in 2001 20 
percent of popular vote was cast for Eurosceptic parties and from 2005 a coalition of 
eurosceptic parties took office. The similarity of the Hungarian and the Polish negotiated 
transitions, the occupation of the left-wing political space by ex- communist parties, as well as 
the predominance of the political axis in structuring competition, makes comparison between 
the two countries useful. The peaceful entry of the European issue on the Hungarian centre-
right demands an analysis of party formation and the party’s European attitudes.  
The successful unification of the Hungarian right in a liberal conservative party 
shows that despite the importance of conflicts over the definition of political community for 
party competition, nationalism was successfully subordinated to a neo-liberal economic 
ethos.427 The transformation of the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) from liberalism to 
liberal conservatism (with a strong nationalist secondary identity)428 proved strategic in the 
effective capture of the centre. It also allowed the party to sustain a Soft Europhile position in 
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harmony with the party’s centrist strategies. The FIDESZ captured the nationalist appeal while 
subordinating it to a secondary element.  
Viktor Orban, with his characteristically strong leadership style captured the 
window of opportunity provided by the disintegration of the anti-communist umbrella 
organisation, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the weakening of the senior liberal 
party, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz), when it joined a governmental coalition with 
the ex-communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP). The FIDESZ galvanised the right-wing 
spectrum and, in the run up to the 2002 elections, it incorporated minor parties, in a bid to 
control the full right-wing space. From 1994 the FIDESZ detached its destiny from the SzDSz, 
previously its senior counterpart, and set about its ideological transformation, stressing a 
family-based social policy, defending the creation of a strong state and espousing 
conservative Catholic morals. These themes were not part of an embrace of Christian 
democracy, but were rather a development on neo-liberal economic themes common to other 
conservative parties. As XXXXX notes, the bourgeosification of society, aimed at the creation 
and support of a middle class in post-communist Hungary, was only possible following the 
introduction of free market reforms. The FIDESZ’s apology of individual capital accumulation, 
despite advocating the supporting role of the state, was still based on the idea of the 
individual economic freedom.  
Alongside its liberal economic programme, the FIDESZ adopted a tipically 
conservative political identity. After it took office in 1998 and took charge of accession 
negotiations, the rhetoric of the party was increasingly determined by nationalist elements. 
When Prime Minister Orban asked the parliament to vote for the government’s programme, 
told them to demonstrate who “belongs to the nation”.429 As the subsequent parliamentary 
elections of 2002 approached and the new identity of the party consolidated, Laszlo Kover, 
the party chairman after the 2000 Congress, made clear that “the nation is only important to 
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us”, and ”only we have a message for the nation”.430 Despite the strong nationalist language, 
the party’s commitment to economic liberalism remained the central element of the party’s 
identity and the basis of its governmental policy. The creation of a strong middle-class based 
on private enterprise became the central plank of its government policy. Under these 
conditions, FIDESZ remained broadly positive regarding the compatibility between the 
perceived national interest and European integration. At the 2001 election the mobilisation of 
the right-wing vote by FIDESZ resulted in the exclusion of polarising Eurosceptic parties from 
parliament after the 2001 election.431 The Hungarian right-wing suggests that a centrist 
identity compatible with European integration facilitates the creation of a stable centrist party.  
 
Like in Hungary, the consolidation of the centre-right was achieved in the Czech 
Republic around a liberal conservative identity. Differently from the FIDESZ, the Czech centre 
right is Eurosceptic, but in opposition to the Polish case, the European issue does not 
reinforce any divides. Vaclav Klaus, the finance minister in the first democratic Czech 
government, understood early on that the pervasive anti-party sentiment among the dissident 
group Civic Movement was inadequate in a democracy, as these demand only 
institutionalised parties. Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS), created in 1991, was thus a 
forerunner in the occupation of the centre-right in the Czech Republic. Its neo-liberal identity 
reflected the centrality of questions of economic reform in the early period of transition, to 
which the party answered with a radical program of marketization leading to the establishment 
of a liberal market economy where the state would have a limited role to play in the regulation 
of the economy. The Klaus government, which was formed after the 1992 elections, 
continued in power until June 1996. It consisted of the ODS and three smaller parties: the 
Christian Democratic Party (KDS) which merged with the ODS in 1995; the Christian 
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Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL); and the Civic Democratic 
Alliance (ODA). By the mid-nineties the core of the centre-right party system was formed.  
Vaclav Klaus was also the first Central and Eastern European leader to advance 
a critical attitude to European integration, fashioned on Thatcher’s criticism of Europe as 
“socialism through the back door”. The Civic Democrats’ extreme interpretation of economic 
liberalism was, following the unexpected emergence of the Czech state in 1993, 
complemented by the party’s self-portrayal as the protector of the fragile Czech nation. As 
Hanley describes and explains in its article “From neo-liberalism to national interests”, as the 
party adopted the nation as a secondary party identity, the party’s Euroscepticism hardened. 
Eurorealism, a position that claims to evaluate European integration according to “real” as 
opposed to ideological criteria, became from 1997, the label of outspoken opposition of 
Vaclav Klaus to European integration. Such position, although being principally backed by 
arguments of economic nature, accession leading to the over-regulation of the Czech 
economy, 432  was reinforced by political arguments, i.e., an opposition to the supranational 
character of the EU.433 European integration was accused to further the interests of West 
European states, in particular those of Germany, and being therefore incompatible with the 
Czech national interest. In the 2001 Manifest of Czech Eurorealism, the party evoked the 
marginal influence of the Czech Republic in European decision-making as a reason for 
delaying and possibly withdrawing the Czech application.434 While Klaus’s economic 
liberalism made it accuse the European Union of curtailing economic freedom, the party’s 
vocal political nationalism resulted in a vigorous defence of the Czech state as a guarantee of 
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national identity and political self-determination against the supranational institutions of the 
EU.435  
 
Slovakia 
The way the European issue influenced core party formation in Slovakia differed 
clearly from that of the other CEE countries. In contrast to the splitting effect that Europe had 
on the Polish governing coalition between 1997 and 2001, the European issue was the raison 
d’etre of the 1998- 2002 and the 2002-2006 governing coalitions in Slovakia. The 1994-1998 
Meciar government non-democratic practices and anti-NATO rethorics resulted in the 
exclusion of Slovakia from the first group starting accession negotiations at the Luxembourg 
Council in 1997. This decision triggered the coalition of opposition forces in Bratislava, who 
started to mobilise a common front to defeat the Meciar party in the 1998 parliamentary 
election.436 The Slovak Democratic Coalition which was created by “smelting all the 
democratic forces in the country so that the group would be the strongest”,437 was above all 
based on the understanding that an alliance between pro-European Christian democrats and 
liberals was of the essence to save Slovakia from international isolation and internal 
stagnation.438 
Despite the Christian democratic origins of the Slovak Democratic Coalition, 
which was launched by moderate Christian democrats and liberals, and the intention of its 
leadership to create a broad Christian democratic movement following the model of the 
German Christian democrats, the divisions among the Christian democratic party between 
hardliners and moderates weakened the chances of their success, and proved a resilient 
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source of division in the centre-right. After ousting Meciar from government and taking office, 
the conservative wing of the Christian Democratic Mouvement (KDH), anxious to preserve its 
ideological purity, soon challenged the legitimacy of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) 
and advocated a return to the original five-party coalition form. Opposite plans were divised 
by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda and his allies, who intended to make the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition the vehicle of a new formation with a wider appeal. After futile attempts 
to find an agreement, Dzurinda and a group of ministers created the Slovak Democratic and 
Christian Union (SDKU) in 2000. The SDKU, projecting the image of the sole guarantor of 
Slovakia’s entry into NATO and the EU against the comeback of Meciar – this time in coalition 
with a new left-win party, SMER, would contest the 2002 elections, and, despite winning only 
15% of the vote, be the leading party in a second electoral coalition with Christian democrats, 
liberals and the Hungarian minority party.  
The survival of Christian democrats as the heart of the governing coalition in 
2002 assured the compatibility between the values of the centre right and European 
integration. Despite the party system core in Slovakia being still largely unconsolidated, the 
fact that the coalition opposing Meciar in 1998 was built on the basis of a strong pro-Western 
consensus means that the germ of the centre-right was built on non-nationalist principles. 
Although the formation of a core right-wing in Slovakia on the basis of Christian democracy is 
troubled by the division of the movement between moderates and purist ideologists, the 
centre right is nevertheless devoid of nationalists.  
The exclusion of nationalists from the pro-European coalition takes its full meaning in 
the aftermath of Slovakia’s accession to the EU, with the coalition of Robert Fico’s left-wing 
SMER (Direction), with the of HZDS of Vladimir Meciar and the Slovak Nationalist Party. 
Despite the uncertainty involving the future of the centre-right, this pattern of coalition appears 
to reinforce a division among the right and the left along nationalist lines. Neither the SNS nor 
the HZDS are currently Eurosceptic, the first preferring to concentrate on an anti-Hungarian 
attitude, the second showing its lack of ideological basis and opportunistic character, having 
changed its European attitude after it lost office in 1998.  
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Austria 
 
In Austria the increased divisiveness of nationalism within the FPO after it took 
office with the Austrian Christian democrats, was intrincically related with the European issue. 
Such relation materialised in an unusually concrete way first when the EU countries 
introduced diplomatic sanctions after the FPO took office. The Austrian case shows in a 
forceful way how European integration hightens the tensions of a nationalist party’s 
participation in a governmental coalition. The European issue was from the beginning the 
achille’s heel of the coalition of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) with the Austrian Christian 
democrats (ÖVP) in 1999, and it deepened the severe tensions within the FPÖ between the 
factions advocating ideological consistency and those pursuing pragmatic office-seeking 
considerations, a conflict that led to the split of the party in April 2005.   
Europe first became a central point of contention within the party when the 
governments of the other 14 EU member states introduced diplomatic sanctions against the 
coalition government by its opposition to the presence of nationalists. The heavy decline in 
the 2002 parliamentary elections primarily stemmed from tensions between office-holding 
constraints and the party’s nationalist identity. The transformation of the FPÖ into a liberal 
conservative party was impeded by structural difficulties in overcoming the commitment to the 
nation as the fundamental political community. The soaring tensions caused by this resulted 
in the split of the Freedom Party of Austria in 2005.  
The FPÖ’s ideology has its origins in that of the nationalist camp that represented 
the aspirations of the German-speaking majority, at the time of democratic mobilisation, within 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During World War II, the predecessor of the FPÖ was linked 
with the Nazi regime, leading to its exclusion from government until 1983.439 In the seventies 
and eighties, the party several times attempted to change its identity and overcome its 
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exclusion from office, by replacing nationalism with economic liberalism. However, the limits 
to the possibility of changing the basic ethos of the party’s identity soon became apparent.  
The temporary success in reversing the hierarchy of values between nationalism 
and economic liberalism made it possible for the party to become part of a government 
coalition with the Socialist Party. This was made possible by the pre-eminence exerted by the 
top liberal elite which had the party renamed internationally as the Liberal Party of Austria and 
made it a member of the Liberal International. In 1985, Vice Chancellor Steger and G. Stix 
attempted to formalise this change by introducing the concept of freedom as the centre-piece 
in the new party programme. Freedom was conceptualised as autonomy for the individual and 
the national community, but the attempt to reconcile the two party traditions also meant a 
reversal of the FPÖ’s tradition of subordinating liberalism to nationalism.440  
However, the constraints and compromises imposed by participation in 
government alienated parts of the party’s rank-and-file, in particular its regional structures, 
who soon organised to challenge the predominance of the party-in-office. In 1986, taking 
advantage of the strengthened position of nationalists within the party’s regional structures, 
Jörg Haider took the grievances of the membership against the liberal leadership to win the 
party’s leadership on a nationalist platform. A reversal of the ideological transformation from 
nationalism to liberalism quickly followed, and when the EU rose in the Austrian political 
priorities in the run up to the 1994 enlargement, took up an Eurosceptic stance.  In the 1999 
elections the FPÖ, campaigning on a nationalist platform, significantly increased its share of 
the vote to more than 27% of the popular vote, mainly by drawing voters away from the 
Austrian Christian Democratic Party (ÖVP). In January 2000 the ÖVP formed a governmental 
coalition with the FPÖ, which provoked an outcry among the governments of EU member 
states.  
The diplomatic sanctions imposed by Austria’s EU partners increased internal 
pressures and served to mobilise Austria’s anti-FPÖ forces and led to the resignation of Jörg 
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Haider from the party’s chairmanship on 1 May 2000 in favour of Susanne Riess-Passer, who 
became Vice-Chancellor and led the FPÖ’s government team.441 However, Haider’s 
resignation did not exclude him from party politics, and he remained the FPÖ’s leader behind 
the scenes and a member of the coalition committee. Haider considered himself responsible 
for the FPÖ’s success442 and resented the popularity of the moderate FPÖ leaders with 
ministerial posts, like Riess-Passer and Finance Minister Karl Heinz Grasser.443 Enmeshed in 
this conflict of personalities was the deeper issue of the nationalist party identity. The conflict 
between the office-seeking moderate wing of the party and Jörg Haider and his followers 
implied the (re)definition of the party’s identity away from nationalism. However, neither 
Haider nor his followers were inclined to let that happen and in the midst of a party crisis 
involving the two factions, one of Haider’s followers, Stadler, launched a petition against the 
party’s moderate wing in order “to ensure the FPÖ remains Haider’s party”. Among the 
conditions raised in the petition were typical demands destined to reinforce the party’s 
identity, like vetoing the EU enlargement if the Czech government did not revoke the Benes 
decrees.  
The FPÖ’s nationalist identity is the basis of its Hard Euroscepticism. The 
tensions between the centripetal strategies of the FPÖ while in office and its nationalist ethos 
- embodied in Jörg Haider’s leadership - became evident and contributed to the disintegration 
of the party soon after its participation in the governmental coalition. Three of the FPÖ’s 
ministers resigned and the government finally fell, which led to early elections in early 
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2002.444 The question of Haider’s leadership, feeding the heavy intra-party turmoil, reflected 
into a marked electoral decline, the party losing two-thirds of its 1999 vote.  
                                                     
The situation had echoes of the historic confrontation between the centrist wing of 
the party and its nationalist elements, principally engrained in the provincial politicians longing 
for a revival of the populist roots of the party. Such defeat was again repeated in the infighting 
between the head of the list, the centrist Kronberger and the third candidate of the list, the 
nationalist Molzer, in the 2004 European Parliament elections campaign.445 Molzer’s victory 
reflected the ultimate predominance of a clear adherence to the German-national core group 
in the party’s nationalist identity. A group of FPO politicians holding ministerial posts, realising 
that the FPO was an intrinsically nationalist party and strongly resisted the compromises 
ineherent in a centrist strategy, decided to split from the FPO and create a centrist party. The 
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) was thus born in 2005. The centrist strategy of the 
party was however not successful, and in the 2006 elections, the BZÖ tried to identify itself 
with the FPO and returned to nationalist and eurosceptic attitudes.  
 
 
The Agrarian parties  
The ethos theory also explains why the Hungarian agrarian party, the 
Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) is Soft Europhile446 despite its nationalist ethos. 
Agrarian parties are fundamentally determined by the conception of estate as their basic 
economic community. Their evaluation of the EU depends on whether they see it as 
facilitating transfers to farmers. Contradicting previous explanations that consider the party’s 
 
 
 
 
444 op.cit. 
445 {Fallend, 2006 #425} 
446 Batory, A. (2002), “Attitudes to Europe: Ideology, Strategy and the issue of European Union membership in 
Hungarian Party Politics”, Party Politics, 8(5): 525-540, p.543. 
 216 
positive attitude towards European integration the result of its competitive strategies,447 the 
ethos theory considers FKGP’s Europhilism the result of a positive evaluation of integration’s 
impact on support for farmers. Nationalism, as a secondary element in the party’s identity, 
merely dete nditional or unconditional.  
, and 
especially to an anti-Euro stance (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005, Chari et al., 2004).  
                                                     
rmines whether this support is co
The limits to the applicability 
The application of this framework beyond the Polish case shows its limitations. 
First, the framework does not apply to parties which are founded primarily on office-seeking 
consideration rather than on their ethos. The European position of a political party fitting the 
Downsian description of parties as teams of office-seeking politicians (Downs, 1957) can not 
be predicted from its ideology, since their policy stances do not necessarily translate 
ideological positions. Contrary to the temporary character of the European positions of ethos-
based parties in electoral periods, the incongruence between the European positions of these 
parties and their stated ideology can be permanent. The Euroscepticism of the Italian 
Northern League (LN), a party where power-seeking considerations prime over ideology 
(Leonardi and Kovacs, 1993, Ruzza and Schmidtke, 1993), is inconsistent with its earlier 
appraisal of integration as beneficial for northern Italian minority nationalism. Several authors 
agree that the imperative of coalition politics led the LN to a lasting Euroscepticism
 
 
 
 
447 Batory, A. (2002), “Attitudes to Europe, Ideology, Strategy and the issue of European Union membership in 
Hungarian Party Politics”, Party Politics, 8(5). 
 217
 West European parties  
 
The second setting to test the theory is the West European party systems, where 
the European issue gained relevance when the party systems had achieved a degree of 
ideological structuration. Despite the consolidation of the ideological space which is 
characteristic of West European party systems, the evolution of modes of European-level 
governance, in particular since the Maastricht Treaty which provided for the extension of 
majority voting, has also had indirect effects on the ideological identity of parties. The long-
term incompatibility between political nationalism as the central core party ethos and centrist 
strategies appears particularly marked in the case of right-wing parties in Western Europe. 
 
The British Conservative Party’s change of dominant ethos from neo-liberalism to 
nationalism during the second half of the 1990s explains the move of the party from Soft 
Europhilism to Hard Euroscepticism. As a mirror image of this development, the French 
Gaullist camp’s move from nationalism to economic liberalism in the explains the Europhilism 
of the Movement for the Republic (RPR). The impossibility of changing their fundamental 
identity underpins the Euroscepticism of Austrian and French nationalist parties, as well as 
the tensions between their stance on Europe and their desire to participate in government. 
Such tensions were most visible in the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), with the European 
issue rising to prominence when the party became the junior partner in a governmental 
coalition with the Christian Democratic Party (ÖVP) in 2000. The sanctions imposed by 
member states of the EU on the Austrian government were a factor in the resignation of its 
leader and ideological mentor, Jörg Haider. However, the impossibility of replacing its 
nationalist ethos resulted in a severe party crisis, causing the demise of the governmental 
coalition and the subsequent electoral decline of the party. 
 
France  
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The ethos theory helps to explain why parties with a nationalist ethos, if this is not 
central to their identity, can conditionally support European integration. The evolution of the 
French right-wing camp illustrates how downgrading its legacy of nationalism to a secondary 
element, allowed the French Gaullist camp to support European integration. The 
transformation of the French right in the context of the conversion of governance at the 
European level into a more supranational regime was characterised by a clear division 
between nationalists like the Front National and the creation of a liberal conservative camp 
consisting of the UDF and, with increased dominance, the Union for the Republic (RPR).  
The Gaullist camp was effectively split in the late seventies when, in 1976, 
Jacques Chirac created the Union for the Republic (RPR) and attempted to make the party 
the inheritor of de Gaulle’s legacy. Initially, Chirac adopted a nationalistic Eurosceptic attitude. 
This became a defining difference with respect to the cosmopolitan and pro-European Union 
for French Democracy (UDF) created in 1978 and led by Giscard d’Estaing. In founding the 
RPR, Chirac attempted to reoccupy the Gaullist high ground on the issue of French national 
sovereignty. However, his intention was not simply to be a passive inheritor of the Gaullist 
legacy, but to renew the right-wing. He set out to achieve this by reinterpreting the 
fundamental concepts of Gaullism. During the late seventies and early eighties, Chirac’s 
reinterpretation of Gaullism was based on the assumption that the increasing degree of 
European integration meant that economic liberalism should be the central identifying concept 
of a Gaullist party rather than political nationalism. The RPR’s central identifying reference 
became neo-liberalism. References to de Gaulle’s nationalism became much rarer.448 Instead 
the party stressed an economic programme clearly based on the conception of the market as 
the perfect distributor.449 
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The victory of the Socialist Party on an interventionist economic platform in the 
1981 elections gave the RPR a platform against which to stand. This reinforced the 
reinterpretation of de Gaulle’s legacy away from a nationalist vision of the national interest. 
The party’s programme stressed the centrality of economic liberalism, strongly attacking the 
Socialists’ plans for reforming the French economy and defending the merits of deregulation, 
privatization and market forces.450 The French centre-right moved away from national 
conservatism to liberal conservatism.451 
In the elaboration of the party’s identity, economic liberalism and the commitment 
to the market came hand-in-hand with a Soft Europhile stance based on a vision of European 
integration as the consolidation of a European free market. With the conversion of the party to 
market liberalism, the appeal of Europe as an economic space came to outweigh the political 
threat posed to national sovereignty. The role of Jacques Chirac in this transformation fits the 
theory outlined in this thesis. The Soft Europhile stance deriving from the new party identity 
made possible the compatibility between the party’s ethos, European position and office-
attaining ambitions. Jacques Chirac’s reinterpretation of de Gaulle’s legacy allowed the RPR 
to conditionally support a more supranational mode of governance, thus making Chirac an 
odd figure among Gaullists. Chirac understood that the “cosmopolitan dimension” bestowed 
by de Gaulle’s to French nationalism, i.e., presenting a “Grand Europe” as a continuation of 
the defence of French national interests, was not well suited to the project of creating the 
European Union. The Maastricht Treaty and the extension of qualified majority voting made it 
explicit that the loss of sovereignty implied in European integration would be too severe for a 
nationalist party to bear.  
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The transformation of the RPR from national conservatism to liberal conservatism 
was not a consensual process and divided the ranks of the party on several occasions, most 
vividly during the campaign for the Maastricht Treaty. The primary cause of the split arose 
from differing visions of the party’s identity as the inheritor of de Gaulle’s nationalist legacy. A 
centralised and unified party saw the strongest opposition to the leadership of Jacques Chirac 
and the Maastricht Treaty emerge through the voices of Charles Pasqua and Philippe Sèguin. 
So serious was the contestation mounted by Philippe Sèguin’s defence of democracy as 
inseparable from national sovereignty against “Maastricht Europe” that he became a serious 
rival to Chirac for the leadership of the party, and even for the presidency. The party 
eventually split on the issue of European integration.  
 
The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty ultimately showed the contradiction between 
nationalism and Europhilism that had marked Le Pen’s rhetoric until then. The Gaullist 
Europhilism and nationalist identity proved too difficult to reconcile in the face of the 
Maastricht Treaty provisions for extending majority voting to new areas of policy making.452 
Previously, Le Pen had attempted to reproduce de Gaulle’s combination of nationalism and 
Europhilism, by portraying integration as a process serving the French national interest. In the 
1989 European elections, Le Pen outlined a Gaullist vision of European integration, stating 
that France would only allow a pooling of national sovereignty where this appeared beneficial 
to its own interest, for example in the area of defence. This implied that European integration 
remained under France’s control. Le Pen’s support for European integration was part of an 
attempt to appear worthy of office, i.e., it derived from his centrist, office-seeking strategy. Le 
Pen campaigned for a “No” vote, in a concerted strategy that stated that the consequence of 
a yes vote would be “worse than losing a war’”, the triumph of an “international conspiracy 
mounted by hidden forces and vested interests against our nation”, the end of the “France 
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eternal”.453 The alternative proposed by Le Pen was a European concert of nations where 
France was to have a predominant role.  
The French case shows that a nationalist’s core ideological convictions is 
structurally results in opposition to European integration. Nationalist parties differ from 
conservatives in that the latter are able to subjugate a nationalist legacy to economic neo-
liberalism and maintain their centripetal strategy.  
 
Britain  
 
The same dilemmas over loss of sovereignty versus economic liberalism run high 
in the British right-wing camp. The ethos theory explains the variation in the British 
Conservatives’ European position in the same way as it does for the French right. In a mirror 
image of the developments occurring in the French RPR, where the reinterpretation of the 
Gaullist legacy meant that economic neo-liberalism became the central party identity and 
allowed the RPR to adopt a Europhile attitude, the British Conservative’s Euroscepticism 
derives opposition to both developments accomplished in Maastricht: the regulation of 
European markets and the extension of policy areas subject to qualified majority. The party’s 
Eurosceptic attitude resulted also from the replacement of economic neo-liberalism as the 
party’s central element in the party identity with political nationalism.  
During the seventies, the Conservatives’ reluctance to accept any form of 
supranational governance had been overcome by Edward Heath and the Conservatives led 
Britain to membership of the EEC. The party’s Soft Europhilism resulted from a positive 
evaluation of European integration’s contribution to economic liberalisation, the central goal of 
the party. Later, Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberalism reinforced the individual and the market 
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as the identifying concept of the party. European integration was welcomed as a way to 
create an internal free market within the EC and as a security guarantee against the 
communist threat. Although the Conservatives’ backing of British participation in the EEC was 
still a balancing act between the positive evaluation staked by neo-liberals and the opposition 
of nationalists, Margaret Thatcher was one of the strong supporters of the 1985 SEA.454 
However, after the SEA and the completion of the Single Market, Jacques Delors’s EU 
agenda moved towards European market regulation and a supranational mode of 
governance. Margaret Thatcher’s 1989Bruges speech marked a shift in the party’s position on 
integration and against the process which ultimately led to the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Margaret Thatcher defined British Conservatives in relation to European integration as 
the party of economic deregulation and nationalism.455 
Although Thatcher’s Euroscepticism resulted from what it saw as “socialism 
through the back door”, opposition to ratification of the Maastricht Treaty also derived from 
nationalist elements within the Conservative Party, and the issue provided a platform against 
which to rally against. The issue became highly salient since Margaret Thatcher’s resignation 
as Prime Minister was partially related to her stance on European integration. To deal with the 
party’s divisions on Maastricht, the next Prime Minister, John Major, resorted to the argument 
that ideological disagreement should be muted in order to maintain party unity. This argument 
implied that nationalist opposition to European integration should keep silent for so that the 
party could retain its centrist, office-seeking strategy. In order to make ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty possible, John Major had to demand a parliamentary vote of confidence.456 
However, in the long-run, efforts to combat a Eurosceptic attitude with an instrumental 
justification based on strategic, office-seeking considerations, in the long-run weakened the 
neo-liberal wing of the party by not properly linking the party’s Europhile stance with economic 
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neo-liberal arguments. John Major’s stance provided the nationalists with a rallying platform 
and came to be seen as an office-seeking strategy. Once out of office, under the leadership of 
William Hague the nationalist faction’s ascendancy ensured that the party’s identity was 
increasingly determined by the concept of a national political community and resulted in a 
decidedly Hard Eurosceptic stance in the 2001 parliamentary elections.  
 
 
Europe and the formation of the centre-left 
 
The causes of the evolution of the Scandinavian social democratic parties from 
Soft Eurosceptic positions in the seventies and eighties to Hard Europhilism in the late 
nineties illustrate the result of two related but separate processes elsewhere in Europe. The 
Scandinavian states, and in particular Denmark, developed a very comprehensive welfare 
state than other European The Danish social democratic party (SD) maintained throughout 
the seventies and eighties an interpretation of the core class ethos through the prisms of a 
national Keynesian policy.457 The party’s commitment to the left-wing ideal of workers’ 
involvement in salary decisions further prevented the party from having an effective income 
policy sustaining wage restraint. This worsened the effects of the economic crisis that 
followed the 1970s oil price hikes.  
The SD’s belief in national Keynesianism led the party to evaluate negatively the 
effects of economic integration on the national economic regime. Social democrats saw the 
European Single Market as a mechanism for promoting tax competition and attempting to 
insulate markets from political interference by combining a European-wide market under 
selective supranational surveillance with intergovernmental decision-making vested in 
sovereign national governments. Therefore, until the early nineties the Danish social 
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democrats were among the parties with the lowest support for European integration.458 A 
strongly regulated national market with a sizeable welfare and social transfers implied their 
considering that European integration was a threat to the Danish national interest.  
The re-appreciation of the SD’s position on Europe resulted from changes in the 
European agenda and Jacques Delors’s initiatives leading to regulated capitalism in line with 
European social democratic and Christian democratic traditions.459 The EU became the 
provider of a series of supply-side policies of collective goods. Simultaneously, the SD 
leadership came to realise that national Keynesianism was not a viable option in a globalised 
economic environment where capital is free to move. In 1992 the party elected a new leader, 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and in its 1993 electoral programme the party proceeded to shed 
traditional claims, such as workers’ participation in firms’ decision-making. The abandonment 
of national Keynesianism and the acceptance that all European economic regimes are 
interconnected became part of the programmatic claims of the party. Traditional claims to 
economic democracy, i.e., the belief that workers should have a say in the decision-making 
process of the firms in which they work, was replaced with an insistence on good economic 
governance as the priority of the party. 
After winning office in 1993, the party changed the labour law and performed a 
reform of the tax system. The party seemed to have achieved a new formula for combining 
social justice and effective economic governance after the failure of the Keynesian formula in 
the 1970s and the 1980s.460 The party advocated a retrenchment of unemployment benefits, 
and focused on active labour market policies. The extent and speed of party reinterpretation 
of its economic ethos is illustrated in the change of attitude towards reform of the welfare 
state. In the late eighties the party had refused to support the conservative government 
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attempts to implement a package of tax and labour reforms, aiming at wage moderation. This 
reform was supported by the trade unions. However, after winning office in 1993, the social 
democratic government implemented a series of reforms with the objective of rolling back the 
welfare state.  
Although Eurosceptic factions remain within the SD, the party can today be 
characterised as Hard Europhile.461 The progressive transformation of its stance on the EU 
was shaped by the re-assessment of the impact of EU policies on the national economic 
regime. Since 1992 the SD’s conditional Euroscepticism462 evolved in a consolidated pro-
European attitude. For the Danish social democrats, Europhilism became attractive, feasible 
and consistent with the party’s policy goals. While domestic political calculations have been 
important determinants of the SD’s Europhilism, the change in the party’s position is not mere 
political convenience. The SD’s repositioning on the European issue reflects the 
acknowledgement that the EU provides the most appropriate framework for pursuing many of 
its left-wing objectives.  
 
The Wider Picture  
 
As spelled out in the Introduction, the two sets of hypothesis currently discussed 
in the literature and tested in this thesis derive from different traditions of party analysis: in the 
first parties act as path-dependent and policy-seeking institutions, in the second parties are 
conceived as office-seeking institutions. The literature on party attitudes towards European 
integration has overlooked the necessity of a theorisation that associates the conditions of 
parties’ European attitudes with the wider debates on sources of political party competition. 
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This de-linkage has resulted either in oversimplified or under-specified hypotheses. In this 
thesis I tried to overcome this shortcoming and elaborate the ideological and the strategic 
hypothesis and test them through the application of QCA techniques.  
The ethos theory specifies the conditions of the predominance of parties’ ideology 
while testing for the effects of a specified strategic hypothesis on parties’ European positions. 
This presupposes the primacy of parties’ ideological precepts over their competitive 
strategies; when the strategies and ideologies are in conflict, the conceptions constituting a 
party’s ethos predominate over parties’ competitive considerations. This means that the dual 
imperatives of a party’s internal need for collusion and the conditions of external competition 
are structural elements of political life.463 The preservation of party identity is in the long-term 
predominant over office-driven competitive realities. It appears that parties based on the 
political ethos evaluate European integration according to the compatibility with their 
conception of the political community while parties based on the economic ethos evaluate 
integration according to its compatibility with the national one. 
 
Contribution to the general literature on parties  
 
Beyond the theorisation of parties’ responses to European integration this thesis 
contributes in a fundamental way to the understanding of parties as policy-seeking entities. 
The typology of parties’ ethos on which the theory is founded assumes that parties ultimately 
exist to embody a fundamental political idea, i.e., a conception of the relations between 
individuals and the political community. Every party owes its existence to a fundamental 
notion of the political and economic communities, and these determine parties’ ideological 
positions and policy positions “down the line”. 
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The Rokkanian view of parties as representatives of social groups has been the 
predominant conception of parties as policy-seeking institutions.464 I argue for the 
primordialism of political values, which imply that parties’ ethos are independent of the 
mobilisation and representation of social groups. Parties are ultimately “communities of 
discourse”.465 Thus, modern ideologies are at the origin of party systems and political 
competition and party continuity and stability should be approached not through the prism of 
frozen social conflicts suggested by Rokkan’s theory466 but from the rationale of elite 
ideological consistency. The view that parties’ policy-seeking function ultimately derives from 
the political conceptions materialised at the time of their formation have, since Von Beyme’s 
classification of parties in Familles Spirituelles, been neglected. 
Parties’ path-dependent nature results from the need for coherence with its 
ideological precepts. Beyond attaining office or representing socio-economic groups, political 
parties’ rationality ultimately originates in the basic conceptions of political and economic 
reality. Thus the choices of party leaders are determined by the need for coherence well after 
the initial period of party formation and mobilisation is attained. As “layered” institutions467 
parties can add new functions and policies, rather than replacing the existing ones. This 
makes them able to respond to contemporary concerns by conceiving new appeals and 
policies, provided these are broadly coherent with the conceptual core of their identities. 
The primordial nature of a party’s political and economic identity has a further 
theoretical implication for the discussion of political rationality. At the core of this discussion is 
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the way political ideologies and strategic behaviour interact. The exclusion from the centre is 
in the long-run an unintended consequence of the policy positions deriving from party’s ethos. 
This means that the choice of certain political and economic conceptions may be a structural 
obstacle to participation in centrist politics; identities prevent parties from compromising on 
issues that are institutional or informal preconditions of governmental participation. Parties’ 
core values, as part of the preconditions for political competition, rule over strategic 
considerations. The constraints imposed by core identities on parties’ policy positions 
determine their strategic behaviour. Parties’ polarising behaviour result from the long-term 
correspondence of their policy positions to their political and economic ethos, rather than 
being the realisation of actors’ intentions. An example of such effect is provided by the 
analysis conducted in chapter VI that shows how a nationalist party’s Euroscepticism may in 
the long-run exclude it from centrist politics.  
 
Contribution to the literature on the Europeanization of national political parties 
 
A second theoretical contribution speaks to the literature on the impact of 
Europeanization on political competition. Peter Mair’s 2000 article “The Limited Impact of 
Europeanization on National Party Systems” argues that Europeanization has a very limited 
impact on party systems, both in terms of its format and mechanics.468 The present thesis 
reinforces this statement by suggesting that the European issue is fought along pre-existing 
lines of competition. However, the analysis of European attitudes, party values and 
competitive behaviour suggests that, despite the preponderance of political values, the three 
elements interact, i.e., that the centripetal and ideological transformation of left-wing parties 
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towards Europhilism was facilitated due to the compatibility of their aims with European 
values and policies. This effect is more accentuated in party systems like the Polish, where 
Europeanization and the formation of the party systems have been taking place 
simultaneously. The coincidence of the processes of European accession and transition to 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe reinforces the relationship between Europhilism 
and the formation of the centre of the party system, posing a constraint on the type of viable 
identities. The most obvious effect and the one most accounted for in this thesis is the difficult 
relationship between nationalism and a centrist position.  
The transformation of the ex-communist SLD provides an example of the 
interaction between the creation of an identity and European positions. The SLD’s conversion 
to social democracy resulted in a Hard Europhile stance reinforcing the party’s centripetal 
drive. The need to gain internal and external legitimacy has led the ex-communists to 
condition their transformation to ensure compatibility with the values driving European 
integration. This led to a specific operationalisation of the concept of social justice that 
resembled the outcomes achieved by some of the West European social democratic parties. 
The openness of the Polish ex-communists to the adoption of the principles of European 
social democracy was facilitated by the strong political cosmopolitanism inherited from 
communist ideology.  
 
Contribution to the literature on Central and Eastern European party formation  
 
The third debate to which this thesis contributes to is on whether parties’ 
programmatic choices are the main structuring element of political competition in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The introductory chapter of this thesis depicts the two notions of parties from 
which the two sets of hypotheses tested in this thesis are devised. The test in the Polish case 
of a theory arguing that a party’s core identity provides the long-term anchorage for the 
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party’s subsequent programmatic choices supports those authors that claim value 
commitments to structure political competition against those who argue that catch-all vote-
seeking considerations determine the structuration of party competition.469  
Authors claiming that vote-seeking concerns predominate over value-driven 
considerations argue that the predominant party form is a sort of catch-all party with a very 
light ideological baggage; parties of this nature are successful in catching the centre position 
and achieving office without committing to any form of value-based policies. Party formation is 
a function not of ideological differences “but rather the consequence of fierce battles over 
party leadership, personal aversions among party leaders, and an intolerance of minority 
opinions within the party”.470 Political competition in Central and Eastern Europe is therefore 
shaped mainly by rational vote-seeking actors. 
However, the testing of synergies and antagonisms of ethos and competitive 
strategies conducted in this thesis contradicts this notion and links with Gabor Tóka’s analysis 
of the factors working for the permanence of party-voters linkages in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Tóka states that political identities are not only important for the creation and 
maintenance of parties. The author also demonstrates that parties’ ideological discourses 
contribute to the forging of party-voter loyalties. Formalising and testing hypotheses current in 
the literature,471 Tóka´s analysis concludes that parties’ value-based stances provide for a 
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stable affinity between political elites and voters. Political discourses are then crucial in 
providing the closeness of class relations and voters’ choices. “Value preferences seem to 
provide for relatively more solid, stable basis for enduring partisan attachments.(…) In the 
new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, voters’ willingness to stay with party 
preferences over time is a function of their ‘value voting’ along such dimensions as religious-
secular, left-right, and nationalism-anti-nationalism.” 472 Clear and sharp value-based choices 
are the main factor entrenching voters’ choices in Central and Eastern European countries. 
An empirical-based study by Markowski reinforces this finding, concluding that voters’ values 
and political orientations, rather than pure socio-economic variables, are the best predictors of 
positioning within the left-right political spectrum.473  
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the Polish party system shows the repeated failure of right-wing 
political leaders to create a stable centrist party that integrates nationalist formations. The 
proliferation of Eurosceptic parties on the right of the system is therefore the result of the 
failure to create a united party around a Christian democratic identity. Even when in 
government, nationalist parties or factions continued to oppose European integration. This 
tendency was persistent in right-wing governments, during the 1991-1993 and the 1997-2001 
parliaments. Although the need to be competitive at the governmental level may lead parties 
to try not to oppose European integration openly, nationalists within government coalitions or 
parties are uneasy and rebel against this solution. Therefore, even if Polish right-wing 
coalitions attempted to formulate positions in a way that attempted to obscure contradictions, 
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for example by portraying European integration as an enterprise of Christian nations, in the 
medium and long-term, divergences among liberals and nationalists were magnified by the 
necessity to devise concrete positions on European accession. The splitting of the centre-
right, facilitated by the European issue, freed the space for the victory of the Eurosceptic 
nationalist right. 
A further contribution of this thesis concerns the link between the dominant 
identitary discourse of parties and the contestation of European integration within a political 
system. Political opposition to European integration leads to the debate on Europe being 
fought along the axis on less versus more Europe, rather than what should Europe do.474 In 
Poland the European debate and the positions taken by its governments in negotiations with 
their European counterparts, reflects the salience of sovereignty issues. This is visible in the 
emphasis placed on the government’s negotiating stances on issues such as land acquisition 
by foreigners, declarations of sovereignty on issues of morality and references to the need for 
a return to fundamental values and European spiritual traditions, and the strident opposition to 
altering the voting formula in the Council of Ministers accepted in Nice. All this suggests that 
the European question is framed as a political issue and party responses depend on their 
definition of the political community.  
The reluctance of the Polish to compromise on the issue of voting rights once it 
had been decided at the Nice Intergovernmental Conference is a manifestation of European 
integration being taken hostage by nationalism. The Nice voting formula is regarded by Polish 
political elites as limiting the loss of sovereignty inflicted by accession, and the political class 
was unanimous in its support for the government’s position. The voting formula gained in the 
Nice Treaty was regarded as an assurance that integration remains partially in the hands of 
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the Polish nation. Reluctance to shed sovereignty is natural in a country of the size and 
history of Poland; on the other hand, the submission of the three cosmopolitan ideologies 
which surfaced in the Round Table negotiations in 1989, Catholicism, political liberalism and 
class cosmopolitanism, to an essential nationalist stance, should be explained by the process 
of party formation. The success in creating a centre-left social democratic party is not 
matched by a similar outcome on the centre-right. On the contrary, the centre-right formations 
running for the 2001 elections abandoned the Christian democratic ethos for a liberal 
conservative type of party. Even if this process succeeds it can still be expected that Polish 
participation in European integration would continue to be marked by its troubled past. The 
Polish case also alludes to the effects that the rise of parties with a national ethos is likely to 
bring to the process of political and economic integration across the whole continent.  
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